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ABSTRACT 
 
Between 1890 and the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, nations on both sides of 
the Atlantic attempted to gain prestige by building the world's greatest steamships for 
their merchant marines. In 1901, the United States entered this competition with the 
advent of J.P. Morgan's International Mercantile Marine, which built on the previous 
work of shipping magnate Clement Griscom. This project will explore why and how 
Morgan built his monopoly and the implications and repercussions this project had for 
both Atlantic shipping and U.S. foreign relations. Moving beyond Morgan the man, it 
also tells the story of the key figures in American politics and business that supported 
his venture.  
 To reconstruct this history, this dissertation draws on a wide variety of 
primary source materials. These include archival materials housed at the, University of 
Liverpool and the Ismay-Cheape Family Archives. It also draws from published 
sources, including period newspaper articles, advertising material from the IMM and its 
constituent lines, and political speeches and documents that supported American 
shipping.  
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Although many secondary sources exist on the history of trans-Atlantic liners, 
much of this literature has been written by enthusiastic amateur historians and 
antiquarians. This dissertation, by contrast, makes a more scholarly contribution to this 
field. Influenced by scholarship on the history of U.S. foreign relations and American 
and global capitalism, this dissertation analyzes the history of the trans-Atlantic ferry 
from new angles. In the process, it also makes a new contribution to studies of shipping 
and international politics. While many scholars have examined the link of the race for 
battleships in the lead up to the First World War, professional historians have largely 
ignored the role of commercial super ships in this international rivalry. My project 
begins to correct this oversight.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Launching the Ship of State 
The Origins of a Multinational Corporation 
 
 It was a dark and stormy night in the Belgrave Park area of London on April 
30, 1907 when Lord William Pirrie, chairman of Harland & Wolff Shipyards welcomed 
J. Bruce Ismay, president of the International Mercantile Marine and chairman of the 
White Star Line, into his home. The oppressive fog off the Thames cloaked the evening, 
adding an air of mystery to the proceedings.1 Discussion surrounded the Cunard Line’s 
steamers, Mauretania and Lusitania, and how the International Mercantile Marine could 
top Cunard's achievement. Over the course of the evening, Ismay and Pirrie discussed 
                                                          
1 Monthly Weather Report of the Meteorological Office. Westminster: Wyman and Sons, 
1907. s.v. "April, 1907." http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/archive/monthly-weather-report-
1900s (accessed October 3, 2013). 
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building liners so large, so luxurious, they would cement the White Star Line, a client 
company of IMM, as the leading trans-Atlantic shipping firm for years to come. The 
three new liners would be the last word in comfort and elegance.  
Within a few years, this informal dinner conversation would come to represent 
one of the most important points in the history of North Atlantic shipping and business, 
a watershed moment that ultimately led to the resurgence of the United States merchant 
marine.  The American merchant navy had virtually ceased to exist, except coastally, 
during the 1860s. As business and technology changed over roughly 45 years between 
1860 and Pirrie’s dinner with Ismay in 1907, the American merchant marine was 
reimagined and rebuilt as an international conglomerate. Although the combine they 
built would ultimately fail, the IMM’s rise and fall marked a critical chapter in the 
history and evolution of the American merchant marine.  
§§§ 
In the late 1800s, the Great Powers of the world acquired a new status symbol: 
the ocean liner. Designed not only for utility but also as emblems of nationalism, ocean 
liners carried trade, power, and the flag of their nations around the world. They each 
represented tremendous investments in time, material, and technology. Crossing the 
globe in growing numbers, they were increasingly coveted by nations that did not have 
them. At the same time, they presented nations on the fringes of power with a new 
means to display their status and wealth and to assert their growing political and 
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economic strength. The late 19th and early 20th century growth in shipping both 
reflected, and led to, changing relations between business and government. The 
massive size of the new super ships required improvements of infrastructure, such as 
increasing size of docks, constructing new fueling depots, and staffing repair facilities. 
In some countries, including Great Britain, France and Germany, such needs led to 
government support in the form of subsidies.  
Although the United States lagged behind other nations for much of the 19th 
century, by the late 1890s many American businessmen had developed a renewed 
interest in shipping. Eventually, their pressure prompted the U.S. government to lend 
modest support to American lines as well.2 However, unlike their European rivals, 
American industrialists had to pursue alternate, and in many ways, innovative paths to 
build a new shipping empire. Led by Clement Griscom and then J. P. Morgan, the 
United States reentered the Atlantic and tried to form an ambitious new transnational 
monopoly: the International Mercantile Marine. A Tall Ship asks how and why did 
American businessmen take up this challenge what is the significance of their efforts? 
IMM was the brainchild of Morgan and built upon Griscom’s earlier successes 
forming the International Navigation Company. Griscom wanted to build ships that 
could transport American goods to Europe directly without having to pay foreign 
                                                          
2 Steven Ujifusa, A Man and His Ship: America's Greatest Naval Architect and His Quest to 
Build the SS United States. (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2012), 8-12. 
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shippers. He hoped to drive transport costs down so that American products might be 
more easily introduced in foreign markets, creating demand for American goods. After 
his attempts to build a domestically-owned firm with native built ships foundered 
because of the lack of modern shipbuilding capability and outdated laws, Griscom 
formed the Red Star Line in Belgium, with active support from that nation’s king and 
government. Building on these successes, Griscom expanded his company through the 
purchase of British assets.  
Beginning in 1900, Griscom’s fortunes took another turn, when he sought and 
received financial support from J. P. Morgan. For reasons similar to Griscom’s, Morgan 
had become increasingly interested in a trans-Atlantic monopoly. Between 1900 and 
1905, Morgan bought up controlling stock interests in previously established foreign 
shipping lines. Often Morgan’s purchase price was far above market value, creating an 
asset valuation problem that would haunt IMM throughout its existence. Most of the 
companies Morgan bought were based in Great Britain, with a few others 
headquartered on the continent of Europe. Morgan’s raid of European shipping 
resulted in the direct intervention of the governments of Great Britain and Germany to 
maintain the independence of their merchant marines with varying degrees of success. 
Failure to secure a true monopoly caused intense competition between the British 
government-backed Cunard Line and Morgan’s IMM, resulting in construction of 
bigger and more superlative ships, including most famously the R.M.S. Titanic.  
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Already by the 1910s, however, IMM had begun a slow decline. Loss of the 
Titanic, followed by leadership vacuums at the highest levels of IMM, led to financial 
losses and instability. Although World War I brought a temporary windfall of profits, 
those profits came to an end in 1918 when British ships, released from war service, 
returned to the Atlantic. Additionally, IMM faced competition from the U.S. 
government as ships confiscated from Germany were released for civilian use under 
domestic ownership, usurping IMM’s position as the United States’ merchant marine. 
By the mid-1920s, IMM began selling off its foreign assets, ceasing to be a truly 
international merchant marine. 
The history of the International Mercantile Marine reflects many aspects of the 
economic, ideological, and foreign policy evolution of the United States during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. First, the way IMM was built, primarily through the 
purchase of foreign assets, sometimes at far above their actual value, demonstrated the 
growing power of the American dollar. This was highlighted particularly well, as we 
shall see in later chapters, in the 1901 purchase of the White Star Line. Second, IMM’s 
history reflects a change in American naval ideology, a worldview that included 
commercial as well as military ships. Built on a foundation of the importance of sea 
power promoted by naval theorist Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, policy makers supported 
by the American people, began a program of expansion that encouraged a parallel rise 
in merchant fleet strength. Finally, the rise of IMM illustrates a more ambitious and 
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engaged foreign policy between the United States and the rest of the world in general, 
and Europe in particular, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
Even though the above scope of analysis is a full one, immigration is 
conspicuous for its absence. The transport of European immigrants was a major source 
of income for all the shipping line, and provided an abundant source of labor for 
American factories. Indeed one of the most lasting affect of IMM may be the cultural 
impact of the many people its’ ships brought to Ellis Island. However, adding that story 
to the already complicated and, at times, highly convoluted narrative and analysis of 
business, corporate espionage and government machinations would easily double the 
size of this dissertation. Contributing to this are limited time and resources with which 
to complete the project. For that reason, an analysis of immigration is left for the future.   
Through IMM, the United States became more engaged in an interconnected 
world economy in which nations became strongly interdependent because international 
trade became even more tied to local market places. The history of IMM, in short, offers 
valuable perspectives on the history of the United States and its relations with the 
world. 
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Context of the Times: Formal and Informal Imperialism and the Place of IMM in U.S. 
International Relations 
  
 Historians have long noted the rapid changes that reshaped both U.S. and 
world history during the second half of the 19th century, a process that is now 
commonly referred to as “globalization.” Discussing the years from 1850—1914, Gary 
Magee and Andrew Thompson use the term “globalization” to describe a process in 
which time and space were compressed, accelerating the interdependence of societies 
and states.3  Much of this process was due to imperial pursuits, in which militaristically 
strong nations, such as Great Britain and Germany, took control of weaker regions or 
entire states, such as ports in China or large parts of Africa.4 Others, such as Marc-
William Palen, have pointed to a growing belief at the time in free trade, including 
loosening restrictions on imports and exports between nations. These processes led to 
more interconnected economies, which in turn increased the pace of globalization. Yet 
                                                          
3 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and Globalization: Networks of People 
Goods and Capital in the British world, c. 1850-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 2-4. 
 
4 Jurgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth 
Century World. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), xx – xxi. 
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even as free trade ostensibly increased, its effectiveness relied on imperial power.5 For 
example, the so-called “opening” of China to European and eventually American 
exports—heralded by many at the time as an example of free trade—was built and 
maintained with military intervention.6 
Many historians examining these late 19th and early 20th century shifts focus on 
the beliefs and ideologies of policy makers. Whether grounded in scientific racism, 
nationalism, a sense of civilizing mission, or a combination of these factors, it is the 
ideologies of empire that take center stage in much of the historiography. Of course, 
Edward Said’s Orientalism is a classic in this field. Briefly stated, Said believed that 
Orientalism was a way in which imperial nations, specifically in Europe, viewed, and 
characterized the middle east and Asia. These characterizations, often based on race and 
perceived cultural backwardness – as compared to European defined technological and 
societal advancement – supported colonial ideologies.7  
Since its publication, Said’s analysis has been highly influential and has informed 
many studies of imperialism, including scholarship on the United States. In the time 
                                                          
5 Marc-William Palen, the Conspiracy of Free Trade; The Anglo-American Struggle over 
Empire and Economic Globalization, 1848-1896, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), xvi – xix. 
 
6 Robert Bickers, “Chinese Burns: Britain in China 1842-1900,” History Today, August 
2000, Vol. 50 Issue 8, p10-17, 8p. 
 
7 Edward Said, Orientalism, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 9-12. 
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since his book came out, moreover, a number of authors have examined diverse 
motivations for empire—ideological and otherwise—in the late 19th and early 20th 
century United States.8 Walter Nugent, for one, suggests that American expansion, like 
its European counterpart, was initiated by a search for more resources for both 
agriculture and industry. However, he argues, the motivations were different, at least in 
the view of Americans. Americans saw themselves as “beacons to mankind.” In their 
minds, in other words, American imperialism was desirable because it uplifted those 
areas brought under American control.9 Even though Europeans also believed in the so 
called “white man’s burden” of civilizing what they saw as backwards regions, 
Americans believed they were more humane in pursuing the same mission. Howard 
Jones likewise points out that common Americans bought into the civilizing mission of 
imperialism, reinforced by political and intellectual leaders which led to calls for 
                                                          
8 For more on the American impulse for imperialism see Nathan Jessen, Populism and 
Imperialism: Politics, Culture, and Foreign Policy in the American West, 1890-1900. 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2017; Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism; The 
United States, Great Britain and the Late-Industrializing World Since 1815, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981; Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire; A History of 
American Expansion, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008; Ivan Musicant, Empire by Default: 
The Spanish American War and the Dawn of the American Century, New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1998; Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude 
to Globalization, Berkley: University of California Press, 1999. 
 
9 Nugent, Habits of Empire, xiii – xvi. 
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increased missionary work.10 More recently, historians like Kristin Hoganson (along 
with many others) have introduced and explored the theme of cultural imperialism – 
the practice of changing another nation by introducing goods and services – into the 
debate. Hoganson, a prime example of this cultural turn, argues that the United States 
created an informal empire through business expansion, philanthropy and missionary 
work.11  
 While some historians have focused on how the United States fits into the 
history of imperialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, others have worked to expand 
definitions of empire by considering the categories of formal and informal empire (and 
their relationship to one another). Originating as far back as the 1940s, and gaining 
steam with the work of John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, the concepts of formal 
and informal empire have been debated by historians for many decades.12 Writing in 
1997, John Darwin defines formal empire as a process that includes “explicit transfer of 
sovereignty and, usually, the imposition of direct administrative control.” He further 
defines informal empire as relying “upon the links created by trade, investment or 
                                                          
10  Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1897, 
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 1-3. 
 
11 Kristin L. Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium: The Global Production of American 
Domesticity, 1865-1920, (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1-5. 
 
12 John Gallagher, and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Free Trade." The Economic 
History Review, New Series, 6, no. 1 (1953): 1-15. doi:10.2307/2591017. 
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diplomacy, often supplemented by unequal treaties and periodic armed intervention to 
draw new regions into the world systems of an imperial power.”13 More recently, Peter 
Cain and A. G. Hopkins have refined the concept of informal empire, and the associated 
term “gentlemanly capitalism,” to connect imperialism to financial pursuits that directly 
or indirectly propelled formal imperial projects. They see the motivation for empire as a 
means to cement economic security in an uncertain world, especially in connection to 
events such as the economic depression of the late 19th century.14 While these 
discussions have been focused on explaining British imperialism, many of the 
arguments can and have been applied to American imperial activities as well.15  
April Merleaux's Sugar and Civilization, for instance, examines the role of 
corporations in expanding American influence, showing this as an example both formal 
and informal empire simultaneously. Focusing in on the sugar industry, Merleaux 
examines how sugar investors used new corporation laws to control United States sugar 
                                                          
13 John Darwin, "Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial 
Expansion." The English Historical Review 112, no. 447 (1997): 614-42. 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/576347. 
 
14 P. J. Cain, and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2015, third Edition, (London: 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016), 2, 7-10, 36-39.  
 
15 A. G. Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History, (Princeton; Princeton University 
Press, 2018). Hopkins. Having moved to the University of Texas at Austin, followed up 
his studies of British imperialism with one on the United States. His book examines U.S. 
imperialism over its history and compares it to British imperial projects over the same 
time.  
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manufacturing through a holding firm in New Jersey. Importantly Merleaux examines 
the interaction between nation-states and ostensibly private business.16 Likewise, Jason 
Colby’s Business of Empire examines the rise of the United Fruit company in the 
Caribbean. Colby points out that United Fruit became the most power economic entity 
in the region, becoming an imperial project because of its corporate nature, rather than 
active support of Washington policies.17 Other scholars, including Hoganson, William 
Leach, and Lizabeth Cohen, have called attention to the links between mass 
consumerism in the United States and U.S. commercial exploits abroad. Between the 
purchasing power of common Americans and growth of American business interests, as 
these and other authors show, informal empire became the primary form of American 
expansion as consumers sought new products and business sought new markets. The 
American economy and its ability to shape national and international policy is thus a 
running theme in the story of American empire. Together, these and other scholars have 
advanced important new perspectives, helping scholars understand how the United 
States developed as a global, imperial power.18  
                                                          
16 April Merlaux, Sugar and Civilization: American Empire and the Cultural Politics of 
Sweetness (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 10, 16-17. 
 
17 Jason Colby, The business of Empire: United Fruit, race, and U. S. Expansion in central 
America (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 2011), 3-5. 
 
18 For more on the power of the American economy, consumerism, informal and 
American empire see Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political 
Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico During U.S. Colonialism, (Durham: Duke 
13 
 
This newer reading of imperialism, which includes formal and informal empire, 
is part of a larger historiography with which A Tall Ship enters into conversation. 
Morgan's IMM stands out as a major project of financial expansion, and it served in 
many ways as a tool of informal empire. Morgan's IMM used a structure that is familiar 
to discussions of economic imperialism: a corporation, in this case based in New Jersey, 
held controlling interests in firms in several foreign nations. This new combine had to 
engage in negotiations with heads of state or their representatives to do business. Like 
other imperial projects, IMM also concentrated economic and political power within the 
hub of an imperial network.  
These similarities between Morgan's attempted takeover of the Atlantic and 
more obvious imperial projects have been virtually ignored by historians. Part of the 
reason this dissertation argues, is the power relationships at play between the parties 
involved. Unlike smaller countries in the Caribbean or Central America, Great Britain 
and other nations in Europe had the power to resist formal U.S. imperialism as defined 
by Darwin, Gallagher, Robinson and others. Morgan simply could not expect U.S. 
armed forces to support his bid to build an Atlantic monopoly, nor could he expect 
European nations to be intimidated by political power or industrial imbalances. 
                                                          
University Press), 2003; Katherine C. Grier, Culture and Comfort: Parlor Making and 
Middle Class Identity, 1850-1930, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 2007; 
William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power and the Rise of a New American Culture 
(New York; Pantheon Books), 1993;  Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth 
Century, (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press), 1995. 
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However, he could rely on American economic power—the power of the dollar—to 
create inroads to otherwise impenetrable competing empires. Morgan used his 
overwhelming financial resources to offer more profit to European shipping owners 
faster than they could have otherwise realized. Through investments, he was able to 
bring foreign assets under American control, a process very much in line with Darwin’s 
definition of informal empire.  
At the same time, however, it is equally important to note the differences 
between IMM and other types of imperial relationships. Political and corporate leaders 
in Great Britain and Germany worked to limit Morgan’s influence once they realized his 
plan. Cunard Line, Britain’s last remaining major steamship company after the 
purchase of White Star Line in 1901, had a financial foundation strong enough to 
withstand Morgan’s overtures of buy out. Parliamentary intervention gave Cunard’s 
British stockholders an alternative that no Caribbean, Pacific, or African target of 
imperialism could ever enjoy. Likewise, personal intervention from Kaiser Wilhelm II 
and the strength of the German economy maintained the independence of German 
shipping as well. In the face of this kind of opposition, Morgan and his investors had to 
accept “no” as an answer to their economic pursuits. This was simply not the case in 
any other example of formal imperial projects.  
 Jenifer Van Vleck's Empire of the Air illustrates more clearly how American’s 
informal empire flourished with regards to transportation technologies; though focused 
15 
 
on the mid-20th century, her work presents a useful model for thinking about IMM’s 
history. Much like the ocean liners of the 19th and early 20th centuries, airplanes 
revolutionized travel and business and expanded American influence. The rapid 
transport and growing omnipresence of American products and culture served to 
“Americanize” regions all over the world at a faster rate. Unlike the great liners, 
airplanes created a truly global economy and transfer of ideas because of their ability to 
touch the most remote locations inaccessible to the sea.  
Yet as this dissertation argues, this process did not begin with the “ascendancy of 
American aviation.” Years before the Wright Brothers ever flew their first test flight, the 
liners and super lines of IMM and other firms began this process of exchange, by 
bringing ever increasing amounts of goods and people to new markets and locations 
often with both positive and negative repercussions. Van Vleck’s observations about the 
simultaneously creative and destructive nature of air power, moreover, can also be 
applied to the shipping industry.19 Specifically, although Morgan's enterprise attempted 
to create an American-owned and operated merchant marine, it did so at the expense of 
the European shipping industry. Britain saw a considerable amount of its shipping 
industry swallowed by the American corporation, eventually leading to parliamentary 
debates and action over the matter.  
                                                          
19 Jennifer Van Vleck, Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendency, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).  
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In comparison to the ethical and philosophical foundations of empire, the 
importance of technology and infrastructure highlighted in Van Vleck’s book have 
received relatively less attention in the historiography. In more recent years, however, 
scholars have begun to explore these material factors of empire in more detail. Michael 
Adas, for example, points out that for many Europeans and Americans, technological 
advancement became the yard stick by which civilizations were measured.20 Likewise, 
Dwayne Winseck and Robert Pike point out the effects of technological communication 
improvements that helped insure stable lines of information. Specifically, they examine 
the proliferation of cable networks that provided telegram service to far off locations, 
binding together remote locations more closely together into imperial networks.21 
Stephen Kern and Vanessa Ogle, meanwhile, show that these new inventions redefined 
time and space. Prior to the revolutions in communications technology, colonies were 
not just distant but remote, meaning that communications and reaction to local events 
could take months or even years. The advent of the telegraph and telephone, however, 
allowed rapid response with increased material resource support. Telephones brought 
                                                          
20 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, technology, and Ideologies of 
Western Dominance, with a New Preface, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, rpr. 2014), 
xiv; Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing 
Mission (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006). 
 
21 Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication and Empire: Media Markets, 
and Globalization, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 3-7.  
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instant information; its ring was sudden and demanded instant attention, with fast 
reactions.22 As these scholars show, without the changes in technology, the rapid 
deployment and responses that made late 19th century imperialism successful on a 
global scale could not have happened. It was European technological dominance, 
especially in oceanic transport, that allowed Great Britain, France, and other European 
powers a head start to begin largescale, worldwide imperialist adventures in the 19th 
century. 
While much of this scholarship is focused on European, specifically British, 
expansion and empire, a number of scholars have also explored American expansionist 
endeavors. For many years, historians of U.S. foreign relations argued that the U.S. 
government maintained an inward-looking policy throughout the 19th century, leading 
up to the Wars of 1898. Presuming that policymakers at the time followed the course of 
neutrality and non-engagement that George Washington laid out in his Farewell 
Address, historians like Samuel Flagg Bemis perpetuated the idea of an “isolationist” 
19th century United States.23 
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In recent decades, however, a new generation of scholars has overturned that 
line of argument, demonstrating the myriad ways in which the United States was, in 
fact, connected with the 19th century world, particularly toward the last quarter of the 
19th century. Glen Jeansonne points out numerous interactions in diplomacy dating 
from the administration of Benjamin Harrison.24 Howard Jones points to Lincoln’s 
successful diplomatic strategies to keep Britain and France from recognizing the 
Confederacy during the 1860s.25 Walter Nugent documents a long history of American 
interaction with other nations dating from 1782 through the present.26 Together, these 
historians and many others  have laid bare the myth of 19th century isolationism.27 A Tall 
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Ship continues this dialog by examining American interaction during the period of 
supposed isolation from the rest of the world. Indeed, interactions like those of Morgan 
helped set the foundation of what has been termed the “American Century” of the 
1900s and were an early sign of growing economic strength.  
 
Growing Economic Power: Revolutions in Industrialization and Transportation and 
the Development of IMM 
 
During the late 1800s, the United States experienced a second industrial 
revolution. New products and patented goods flooded the market. Inventors like 
Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell became household names as their new 
devices fueled production of new goods and services. At the same time, as both 
continental expansion and urbanization continued, new cities were built that required 
infrastructure, housing, household items, food and much more. The explosion of new 
goods invented in the late 19th century, such as the phonograph, telephone, and many 
labor-saving devices, found eager markets across the country and around the world. 
The money brought in by these products strengthened the American economy so much 
that it rivaled—and soon surpassed—many of the longest standing industrial powers in 
Europe.  
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A major part of this economic expansion came from the railroads, as historian 
Richard White has shown in his analysis of the growth of American railroads and the 
evolving business of transportation. As White argues, the expansion of railroads in the 
mid-19th century changed the nature of business. Railroads allowed new products to be 
distributed to wider markets, increased profits for businesses while encouraging 
consumerism, and allowed for further expansion. By the mid-19th century, railroads and 
related industries received major financial support from investors and were sustained 
by booming markets created by a large population. American entrepreneurs built 
railroads and invested heavily in industry, sustained by a booming population, the 
result of both natural growth and immigration. Indeed, the contribution of the railroads 
to American economic expansion can hardly be overestimated.  
Yet the success of railroads was not only due to private investment and 
enterprise. Much like successful European shipping lines that received governmental 
support through subsidies and the renovation and extension of port facilities, railroad 
owners often received subsidies and government support to expand rail networks, 
shipping hubs and repair infrastructure. By the late 1860s, thanks in large part to these 
subsidies, transcontinental railroads connected the East and West coasts. As White 
notes, the transcontinental railroads existed because of support from the state. 
"Government subsidized them, secured their rights of way, regulated them, and 
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protected them.”28 Once built, the railroads integrated new and existing settlements into 
the United States economy by exporting local products and importing goods from 
across the country.29 With tremendous internal markets, the United States had 
supported its own economic expansion throughout much of the 19th century, limiting 
overseas colonial expansion as compared to European powers during the same period. 
As U.S. territorial expansion culminated in the continental West, the search for new, 
overseas markets became more important to U.S. entrepreneurs. 
In many ways, the history of the railroad industry in the mid-19th century United 
States mirrored the evolution of the shipping industry later in that century. It also helps 
explain why Griscom, an investor in railroads and shipping, as well as his successor, J. 
P. Morgan, believed a merchant marine could be built from scratch: they had done it 
with railroads earlier.  In terms of business, credit rather than capital formed the 
foundation for railroad construction. As White discusses at length, the use of bond sales 
to finance the construction of hundred-mile increments of the transcontinental railroad. 
These bonds were sold to investors who expected to receive dividends based on the 
operations of the completed railroads.30 Here again, a remarkable similarity exists 
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between American expansion in the Atlantic to the railroads. In preparing to finance the 
construction of the massive Olympic class liners, Morgan's IMM offered bonds to the 
public. While the railroad bonds were made convertible into federal bonds to attract 
buyers, IMM's bonds attracted buyers based on the previous history of the constituent 
shipping lines that Morgan purchased to build his conglomerate.  
Another similarity to American railroads included the horizontal and vertical 
integration that had proved so vital to the railroad expansion. One of Morgan's key 
partners in bringing together his combine was Lord William Pirrie, chairman of 
Harland & Wolff Shipyards. Harland & Wolff's important role in IMM is frequently 
ignored. In much of the existing historiography, Harland & Wolff is discussed in 
relation to the White Star Line, a British shipping company that later became the 
flagship line of IMM. Roy Anderson's White Star, Robin Gardiner's History of the White 
Star Line and Wilton Oldham's The Ismay Line examine the White Star Line in depth, but 
they too tend to stop at a cursory look at the relationship with Harland & Wolff 
Shipyards.31 The development of technology, subsidies, the nature of competition and 
international policy or monopoly is left almost entirely unexplored. This leaves an 
incomplete picture of the forces that produced the Olympic class ships. A Tall Ship 
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rectifies this omission by bringing all these disparate subjects into one dissertation 
focused on an industry long ignored by historians.  
 Andrew Porter's Victorian Shipping, Business and Imperial Policy is one of the 
few books that demonstrates the similarity between shipping and the railroads.32 In fact, 
Porter directly connects the growth of Britain's railroads to maritime expansion; the 
ability to bring more exports to coastal ports faster supported local manufacturers’ role 
in international commerce.33 Porter's work focuses on the Castle Line, a British firm 
founded by Donald Currie that primarily served ports along the West African coast. It 
details the use of subsidies in the growth of the shipping business and how a deft 
businessman brought that together with a growing market in South Africa that required 
shipping services. Much like the railroads, the Castle Line's expansion in South Africa 
sponsored economic growth by regularly bringing building materials, mail and other 
resources necessary for expansion. Porter’s book highlights the importance of 
government subsidies for expansion of the shipping industry. Routinely, Currie built 
bigger and faster ships to maintain mail subsidies offered by the government. The 
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subsidies then increased which encouraged the construction of faster ships forming a 
self-sustaining cycle.34  
Subsidies – and more frequently the lack of them – play an important part in the 
history of IMM. Just as both Porter and White show how generous subsidies insured the 
survival of growing concerns, A Tall Ship demonstrates how the lack of similar 
subsidies hindered American entry into Atlantic shipping, providing to the existing 
scholarship a new way of looking at American shipping and the challenges it faced. It 
also explores the ways that Griscom and Morgan differed from their predecessors in the 
railroad business, for example by exploring how they dealt with international entities 
rather than a single federal government. 
 While it contributes to the historiography of transportation and economic 
expansion generally, A Tall Ship, of course, also contributes to the history of ocean liners 
more specifically. Existing ocean liner scholars such as John M. Brinnin and John 
Maxtone-Graham, both authors on the North Atlantic trade, tend to focus on the ships 
themselves, offering social histories of the people who sailed and worked them.35 
Stephen Fox's Transatlantic focuses more on business history and technical innovation, 
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examining the influence of Samuel Cunard and others.36 However, he leaves aside most 
of the financial machinations that went into the creation of the International Mercantile 
Marine and its implications on shipping. Steven Ujifusa's A Man and His Ship also 
briefly touches on business history, but like other authors, his focus lays elsewhere, in 
this case the construction of the S.S. United States of 1951. In working his way to the 
1950s, however, Ujifusa discusses the difficulties in funding the Olympic class and the 
intense international rivalry that existed between shipping.37 A Tall Ship expands on this 
existing scholarship by describing that competition and examining the extremes to 
which the shipping companies went to war with each other. The corporate espionage 
that existed during the formation of IMM has not been detailed in previous accounts 
either, and adds significantly to the historiography of transnational business.   
A Tall Ship also connects IMM to studies of the early 20th century origins of 
globalization. To create his monopoly, Morgan relied on purchasing existing foreign 
shipping firms and bringing them under American ownership. The lack of 
infrastructure in the United States to build modern steel ships created a considerable 
obstacle to Morgan's project, but it was not insurmountable. Morgan could and did 
create a self-supporting combine, much like his railroad monopolies thus alleviating a 
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need for shipbuilding facilities in the U.S. Once created, Morgan’s monopoly helped 
bring American products, culture and more to Europe in ever increasing amounts. As 
consumerism grew, demand for American products grew. The growing American 
culture and industrial dominance was even noted at the time.38 The International 
Mercantile Marine played a role in this process, and A Tall Ship brings its vital history 
into conversation with existing scholarship.  
 
The Influence of Alfred Mahan on Commercial Affairs: IMM as a Complement to the 
History of Naval Expansion 
 
While the economic power of the United States grew, Admiral Alfred Mahan 
promoted the expansion of the country’s nautical power. While primarily known for his 
military advocacy, Mahan also encouraged the expansion of the merchant marine for 
the purposes of economic strength and diplomacy. After promoting his ideas for more 
than a decade, Mahan watched as the Spanish-American War of 1898 erupted, a conflict 
that seemed to validate many of Mahan’s ideas to both the American people and policy 
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makers. The swift and overwhelming victory of American forces led to increased 
popular support for nautical expansion, support that was encouraged by literature, 
household goods and even games. General press books and other ephemera 
personalized the conflict for people far away from the theater of war while a market 
grew for memorabilia related to Admiral George Dewey, commander of American 
naval forces in the Pacific. A tour of his flagship, U.S.S. Olympia which is docked in 
Philadelphia, provides indications of his personal renown. For instance, where Dewey 
stood during the battle of Manila Bay is marked by a brass plate. This growing acclaim 
for naval heroes and events was not lost on policy makers. From President McKinley to 
congressmen and local clubs were established, and policy began to take shape that 
supported expansion and set up modest (at least compared to Europe) government 
support for mercantile shipping growth. However, this was only after a long period of 
neglect.  
A generation prior to the 1870s and '80s, the United States fought a destructive 
internal war, one of the effects of which was the loss of its merchant marine. The 
massive war fleet it had built up in the 1860s, once one of the most powerful and 
technologically advanced in the world, had rusted and rotted in obsolescence by the 
1880s. At roughly the same time, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) started publishing 
his ideas on naval power. The world soon took note. Mahan believed that a strong navy 
and merchant marine were key to a nation's wellbeing. In his best known work, The 
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Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan argued that nations rise and fall in war and 
peace based on their strength at sea.39 Yet as historian Jon Sumida points out, merchant 
marines were just as important to Mahan as naval strength.40 Indeed, according to 
Mahan, part of the reason Napoleon's France failed was the inability to effectively use 
maritime trade to harness support from overseas colonies and trade partners.41 
Sumida's emphasis on Mahan's ideas on commerce form a foundation for the argument 
of this dissertation. As primary documentation and secondary sources reveal, it is clear 
that Mahan's arguments were not lost on Americans, nor on the leaders of other nations 
of the world who sought to increase their status in the 1880s and 1890s.42  
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As historian Roger Parkinson notes, by 1889 American policy makers began 
taking the idea of an oceanic navy seriously, turning away from old naval doctrines 
based primary on coastal defense and commerce raiding. Even before this, in 1885, 
American naval cadets trained at Glasgow and Greenwich, Royal Navy bases in Great 
Britain.43 Parkinson’s arguments are significant because they show a growing interest in 
international naval affairs prior to the Spanish American War, which is often recognized 
as the point at which United States naval policy took an international turn. This 
supports other historians such a Paul Kennedy and Dirk Bönker who analyze the 
growth, increased professionalism, and innovation of navies around the world during 
the 1880s and 1890s.44 While Kennedy concentrates on the British and American navies 
and the technological changes of the era, Bonker discusses the new professionalism and 
rivalry of the era, especially concerning the Imperial German Navy and the American 
Navy, and examines the influence of Mahan on policy makers. Together, this recent 
scholarship reflects a subtler reading of Mahan that looks deeper than the overt 
imperialism of establishing bases to spread military power.  
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Bonker, Parkinson, and other scholars also focus on the technological changes 
within the more professionalized, bureaucratized navies of the world. For instance, the 
ships that fought at Trafalgar in 1805 were not all that different than ships that fought in 
the Anglo-Dutch War of the 1660s, in terms of construction. However, during the 1870s, 
'80s, and '90s, technology changed incredibly rapidly in areas such as armor, 
propulsion, watertight integrity, and more. At the same time, navies benefitted from 
growth in the bureaucratization of government, which created professional 
administrations that controlled logistics, personnel, and public relations.45  
For all their value, these naval histories largely ignore an element that Mahan 
believed equally important to a nation’s strength: the existence of a strong merchant 
marine. While Bönker and Parkinson focus on national navies, their arguments could 
well be extended to the private shipping sector, and to the new professionalism and 
competition that redefined it. Like the warships they discuss, merchant ships 
experienced a rapid evolution of technology in the 1880s and 1890s. Ships evolved 
radically while, at the same time, the business of shipping transformed into a massive 
bureaucracy so connected to government that shipping lines almost became 
government departments themselves. This dissertation adds to those analyses by 
looking at the merchant marine through a similar lens as military historians have 
viewed the U.S. Navy.   
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 While Mahan and others, including Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore 
Roosevelt, attempted to renew the U. S. Navy, Clement Griscom, a Pennsylvania 
businessman, began to build American shipping lines that evolved into an attempt to 
build a North Atlantic transport monopoly. That led to the construction of massive 
ships because of intense competition between Morgan’s IMM, Britain’s Cunard and 
other shipping firms on the European continent. This dissertation brings these events 
into conversation by tying together the threads of technological development, the 
evolution of business, and the changing relationships between business and the U.S. 
government. While my dissertation focuses on the civilian merchant marine, Mahan's 
prolific writing created support for expanded maritime participation and provided the 
initial spark of interest in all things maritime for the American people.  
Given their importance to the development of commercial shipping, it is worth 
returning to Mahan’s own theories and analyzing them in greater detail, exploring the 
elements of his writings that other scholars have neglected. Although he never found 
fame as a commander at sea, Mahan reshaped history and foreign relations as a scholar, 
commentator, theorist, and critic of naval policy. Historians have sometimes depicted 
Alfred T. Mahan solely as a proponent of imperialism and expansion; Mahan's writings, 
however, indicate a far more nuanced, internationalist worldview. From the 1880s 
through the early 1900s, Mahan promoted the use of navies as instruments of foreign 
policy by nations in general and the United States in particular. Though he modified his 
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theories considering events such as the Spanish American and Sino-Japanese wars, 
Mahan emphasized three major themes throughout his lifetime. 
  First, Mahan enthusiastically promoted external trade. Using examples from 
history, such as the Southern Confederacy and Napoleon's France, Mahan documented 
the importance of trade to the survival of a nation at war. Secondly, he wanted to end 
American both political and economic isolationism. Mahan encouraged more 
interaction in the wider world. The fact that new technology made distance less of an 
obstacle was not lost on him. Greater interaction with the world simply could not be 
avoided as economies became more intermingled. Ignoring this, Mahan recognized, did 
not change the reality of the situation and encouraged a change in U.S. foreign policy to 
become more proactive in world events. Finally, he wanted to form alliances with other 
naval powers to act in concert to deter aggression. The growth of new expansionist 
nations, particularly Imperial Japan, caused Mahan concern.46 In Mahan's view, 
alliances with nations which had similar interests allowed nations to minimize 
expenditures without losing defensive integrity.47  
 In his The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan described the dominance 
of French land-based trade and the its failure to take advantage of foreign and sea borne 
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trade. "With all her natural gifts,” he wrote, “France wasted away because of want of 
that lively intercourse between the different parts of her own body and constant 
exchange with other people, which is known as commerce, internal and external."48 
Mahan was correct. Napoleon instituted his "Continental System," which attempted to 
prevent British goods entering Europe, but also crippled smaller nations on the 
continent. As Britain invaded Europe, trade began in Portugal, Spain and other places 
constricting French continental trade as Britain gained allies and trade partners.49 
Potentially, Mahan warned, this fate could befall the United States should it enter a war.  
 Mahan did not just apply his ideas to historical events. As a veteran of the 
United States Navy, he maintained an interest in the Navy and the issues under which 
its personnel labored. His work appeared in newspapers and magazines across the 
country. In an article written in 1890, Mahan addressed the need of entering the world 
market, not only for economic prosperity and growth, but for security. In the same 
article, which was later published together with others in book form, he suggested that 
even if the United States did not actively pursue international trade, rivalry from other 
great powers would eventually bring the United States into conflict with them as 
foreign powers entered American markets.50  
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 While stressing the importance of trade and commerce, Mahan did not 
neglect the importance of defense. Still, trade formed the central foundation of his 
concern. Throughout his writings, Mahan emphasized the importance of strong 
international commerce, usually connecting it to national defense. He considered trade 
beneficial but pointed out that it also brought certain risks. For instance, though he 
favored the construction of the Panama Canal, its potential greatly worried Mahan. The 
canal would bring untold trade opportunities, allowing the rapid transport of goods 
from the Atlantic to Pacific oceans while cutting travel time and costs. At the same time, 
it would become a strategic resource that European colonial powers might covet to the 
point of conflict to control it. Mahan suggested that while the United States was isolated 
by custom and distance, the canal would bring aggressive European powers much 
closer much more frequently than in the past.51 "In our present state of 
unpreparedness,” he argued, "a trans-isthmian canal will be a military disaster to the 
United States and especially to the Pacific coast."52 In other words, if it was going to be 
built, such a canal would need to be defended.  
While concerned with the future of a Panamanian canal, Mahan also worried 
about the Sandwich Islands and the entirety of the Pacific coast. The U.S. position in 
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Hawaii provided a base from which trade and a defensive umbrella in the Pacific Ocean 
could be expanded. Writing in 1893, Mahan pointed out that Hawaii was the same 
distance from San Francisco as it was from foreign outposts in the Gilbert, Marshall, 
Samoan, Society and Marquesas island chains. Their importance, he suggested, could 
not be overstated.53 The Hawaiian Islands could serve as a trade port, coaling station, 
naval base, center of alliance-building and more.54 And while these ports could easily be 
fortified, he observed that the historical precedents of fortified islands not supported by 
naval fleets being snatched away from the controlling powers by foreign aggressors.55  
The Spanish-American War provided examples of Mahan's idea in both the 
civilian and military realms. As historian Thomas Schoonover observes, the war 
represented a transfer of leadership dominance in Asia at the expense of European 
powers and even Japan. Further, he notes that this was not an aberration but part of 
longstanding American policy that promoted interaction around the world, particularly 
in economics circles and primarily focused on the Pacific.56  
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  While the U.S. government entered the Spanish American War due to economic 
issues and public pressures over concerns largely independent of rebuilding the navy 
and merchant marine, the war provided an arena in which U.S. nautical strength could 
be tested.57 The war erupted over several fault lines, including American investors who 
wanted their businesses protected and the American public that became outraged over 
atrocities committed by the Spanish against Cuban civilians.58 This was the first war in 
which the United States faced off with a European power since fighting the British in 
the War of 1812. One of the important aspects of the Spanish-American War was that it 
was primarily a war on the seas, much in the form that Alfred Mahan suggested major 
future wars would be fought. In terms of testing international strength and gaining 
support at home for nautical expansion, the war came at a fortuitous time for Mahan’s 
theories.  
After war broke out in the spring of 1898, U.S. troops boarded ships in Tampa, 
San Francisco, or San Diego for transport to Cuba or the Philippines. At the same time, 
modern American warships fought the Spanish Royal Navy at places such as Manila 
Bay and Santiago de Cuba. Unlike prior wars, heroes that Americans read about back 
home had titles like admiral and commodore more often than general or colonel. In the 
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aftermath of the conflict, popular press books painted heroic pictures of drama on the 
high seas.59 In the weeks and months following the successful war, Alfred Mahan 
enjoyed even greater renown now that his ideas appeared to have been confirmed. This 
propelled the people of the United States to support construction of a new and modern 
navy, as well as adding prestige to the validated Mahan.60 In his Lessons of the War with 
Spain and Other Articles, Mahan outlined the experiences of the military in prosecuting 
the war, and emphasized the validations of his own ideas.61 At the same time, policy 
makers seemed to be taking his lessons to heart.  
In an 1899 message to Congress, President William McKinley listed the 
achievements of the Navy and detailed them as having always "maintained the spirit 
and high efficiency which have always characterized that service." Additionally, he 
noted, "The Nation has equal pride in its early and later achievements," and quickly 
followed up that the "people are interested in the continued preparation and prestige of 
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the Navy." Drawing on that support, McKinley discussed "early and later 
achievements" of the Navy without any specific detail. While exaggerating national 
interest in the navy prior to this time, he concluded by urging special legislation to fund 
the enlargement of the navy.62  
Around the same time, publications and clubs appeared highlighting American 
naval triumphs and urging expansion. Henry Beck's Cuba's Fight for Independence and 
War with Spain, one of many titles examining the war, was published immediately after 
the end of hostilities.63 Beck, primarily an author of local histories in the United States, 
wrote for popular audiences rather than for academics. Even so, his book provided a 
great deal of information on the military forces involved, especially in comparing and 
contrasting the abilities of the Spanish and U.S. navies. He gave biographical 
information on naval commanders from both sides as well as a directory of ships in the 
fleets. He also listed every ship in the American fleet, giving their complete 
characteristics and even commanding officers.64 The book supported and justified a 
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growing navy through its documentation of the importance of the navy in the 
prosecution of the war. 
Beck examined all of the naval battles that occurred during the war in detail. The 
battle of Santiago de Cuba, for example, was written in very lurid style. Beck began his 
narrative with the raising of the flag on the St Louis' mast as the crew was drummed to 
quarters. He followed this with a description of the ship sailing closer and closer to 
Spanish forts as shelling grows in intensity.65 Likewise, he trumpeted Admiral Dewey's 
actions at manila Bay with words such as "superb," "unrivalled performance," during 
"one of the most note-worthy battles ever fought in all the world."66 Additionally, the 
book was liberally illustrated with both artist renderings and photos of ships and 
personnel.  
It was not only the "great men" and ships that Beck lionized, however. He also 
chronicled the story of common sailors, further romanticizing the idea of maritime 
might. Alongside the high-ranking officers whom he profiled, low ranking officers and 
common sailors also made an appearance. Ensign Worth Bagely, a 26-year-old North 
Carolina native, became the first American to die in battle during the war. Beck spent 
two pages outlining Bagely's life, including his ancestry.67 By providing examples of 
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common people serving during the war, Beck connected the reader to the profiled 
person inviting the reader to imagine themselves in the midst of the battle, thereby 
becoming a sailor by proxy and a participant in American naval victories.   
Beck's book and others like it vividly depicted U.S. Navy exploits during the war, 
allowing the American people to take part in building a proud naval heritage, at least in 
terms of showing their popular support. This theme continued with books like Splendid 
Deeds of American Heroes on Sea and Land. Editor Bishop Samuel Fallows and his co-
authors chronicle the "glorious naval and military events from Washington to Dewey." 
Interestingly, the book made naval history its primary focus, emphasizing the increased 
prestige of American naval exploits.68 Books like those by Beck and Fallows worked in 
tandem with the writings of Mahan. While the naval theorist presented doctrine and 
policy objectives in academic detail, Beck and Fallows offered heroic stories that ignited 
the imagination with stories of high adventure on the world's oceans. Nautical 
expansion, in short, potentially appealed to the nautical expert as well as the novice.  
While these books proliferated, the Navy League of the United States (formed in 
1902 and still in existence today) was established, and its members created their own 
maritime boosting materials. The Navy League published its own book, A Short History 
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of the American Navy, in 1907, which detailed the U.S. Navy's history from the American 
Revolution through the present day.69 The organization's express purpose was to "... 
acquire and spread before the citizens of the country information as to the condition of 
the U.S. Naval forces and ships and to awaken public interest and activity in all matters 
tending to aid, improve and develop the efficiency of the Navy." Interestingly, though it 
focused on the Navy, the League’s membership demonstrated the connection with 
civilian interests. The Navy League boasted J. P. Morgan, creator of the International 
Mercantile Marine, as an honorary vice president and his son-in-law, Herbert L. 
Satterlee, as councilor at law. Theodore Roosevelt, too, served as an honorary member.70 
In a pamphlet published in 1907, the Navy League boasted a membership of 4,500.71 
Perhaps due in part to their influence, by the eve of World War I, the Navy Department 
frequently answered letters asking about naval preparedness by chambers of 
commerce, local clubs and common citizens.72 
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 Naval affairs and shipping even found their way into popular entertainment. 
Parker Brothers, founded in 1883, produced no less than five board games based on the 
war. The War in Cuba, (1897) portrayed the Cuban rebellion from Spain. The other four – 
The Battle of Manila (1898), The Siege of Havana (1898), The Blockade Runner (1899), and 
Dewey's Victory: Never Beaten (1900) – all allowed players to command ships running 
missions during the war. Although simplistic – two of the games featured wooden 
"shells" that could be "fired" at the Spanish fleet – they brought the naval battles of the 
Spanish American war inside the American home. Advertising showed families around 
a table playing the games together.73 Even today, a casual Google search of Spanish 
American War popular goods will result in a plethora of items, many of which center 
on the fame and exploits of the Navy. Admiral George Dewey was immensely popular. 
Aside from envelopes, pictures and other paper ephemera, his likeness appeared on 
plates, glass jugs, souvenir spoons, butter dishes shaped like battleships, and even 
candy molds.74 Likewise, his flagship Olympia, enjoyed equal popularity. Even today, 
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model kits of Olympia are available, some with original manufacturing dating from 
1959, only three years after the ship became a museum in Philadelphia.75  
 Individually, these books, organizations, letters from common Americans, 
and popular media might not appear all that important. Collectively, however, their 
varied nature and continued production throughout the late 19th and early 20th century 
United States points to a wide spread market based on a growing interest in maritime 
affairs. As later chapters will show, this enthusiasm continued into the first decade of 
the 20th century, with newspapers and magazines featuring design details of major 
ocean liners, in places as far from the Atlantic as Salt Lake City and California. The tone 
of the articles remained positive and supportive of maritime expansion until the Titanic 
disaster of 1912, at which point authors began to question the wisdom of constructing 
super liners.  
As popular enthusiasm for the idea of the Navy grew in the early 20th century, 
the actual course of naval events after the 1898 War with Spain followed much of the 
path Mahan had suggested. The United States continued to build up its fleet after the 
war. Between 1900 and 1907 sixteen new battleships joined the fleet.76 At the same time, 
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under the leadership of J. P. Morgan, the United States merchant marine grew by huge 
proportions. Although largely benefiting by buying out British and European shipping 
lines, American cargo now left American ports on American-owned ships.77 This helped 
solidify American power along the lines that Mahan had suggested, especially after the 
First World War dramatically weakened both the U.K. and Germany. Stated another 
way, Mahan had called upon the United States to build up its navy and merchant 
marine, build alliances, and establish coaling stations, and enter foreign markets to 
increase international trade. Griscom and Morgan attempted to do just this for the 
civilian side.  
 Mahan's success as a writer, followed by his apparent validation through the 
Spanish-American War, led to increased popular support for nautical expansion. 
Although this support offered a vital cultural enthusiasm for maritime expansion, 
another factor—the growth and evolution of business in the United States—provided 
the actual ability to expand American shipping and potentially compete with 
longstanding maritime power Great Britain, whose shipping lines dominated most of 
the world's oceans. The history of the American railroad industry, as well of recent 
histories in American economic and imperial expansion, offers the necessary context for 
the business aspects of this new interest in commercial shipping.  
§§§ 
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 This growth came to a grinding halt, however, with the advent of the Great 
War. The Great War accelerated changes in nearly every aspect of life all around the 
world, including shipping and who controlled it. Leading up to the war, Britain and 
Germany had engaged in a naval arms race that strained their economies. Britain's 
economy took the worst of it because government policy dictated outbuilding the 
German navy.78 Between 1907 and 1910, Britain built 20 dreadnoughts and battle 
cruisers.79 By 1914, Britain had produced 2.7 million tons worth of warships, built 
specifically to outpace Germany's 1.3 million.80 Over the course of the war, Great Britain 
spent over $23 billion in 1913 dollars and mobilized 9.5 million men.81 Between 1913 and 
1918, British exports declined 59.5% and re-exports declined by 81.8% while the British 
trade deficit quadrupled. At the same time, the British merchant marine lost 9 million 
tons, including the Lusitania and the American owned (but British built and managed) 
Britannic, the largest ship in the world at the time.82 Together, these trends created a 
major opportunity for American shipping.  
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 With British shipping, including British IMM holdings, tied up in the war 
effort and German merchant ships interned in ports at home and abroad, a major 
vacuum needed to be filled. This created a situation in which IMM was in financial 
disarray yet making such massive profits. Stock holders were lulled into a false sense of 
security despite a recent fight over restructuring. Likewise, the period from late 1917 
through the end of the war saw the former German merchant navy, which had been 
confiscated by the United States government, turned over to American commercial 
pursuits. The ramifications of these events hastened the demise of IMM as an 
international corporation.  
This slow spiral played out over the 1920s. Despite cooperating with the Wilson 
Administration’s war time goals, by 1918 IMM found itself viewed as the pawn of 
British interests by the U.S. Congress. As a result, Congress left IMM out of postwar 
spoils such as the Leviathan, a massive German liner that IMM had managed during the 
war, but which it lost to a new American shipping company that had gained the 
support of the government by 1921. Facing competition from government-supported 
shipping firms, both domestic and foreign, IMM found itself in a weakening position 
that eventually forced the sale of foreign assets, beginning with White Star in 1926 and 
culminating with complete divestment of foreign assets by 1930.  
Still, even with this disappointing ending, IMM had played the role Mahan had 
predicted during war time. It helped keep the lanes of international trade open, 
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allowing the Allies to maintain the importation of desperately needed resources while 
giving American manufacturing access to markets, promoting a healthy economy at 
home. It had, in short, navigated the tides of war to the benefit of the Allies only to be 
stranded on the reef of post-war politics.  
 
Dissertation Structure and Conclusion 
 
A Tall Ship traces the formation, rise, and fall of the International Mercantile 
Marine, beginning in the 1870s with its immediate predecessor, International 
Navigation, through its early expansion to its ultimate failure as an international 
business in the 1920s. Along the way it asks and attempts to answer the following 
questions: How did American entrepreneurs navigate the challenges of rebuilding the 
American merchant marine in an already crowded market? Europeans dominated the 
Atlantic from the 1870s and fiercely fought to maintain that control during IMM’s 
ascendancy. What steps did Griscom and Morgan take to try to insure success despite 
outdated American shipping laws and a Congress that swung from indifferent to 
supportive to hostile? How did the race for the world’s largest liner, the loss of 
IMM’s Titanic and WWI affect IMM and did these events contribute to its eventual 
failure? 
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To create as accurate a narrative and analysis as possible, many sources from the 
United States and Europe have been consulted. Among the most valuable of these 
sources are the Ismay-Cheape Family Archives and the Cunard Archives housed at the 
University of Liverpool in Great Britain. The Ismay-Cheape Family Archives are under 
the custodianship of Mr. Malcolm Cheape of Great Britain, a direct descendant of J. 
Bruce Ismay. Not seen outside the family since the 1960s, the Ismay-Cheape Archives 
contain correspondence, newspaper clippings, diaries and much more relating to the 
White Star Line from its founding in the 1870s through the departure of Bruce Ismay 
from IMM in 1913. The Cunard Archives in Liverpool includes correspondence from 
successive chairmen of Cunard Line and, most importantly, documents the efforts of 
Cunard leadership to “remain British” when J. P. Morgan attempted to purchase the 
company in the early 1900s. Both of these sources provide valuable insight into the 
highest levels of leadership of the businesses and governments involved. Other sources 
include newspapers from both America and Great Britain, presidential correspondence, 
transcripts of testimony and debates from Congress and Parliament as well as 
published and unpublished contemporary writings. Additionally the National Archives 
in Washington D.C., the Hathi Trust Digital Library, the Woodrow Wilson Papers, 
shipping industry publications and my own collection of material relating to the great 
liners, IMM White Star and Cunard were all reviewed providing valuable information. 
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Because this history is complicated and highly detailed, with an international cast of 
characters, chapters are divided by major events in the life and expansion of IMM. 
 Chapter Two tells the story of Clement Griscom and his attempts to build an 
American shipping firm. Griscom's project faced a number of challenges, including both 
antiquated laws and the lack of infrastructure to build American ships. His stymied 
attempts to establish an American-owned shipping firm led him to do business in 
Belgium and form the Red Star Line in reaction the hostile business environment in the 
United States. As his firm became successful, Griscom began lobbying the U.S. 
government to make changes to laws that hindered his enterprise. By the late 1890s, 
policy makers created new laws more favorable to shipping businessmen. At the same 
time, J. P. Morgan also began building his combine. One of his purchases was the well-
established and well-respected British firm, the White Star Line. At this point, the 
dissertation turns to Thomas Ismay and the foundation of his White Star Line to show 
how the shipping industry was supported in Great Britain and, more broadly, the more 
supportive environment enjoyed by European trans-Atlantic firms. This chapter 
examines White Star Line's partnership with Harland & Wolff to explain the 
competitive edge it had in its entry into the Atlantic shipping industry.  The chapter 
concludes by bringing the two narratives together, tracing how Morgan continued to 
build his combine and examining the concern he caused in Europe as governments 
began to take steps to preserve their shipping industry.  
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 Chapter Three focuses on the efforts of the Cunard Steamship Line to remain 
a British company in the face of Morgan's continued efforts. The changing relationship 
between business and government forms a central theme of this chapter, as does the 
intense competition between major firms. This chapter documents the ways in which 
the competition between IMM and Cunard brought about the massive and still well-
known Olympic class liners and placed in the context of the times. Cunard’s chairman, 
Lord Inverclyde, engaged in in an extended delay campaign to preserve the 
independence of his company. Engaging in negotiations with the British government, 
Inverclyde managed to stave off Morgan, an outcome that would have long term 
consequences for IMM. Cunard’s new partnership with the British government helped 
redefine the relationship between business and government, especially international or 
transnational business. The chapter also traces the high stakes competition between 
companies for the most advanced superliners in the world which resulted in the 
Olympic class liner. Finally, it examines the loss of R.M.S. Titanic and its effects on the 
shipping industry in the context of shipping and what it meant for IMM to the eve of 
the First World War.  
Chapter Four documents how IMM floundered through the First World War 
following the loss of its most talented leadership in the fallout of the Titanic disaster. 
While this catastrophe proved incredibly damaging to IMM, the company’s 
foundational problems – specifically Morgan purchasing shipping assets for far above 
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their real value – also came back to haunt the combine. The ensuing fights over stock 
values and restructuring the company forced the combine’s management to spend time 
quelling investor revolts and took attention away from planning for the future. Despite 
this, the windfall of profits that IMM earned in these years, due to British and German 
shipping competition being removed by the war, gave IMM a temporary reprieve. 
However, as the chapter describes, the United States government eventually became a 
de facto competitor to IMM when it confiscated a large portion of the German merchant 
marine upon the United States’ entry into the war. In a relationship akin to that of 
Cunard and the British government, the U.S. government created a new American 
merchant marine built with confiscated German ocean liners. By the postwar years, as 
this chapter shows, this move completely undermined IMM as America’s merchant 
marine and sped up its decline as yet another competitor back by the direct power of 
government entered the market. In an act of irony, the U.S. government supported the 
new venture because of distrust of IMM and its foreign assets in the belief that IMM 
was the tool of British investors to cripple American shipping. The chapter concludes 
with IMM’s sale of White Star Line in 1926 and traces its decline in international 
holdings until they were eliminated altogether.  
Chapter Five briefly ties together the loose ends of the narrative by tracing the 
later lives of the people, companies, and ships involved in IMM, Cunard, and the other 
participants in shipping from the time period. The chapter concludes with a review of 
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this dissertation’s central thesis, drawing together the evidence and arguments of the 
preceding chapters and offering a final set of takeaway points.  
The International Mercantile Marine was a monumental effort that ultimately 
collapsed. Yet despite its eventual failure, IMM deserves to be studied, not least for 
what it can tell us about the growth of American global power in the early 20th century. 
Morgan intended for this combine to serve as the new American merchant marine and 
saw it as a way to introduce American products and American influence into Europe. 
As a business, it was one of the earliest efforts at a modern transnational company using 
advances in communications and transportation technology. A deeper understanding 
of IMM helps give insight on the “American Century” and the modern world. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Oceanic Majesty 
Clement Griscom, J. P. Morgan and the White Star Line 
 
Lounging comfortably in the smoking room of an Atlantic steamer in 1893, J. 
Pierpont Morgan idly conversed with one of his fellow passengers. The other traveler, 
well aware of Morgan’s success in gaining control of the railroads along the Atlantic 
seaboard, asked him what he thought was a trivial question: would it be possible to buy 
up all the shipping on the Atlantic and form a shipping monopoly? Morgan thought a 
little, then shifted in his seat. “Ought to be,” he said.83 While the story may be 
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apocryphal, it does speak truthfully about how Morgan saw financial challenges. For a 
man who purchased European castles to obtain one or two pieces of artwork, building 
an Atlantic monopoly amounted to routine business.  
As one of the great "robber-barons" and the richest man in America, Morgan had 
the means to make nearly anything possible. A few years later, Morgan joined with 
American shipping businessmen, including Clement Griscom, manager of the largest 
American shipping concerns at the time, to make that monopoly into a reality. Starting 
in 1901, Morgan and his associates began the process of mergers, takeovers and stock 
buyouts that created the largest shipping syndicate in history up to that time.  
By the 1890s, J. Pierpont Morgan had earned his reputation as one of the world's 
greatest businessmen.  He accumulated vast holdings in the railroads and oil industries 
during the 1870s and 1880s. The decision to develop the International Mercantile 
Marine, however, represented the greatest financial risk of his storied career. Although 
he had been approached earlier by interested parties to launch a combine, Morgan 
initially refused such advances. Yet by the late 1890s, Morgan changed his mind.84 He 
wanted to create a combine in which a major steamer left the port of New York each 
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day with mail, cargo and passengers for Europe making a significant change from the 
shape of the shipping industry until that point.85 
Morgan had a great deal of motivation for supporting the International 
Mercantile Marine. First was his personal hatred of waste and redundant business 
efforts, which he had demonstrated during his days organizing the railroads.86 In the 
late 1890s, several ships left the same port for the same destination once or twice a week 
in direct rivalry to each other. Morgan's plan for daily ship departures was designed to 
decrease direct competition, offer a more flexible schedule, and reduce rates because 
shippers could avoid storage fees while cargos awaited shipment. Daily sailings 
decreased the likelihood of spoilage on perishable cargoes that required refunds. 
Specific ships could be detailed for specific cargoes as opposed to placing cargo on 
whatever ship happened to leave that day, despite its freight capabilities or capacity.87 
Second, his newest trust, U.S. Steel, benefited from a foundation of vertical and 
horizontal integration. Morgan controlled every step in the production of steel from 
mining to railroad transport right up to delivery at the New York docks. At this point, 
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Morgan's control ended and he depended on foreign ships to transport his steel to 
Europe.88 Taking the reins of Atlantic shipping potentially allowed Morgan and his 
associates to arrange departures that decreased the cost of shipping steel and opened up 
markets in which the United States otherwise could not compete.  
Third, the ideas of Alfred Mahan gained great acceptance among both the public 
and elite circles during this time period, not least with Morgan. While Mahan wrote at 
length about military preparedness, the strength of international trade formed a 
complementary—and no less vital—part of his arguments about sea power.89 These 
theories became part of the public discourse over the 1880s and 1890s as Mahan 
increasingly wrote for mass audiences. Morgan's new and increased shipping plans 
required improvements to port infrastructure that could support both civilian and 
military needs. Mahan emphasized structural improvements like this in his books and 
articles.  Although Mahan may not have directly or personally influenced Morgan, 
Mahan's close relationship with another individual, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Theodore Roosevelt, certainly benefited Morgan. The International Mercantile Marine 
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stood as one of the very few Morgan monopolies that Roosevelt never targeted, almost 
certainly thanks to its neat fit with Mahan's ideas.  
Together, these three factors led Morgan to decide to pursue IMM in late 1890s. 
In analyzing these motivational factors, the chapter will first trace the formation of the 
Clement Griscom's shipping lines up to the founding of J. P. Morgan's International 
Mercantile Marine and his decision to purchase the White Star Line in 1901. Next, the 
chapter will travel back in time to 1875 and review the formation of White Star, 
providing a contrasting example of the relative ease European shipping companies 
enjoyed compared to the obstacles Griscom faced. Since Griscom's Red Star Line and 
Thomas Ismay's White Star Line formed within just a few years of each other, 1870 and 
1875 respectively, the contrasting examples will demonstrate the difficulties of 
rebuilding American shipping, painting a more complete picture of international 
shipping and trans-Atlantic economics at the time.  
In existing scholarship, the formation of the International Mercantile Marine 
(IMM) is often portrayed as merely a step towards the construction of the Titanic in 1912 
or as part of the history of the White Star Line that owned this ill-fated ship. In some 
ways, this narrative is accurate. Without the financial backing Morgan provided, White 
Star would not have been able to build the three massive liners of which Titanic was just 
one member of a larger design class. And yet, the formation of Morgan's Atlantic 
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combine represented much more than a story of the Titanic’s origins. It also has an even 
longer and richer origin story than historians typically acknowledge.  
As an early example of an American- based, multinational conglomerate, IMM 
has much to tell us about the intersection of international business and politics. 
Studying its history also shows how American businessmen, including Griscom and 
Morgan, applied the lessons of horizontal and vertical integration to a transcontinental 
enterprise that attempted to unite land and waterborne travel. And yet, few authors 
have examined IMM in this context.90 While several journal articles have analyzed the 
events of the merger, they have not considered the history of the IMM in the greater 
contexts of global capitalism, imperialism, or U.S. foreign relations.91 Even fewer have 
looked at Morgan's quests to add Britain's Cunard Line and Germany's Hamburg 
Amerika Line, which evaded his grasp and ultimately contributed to IMM's failure.  
As this chapter will argue, the International Mercantile Marine provides an early 
example of economic imperialism in which the United States expanded influence and 
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power without taking physical territory from other world powers. As many historians 
have argued in recent years, the geography of U.S. and European empires transformed 
in important ways during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. With advances in 
transportation and communication technologies, imperial rule and the projection of 
power became much easier to accomplish around the world. Additionally, larger 
empires could be controlled with smaller forces since telegraph and radio 
communication allowed a rapid response from neighboring forces.92 Economic 
imperialism improved on this by reducing the reliance on hard, or military, power. By 
selling goods in a foreign nation, the exporter (in this case the United States) not only 
exported products, but the culture attached to those products. As Woodrow Wilson 
later asserted, this would "...convert them (foreigners) to the principles of America."93 
IMM helped promote this economic imperialism by giving American exports an edge in 
transport and distribution in the European marketplace with simplified sailing 
schedules and lower shipping rates.  
At the same time, the world economy changed in significant ways. The formerly 
insular nature of many industries grew as the ability to export increased. With limited 
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means to transport products to remote locations, industry could only expand as far as 
transportation network it had access to allowed, despite growing production power 
through new machinery and techniques. To make use of this force, however, nations 
needed markets for their surplus products. Imperial powers, such as Germany, Great 
Britain, and eventually the United States, did not have to control ports as long as their 
goods arrived there and flowed into the market place. Ensuring these flows of capital 
and goods constituted a new sort of imperialism. For those powers that took advantage 
of the new economic imperialism, economic dominance grew as imported goods 
displaced native products, increasing imperial power both at home and abroad.94 
Previous histories of IMM have neglected the issue of economic imperialism. By 
extending its control of trade through ownership of the steamships with which it was 
conducted, IMM provided the United States with the commercial foundation that 
Admiral Alfred Mahan taught was necessary for U.S. defense and economic stability.  
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At the time, the British press deduced that Morgan built IMM as a means to 
distribute products produced by him and "his friends" cheaply, opening England and 
Germany to American products.95 "Mr. Morgan and the group of capitalists for whom 
he operates are resolved to make the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans American lakes so far 
as commerce is concerned, "declared the Liverpool Daily Mail.96 They were only half 
right. While cheaper exports formed the ultimate goal, the means to get there proved far 
more alarming, especially for the British.  
While it explores these issues of economic imperialism, this chapter also 
contributes to historiography by introducing issues of cultural imperialism in the 
discussion of IMM. For centuries Great Britain enjoyed the reputation as "ruler of the 
waves." Since Elizabethan times and the destruction of the Spanish Armada, England's 
reputation for oceanic dominance, and for producing superior ships and sailors, had 
grown. By the late 1800s and early 1900s, it enjoyed recognition as the world's leading 
nautical power.97 With American entrance into the maritime world, however, that 
longstanding British dominance faced a new threat. In terms of cultural imperialism, 
since Britain linked its national identity to its nautical heritage, American buyouts of 
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established and prestigious British shipping lines represented both a perceived and real 
assault on its national identity and development.98 Liverpool or Southampton graced 
the stern of every British-built and owned ship as the city of registry, proclaiming 
British sea power in the most distant world ports. From the British point of view, seeing 
those same ships have Liverpool painted out in favor of New York or Atlantic City 
would represent a humiliating loss of cultural identity.99 This is especially true 
considering that the loss would come, as perception would dictate, because British 
businessmen valued American dollars more than national heritage.100 Even to the 
present day,Great Britain treasures its maritime heritage. In the time period this 
dissertation examines, British ships sailed the seas in the hundreds, if not thousands. 
Watching that massive armada willingly lost to American dollars came as a great shock 
to the British public, especially after almost 400 years of fierce defense of international 
dominance. 
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Clement Griscom and United States Shipping in the Late 1800s 
In 1900, even after twenty-five years of efforts to increase American shipping 
capacity, only 8.2% of American foreign trade left ports on American-owned 
ships.101American exports for 1900 totaled $885 million ($26,643,241,071 in 2018) and 
British exports for the same period totaled $1.477 billion ($44.465 billion in 2018), mostly 
traded on British-built and owned steamers.102 A great deal of revenue awaited 
American investors, such as Morgan, if they tapped into the shipping market and 
opened European markets to American made goods. Yet to accomplish this goal, 
Morgan, or one of his contemporaries, first had to rebuild and consolidate the American 
merchant marine. They would have to do so, moreover, in the face of tremendous 
opposition from the British merchant marine and the British government, which dated 
back to the mid-1800s. Additionally, American shipping interests faced higher 
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construction costs and did not enjoy the subsidies British shippers did.103 Developing 
the American merchant marine, in short, would be an uphill battle. 
While it is generally believed the idea of an Atlantic combine began and ended 
with Morgan, he did not take the initial steps towards making this vision a reality. 
Clement A. Griscom, a young Pennsylvania railroad executive, initiated this process by 
building up American shipping during the last decades of the 19th century. Born in 
1841, Clement Acton Griscom descended from an old Pennsylvania Quaker family. At 
age 16, he began working for the shipping brokerage of Peter Wright & Sons of 
Philadelphia. In May 1871, the brokerage bought the initial issue of stock in the 
International Navigation Company when its charter gained authorization from the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly. By the time of the charter, Griscom was a partner in 
Peter Wright & Sons, and he largely controlled operations for International Navigation 
Company.104 
In 1872, Griscom, with the support of business associate J. Edgar Thomas of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR), decided to organize the International Navigation 
Company to serve Europe and the United States. Griscom hoped the new service would 
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expand anemic American shipping which modestly increased when the American Line, 
also chartered by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1871, inaugurated services 
from Liverpool to Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania Railroad, which owned controlling 
interests in their respective stocks, ultimately controlled both the American Line and the 
International Navigation Company, from their formations in 1870 and '71. Members of 
the board of directors of PRR populated the boards of the new shipping concerns but 
managed by Peter Wright & Sons managed them in day to day operations—or, in other 
words, by Clement Griscom.105 
Griscom intended his new company to provide service from Antwerp, Belgium 
to Philadelphia, using foreign built ships, crews, and registry.106 Griscom took this path 
for several reasons. First, he preferred foreign-built ships for their technological 
supremacy. Since no major civilian ship construction occurred in the United States after 
1865, shipyards did not keep up with technological advances that modern European 
Atlantic liners featured. Writers and historians documenting the formation of Griscom's 
and later Morgan's syndicates have noted the dominance of Britain's shipbuilding 
industry.107 British built ships tended to include steel hulls featuring subdivision into 
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watertight compartments, while American hulls were typically wooden or iron and 
lacked many of the modern advances of competing ships.  
Second, he hoped to avoid the expense and complications presented by 
American registry laws. While Griscom wanted American-built and owned ships, U.S. 
laws prevented Americans from simply buying foreign-built ships to create an 
American transport line.108 These registry laws dated from as far back as the founding of 
the country. Statutes passed in December 1792, specifically, stated that for a ship to 
have American registry it had to be built in the United States, wholly owned by and 
under the captaincy of American citizens.109 Compounding the problem of creating an 
American shipping line, a law passed in February 1866 made it impossible for ships that 
had been previously built in the United States, but "which shall have been licensed or 
otherwise authorized to sail under a foreign flag, and to have had protection of any 
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foreign government during the existence of the rebellion," to return to American 
registry.110 In other words, those ships whose owners sought foreign registry to avoid 
astronomical insurance rates caused by Confederate commerce raiders could not return 
their ships to American registry. 
This act essentially punished shipping owners for avoiding ruinous insurance 
costs and further handicapped the restoration of American shipping over the challenges 
already existing from the 1792 law. By disallowing American registry, Congress 
compelled the few remaining American shipping owners to employ cheaper European 
crews and ships. As an unintended consequence, it fortified British dominance of 
Atlantic shipping by making establishment of new American firms prohibitively 
expensive, especially in the face of subsidies, which the United States did not offer but 
Britain did. Even if American owners could obtain ships, they could not competitively 
operate them with British companies, who could offer passenger rates at cost and still 
make a profit off the mail subsidy offered by Great Britain.111 When Griscom looked to 
found his Red Star Line, foreign registry offered the simplest and cheapest option to 
most of his problems.  
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The monarch of Belgium played a direct part in making all of this possible. In 
1872, after determining that Belgium provided the most central location to base logistics 
in Europe, Griscom went to Antwerp to seek government support. Visiting Brussels, he 
met with American minister to Belgium, John Sanford, who arranged for a meeting with 
King Leopold. The king, who had a reputation as a man of business, liked Griscom's 
ideas and promised his support for a charter and mail subsidy and that he would "see 
that Parliament grants you everything you need."112 
Shortly after meeting with the king, Griscom contracted with a shipyard for 
construction of a pair of steamers. The ships, produced in Belgium, were "built 
especially for this trade; of iron, with double bottoms and in accordance with the 
strictest regulations of English Lloyds."113 Additionally, Griscom's new ships boasted 
special adaptations for safety, comfort and speed, with saloon and first-class 
accommodations in the center of the ship where the least motion was felt.114  They 
followed a fashion set by the British trans-Atlantic shipping and passenger company, 
the White Star Line, just a year or two before.  
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By 1873, Griscom’s ships were sailing and his International Navigation Company 
gained assets in Britain, Belgium, and the United States. Yet while Griscom's Red Star 
Line grew and flourished, it remained largely a foreign concern. Though the ultimate 
ownership was American, Red Star's ships flew Belgian colors, sailed with Belgian 
crews, and retained Belgian registry. None of this fit Griscom's overall goal of 
American-owned and registered shipping. His primary impediment in achieving that 
goal lay with American registry laws, laws which still stated that to have American 
registry, the ship had to be built in the United States.115 Starting off, Griscom did not 
have the assets to afford these types of ships. 
Over the next ten years, this situation began to change. The Red Star Line, 
registered as the Société Anonyme de Navigation Belge-Américaine, and ultimately 
managed by International Navigation Company of Philadelphia, built up a prospering 
business, offering bi-weekly and eventually weekly sailings between Philadelphia and 
Antwerp. By 1884, the line had expanded to the point that Griscom could finally afford 
to purchase American-built steamers. By 1886, the company owned twelve steamers 
totaling over 45,000 tons.116 At about the same time, the foundering Inman Line, an 
established and formerly profitable British line, came to Griscom's attention. Griscom's 
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subsequent pursuit of the Inman Line, carried out over the next few months in many 
ways foreshadow Morgan's later, grander pursuit of European shipping in general.  
Griscom and the Inman Line 
The Inman Line had a glorious history dating to December 11, 1850 when 
William Inman, a partner in a sailing packet line, began experimenting with chartered 
iron steamers. He formed the Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia Steamship 
Company, better known as the Inman Line, directed at serving the immigrant market. 
Shortly after, he and his wife made a trip across the Atlantic to personally study the 
needs of his passengers. The company proved a success and by 1870 carried 3,635 first 
class and 40,635 steerage passengers (the vast majority immigrants), as compared to 
Cunard Line's 7,638 and 16,871.117 
By 1886, however, the once thriving Inman Line was a dying concern. The death 
of its founder in 1881 left the line without a determined leader. Business 
miscalculations, coupled with unsuccessful steamers, led to a debt that exceeded the 
value of the entire fleet. For example, City of Rome, built in 1881, proved disastrous. Built 
to compete directly with Arizona of the Guion Line, City of Rome, in fact took two days 
longer than its rival to travel from Queenstown, Ireland to New York. The return 
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voyage took one day longer than Arizona's time as well. Sent back to the builder for a 
six-month overhaul, she still proved unsatisfactory and ended up back once again with 
her builders.118 In 1866, seeing a clear business opportunity, Griscom bought a 
considerable sum of the Inman Line's debt and approached British stockholders with 
the idea of selling all of their stock to him. On October 18, 1886, the stockholders voted 
to go into voluntary liquidation and sold out to Griscom. Within weeks of the purchase, 
the new Inman and International Steamship Company came into being, managed by 
Richardson, Spence and Company of Liverpool.119 
British subsidy laws enhanced the appeal of purchasing Inman. The Atlantic 
mails had been subsidized as far back as the 1830s, providing significant sums to ships 
that transported British mail across the Atlantic. At the time Griscom purchased Inman, 
three companies split the lion’s share of the British North Atlantic Subsidy: Cunard, 
White Star, and Inman.120 The subsidies allowed the lines to cover expenses associated 
with the high cost of providing regular service to trans-Atlantic ports. Ships serving the 
route had to be fast, reliable, and maintained in prime condition to endure the 
mechanical stresses of routine high-speed crossings. While income from passenger 
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traffic helped, the subsidy often made the difference between solvency and bankruptcy. 
With Inman's part of the subsidy totaling £35,000 ($5,537,660 in 2018), it also proved an 
attractive selling point for Griscom.121 
Acquisition of the Inman Line finally put Griscom in control of an established, 
respected shipping firm known for owning some of the finest ships on the Atlantic. 
Inman ships, such as the City of Richmond and City of Montreal, had reputations as some 
of the most beautiful ships afloat in an age of "floating teakettles." Featuring clipper 
bows and figureheads, Inman steamers harkened back to the era of sailing ships with 
their long, low, sleek lines. Griscom decided to build on this reputation with two new 
twin steamers and catapult the Inman and International Line into position as the 
leading Atlantic company. He therefore entered negotiations with J & G Thompson 
Shipbuilding Yard of Clydebank, Scotland. Fortunately for Griscom, a recession had hit, 
which no doubt gave him an advantage making his deal. Griscom left Scotland with a 
contract for the largest, fastest, most luxurious ships in the world, at the cost of 
$1,850,000 ($47,562,789 in 2018) per vessel.122 
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Christened in 1888, the first of these two ships, City of New York, delighted many 
Americans. Described as "huge and beautiful" and "the "Flying Dutchman" of the 
Atlantic," she garnered extensive praise. Observers raved that she was built on yacht-
like lines and appreciated her "enormous engines that develop extraordinary power,” 
reducing the Atlantic crossing to under six days. Her other reported virtues included 
being "lavishly equipped" with life saving devices including a "superabundance" of 
lifeboats. The Associated Press further reported that her design included plans for quick 
conversion into an armed merchant cruiser should the need arise.123 She and her sister, 
City of Paris, proved extremely successful and won the Blue Riband, a coveted award for 
speed on the Atlantic, for fastest crossing both east and west bound on the Atlantic run 
in 1889.124 
1891 opened new possibilities for American merchant shipping, and for Griscom 
in particular. In that year, Senator William P. Frye of Maine introduced two subsidy 
bills for debate. Frye, a proponent of rebuilding and expanding the merchant marine, 
intended to provide enough incentive to American shipbuilders for the immediate 
formation of a wholly American company. Unfortunately for Frye, when the bill went 
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before the House of Representatives, his generous subsidies were reduced by one third. 
Whereas companies would have earned $6 ($160.43 in 2018) per mile outbound under 
Frye’s bill, the law that finally passed reduced these subsidies to $4 ($106.95 in 2018).125 
The law thus did not have the effect of stimulating North Atlantic trade (though it did, 
however, aid American shipping lines in the Pacific, Gulf of Mexico and South 
Atlantic). As originally written, moreover, the law still mandated that ships must have 
American registry which required construction in American yards.126 The same old 
stumbling block remained.  
In 1891, however, the precise type of bill needed to remove this obstacle began to 
make its way through Congress. The bill, ultimately named "An Act to Encourage 
American Shipbuilding," held great significance for Griscom financially, because the 
Parliament of Great Britain cut Inman and International Line out of the mail subsidy 
when it came up for renewal the year before. The official explanation for the change, 
according to Parliament, was that with modern technological advances, White Star and 
Cunard easily met requirements for uninterrupted mail service with two instead of 
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three sailings a week. Unofficially, as Griscom understood it and explained during a 
subsequent Congressional hearing, the British government did "not feel that a company 
owned entirely by American capital should receive mail pay from the British 
Government, and so we were not considered when the new contracts for two sailings 
per week were concluded."127 Griscom’s suspicions of national rivalry seem grounded, 
since Inman and International owned the largest, fastest, strongest built ships in the 
world at the time in the City of Paris and City of New York, ships specifically designed to 
provide reliable cargo and mail service between Great Britain and North America. 
British officials clearly only wanted to subsidize ships that brought prestige to their 
own flag. The British made their message clear: If Americans intended to enter Atlantic 
shipping they needed someone else's subsidy. 
Inman's control of such prestigious ships may have raised concern in Parliament, 
but they positively influenced Congress's decision to change U.S. policies on the matter. 
The resulting "Act to Encourage American Shipbuilding" passed on May 10, 1892. It 
allowed ships, "of not less than eight thousand tons, and capable of speed not less than 
twenty knots per hour," to have American registry despite construction in a foreign 
yard. The legislation required the shipping company to have American owners, and 
"have built or have contract to build, in American shipyards, steamships of an 
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aggregate tonnage of not less in amount than that of the steamships so admitted to 
registry."128 Not coincidentally the City of New York and City of Paris weighed in at 10,802 
and 10,795 tons respectively, not only meeting but surpassing the tonnage requirement 
of the law.129 They also surpassed the speed requirement with record crossings at 20.1 
and 20.7 knots.130 The act finally gave Griscom what he had long desired: American 
registry for his American-owned ships, without the need for convoluted ownerships 
and multiple boards in multiple nations.  
 A follow-up bill paved the way for further expansion. Hotly debated in both 
houses of Congress, the Free Admission to American Registry of Ships Built in Foreign 
Countries Act ultimately passed and became law in 1893.131 Those opposed to the bill 
based their arguments on protecting the shipbuilding industry. The Minority Report on 
the bill stated that, "The course proposed in this bill is wholly opposed to American 
interests and American spirit. It proposes still further blight upon American enterprise 
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and American industry." The Minority suggested that by buying ships, the shipbuilding 
industry in the United States would stagnate to the point that even naval construction 
might depend upon European shipyards.132 Proponents pointed out that, "Lines that are 
essentially American lines are sailing the ocean under the British and other foreign 
flags. Ninety percent of the stock of some of these foreign lines is owned by citizens of 
the United States."133 Without mentioning Griscom's firm by name, the Majority Report 
described the condition of the Red Star Line almost exactly.  
The importance of the 1891, 1892 and 1893 laws cannot be overemphasized. They 
marked a turning point in the quest to rebuild American shipping on the Atlantic and 
encouraged J. P. Morgan's later actions to build on Griscom's achievements. American 
entrepreneurs now enjoyed more equal footing with their European competitors. Even 
so, British subsidies still far exceeded what the U.S. federal government authorized. The 
P&O Steamship Company, another British firm on the Atlantic, received an annual 
subsidy of £330,000 in 1899 (roughly $54,277,809 in 2018).134 By contrast, Griscom 
testified in 1898 that the annual subsidy income of his line amounted to just $750,000 
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yearly ($21,797,283 in 2018, 2.5 times less than its British rival).135 The subsidy may not 
have resolved the disparities between European and American competition, but they 
nevertheless served to facilitate Inman’s competition with European rivals. 
Transfer to American registry prompted celebration, not just within the Inman 
and International Line but in the new home port of New York. The New York arrived in 
harbor first after passage of the bill and garnered the more lavish of ceremonies to mark 
her transition to American registry. The event occurred on George Washington's 
birthday, 1893, in front of thousands who braved harsh weather conditions to line the 
sea wall at the battery to view the spectacle hailed as nationally important. President 
Benjamin Harrison himself raised the colors on the New York's sternpost as guns from 
the cruiser Chicago and Castle William thundered in salute. Harrison had also prepared 
remarks. He began by saying, "I have felt both as a citizen and as president, the 
mortification that every American must feel that examines into the standing of the 
United States in the merchant marine of the world." He went on to praise the design of 
the New York and express excited anticipation that it was a "precursor of many others 
that are to float this flag."136 The arrival of the Paris a few short days later prompted 
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similar festivities, although this time Griscom's thirteen-year-old daughter, Frances, 
raised the colors. The event enjoyed even more of a triumphant air as the supremacy of 
Griscom’s ships became clear. The Paris had not only overtaken the newer White Star 
Liner Teutonic, which had left Liverpool thirty-five minutes earlier, but had beaten her 
British rival to New York by three hours.137 This despite the fact that the newer and 
larger Teutonic and her twin sister Majestic were designed with speed in mind.138 
Transfer to American registry also brought a number of changes for the 
company. Inman and International Line ceased operations under that name. In a nod to 
their new role in American shipping, they were re-christened as the American Line. The 
newly branded American Line promptly contracted with Cramp and Sons Ship and 
Engine Building Company of Philadelphia to build two additional ships: the St. Paul 
and St. Louis, each of 11,600 tons and capable of at least 20 knots speed.139 The two new 
steamers entered the water in 1894 and 1895. President and Mrs. Cleveland attended the 
launching, with the First Lady breaking the christening bottle on the bow of the St. 
Louis. The steamers were so large that they required new piers in the North River to 
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accommodate them.140 Described as "thoroughly American in design as well as 
construction," an author claimed that a trained sailor "would recognize them as Yankee 
vessels a dozen miles away." They "have a straight bow... the long, fine Yankee sheer, 
the graceful stern, the wholesome freeboard... all salient characteristics of the modern 
seagoing steam merchantmen of the United States." They had two clean masts, free of 
yard arms while "foreign craft were still dragging about the cumbersome square yards 
and canvas."141 While never Blue Riband winners, they met and surpassed the 
conditions set by the 1892 law.  
The construction of the new American Line ships, however, had come at great 
cost. In 1900 Thomas Clyde, of the Clyde Steamship Company, testifying before 
Congress, noted that St. Paul and St Louis "cost more than twenty-five percent more 
than they would have cost abroad." Another ship, he noted further, had cost more than 
fifty percent.142 In his own testimony, Griscom noted that the cost differential both in 
construction and operation made further ships of the St Louis and New York types, let 
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alone improved or enlarged versions, prohibitive at best, unless Congress increased 
federal subsidies.143 
Fortunately for Griscom, Congress was in the mood to support the expansion of 
the merchant navy, due to contemporary geopolitical concerns. In April 1898, the 
United States had entered Cuba’s revolution against Spain, transforming that conflict 
into the Spanish-American War. Unlike previous U.S. wars, a substantial part of it raged 
at sea. Much as Alfred Mahan had predicted, the American Merchant marine played a 
major role in this conflict, both in the actual fighting and in support roles. St. Louis, St. 
Paul, New York, and Paris all became armed merchant cruiser auxiliaries of the United 
States Navy. To mark this change in status, Paris served as Yale and New York as Harvard 
for the duration of the conflict.144 
The war records of the American Line ships validate much of what Mahan 
predicted about the use and value of merchant ships in war time. Harvard and Yale 
proved useful to the U.S. Navy over and over as fast scouts for the fleet and as flanking 
forces during battle. Their cargo and passenger capacity allowed them to ferry entire 
brigades of soldiers to the front lines and they even proved capable of taking and 
defeating smaller but purposely built Spanish warships. St Louis took part in cutting an 
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underwater cable, hobbling communications with Spanish commanders in Cuba with 
Spain, and disabling the Spanish destroyer Terror. She also served as the prison for 
captured Spanish officers, including Admiral Pascual Cervera, Spanish commander at 
the battle of Santiago de Cuba.145 
An account of the cable-cutting adventure of the St. Louis, provided by an 
unnamed soldier, offers a more detailed example of these varied exploits. The mission 
began on the moonless night of May 15 at the entrance of Santiago Harbor. The 
operation took several days, making it even more harrowing. By 7:00 a.m. on May 17, 
St. Louis engaged the forts protecting the cable as her crew grappled with the cable 500 
fathoms below. The guns of Morro Castle opened fire followed by a shore battery after 
noon, to which the St. Louis redirected her own guns, ultimately silencing Morro Castle 
after an extended exchange of fire. During the battle, the ship's crew grappled the cable, 
hauled it up, cut it and released the ends back into the sea.146 
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In cutting the cable connecting Santiago de Cuba and Jamaica, the crew of the St. 
Louis assured an isolated command in Cuba that could not alert supporting forces in the 
area to the daily needs of army or navy logistics or the rapidly changing threats posed 
by the American army and navy. While it is conceivable that other ships could have 
performed these functions, it would have slowed American operations because of the 
limited number of warships available to engage in these secondary, but vital, 
operations. This kind of operation enjoyed growing significance as communications 
technology improved.  
During the Spanish-American War, the ships of Griscom's American Line had 
thus performed exactly as Mahan had predicted they would in his The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History, in several key respects. First, while the American navy had enjoyed 
a revival in the form of new construction in the years leading up to the war with Spain, 
it did not possess nearly enough ships to perform all the roles needed. Troop ships, and 
cruisers in particular, required supplemental vessels. American Line ships provided 
these supplements, making them vital as troop transports, supply ships and more.  
The speed of the American Line ships made them further invaluable for 
communications purposes, a second point Mahan had suggested. By scouting out 
enemy forces, American Line ships allowed commanders to prepare for and 
outmaneuver Spanish commanders in days before wireless communications. In prior 
wars, news from the front often arrived months after the actual events, constraining and 
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sometimes even eliminating reactive moves by an opposing power. Communications 
cables allowed rapid reactions which often saw smaller military forces prepare for and 
even defeat larger powers. Controlling communications, with the aid of the American 
Line steamers and other auxiliary consorts, gave the United States a tactical and 
strategic advantage without sacrificing offensive units in primary operations. 
Conversely, Spain's relative lack of large merchant auxiliaries prohibited rapid 
resupply, communications or any other logistical support, exactly as Mahan predicted.  
Additionally, at no point during the war was American trade seriously 
threatened, a third issue Mahan had discussed. Mahan's writings emphasized this 
particular concern in potential future conflicts, citing lack of external trade as a major 
factor in the defeat of Napoleon's France. Although the United States’ internal trade was 
quite strong, and although the war ended up being short in duration, the means to 
protect American commerce had been put in place, even if not to the extant Mahan 
would have liked. Thus, in terms of quality, communications and trade, the value of 
American Line ships in the Spanish-American war validated Mahan and maritime 
expansion to the nation.  
Aside from validating Mahan, these events also provided heroic tales that the 
American people at home latched onto and formed a basis for support of later 
expansion of the merchant marine. Tales like the St. Louis cable story, the capture of the 
Spanish collier Restormal by the St. Paul, or the arrival of Gen. Duffield's 1,300-man 
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brigade aboard the Yale surfaced regularly in the press all across the United States 
during the war. Such stories of heroic deeds no doubt influenced the public support 
encouraging congressional action. They also renewed and bolstered prewar efforts to 
revive the merchant marine, justifying their expense to both the American public and 
Congress.147 
And indeed, within a year of the close of the war, Congressional debates opened 
with the object of expanding subsidies, much to Griscom’s delight. At this point, 
however, Griscom's successes still appeared small compared to British dominance of 
the Atlantic. A concerted effort by British shipping owners to quell the upstart 
American expansion might well have ended Griscom's efforts, but British shippers 
chose to ignore Griscom. Even as late as 1901, after J.P. Morgan entered the picture, 
leading British shipping magnates, such as Lord Inverclyde, chairman of Cunard Line, 
refused to fully acknowledge the threat. However, Morgan's now direct participation 
set the stage for dramatic changes, whether the British were ready for them or not.    
Enter Morgan 
Until 1900, J.P. Morgan had restricted his participation in Griscom's enterprise to 
that of an interested observer. While he assisted in finance, he did not directly advise or 
intervene in day to day operations or even major decisions. That changed with the 
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opportunities presented by potential new acquisitions. Morgan brought a new 
aggressiveness to the renewal of the American merchant marine. Well known as the 
richest man in the world, Morgan had a reputation of sparing no expense when it came 
to the things he wanted. He now turned that "never take no for an answer" attitude and 
vigor to the project of an international Atlantic combine and injected the determination 
and financial foundation that could make an international conglomerate possible. 
By 1899, Griscom was in a position to refinance his debts and begin new 
construction. At the same time, the Leyland Line of Great Britain announced plans to 
acquire the Atlantic Transport Company of Baltimore, Maryland. If Leyland Line 
gained control of Atlantic Transport, Griscom's position on the Atlantic and his scheme 
to build an American shipping empire would be seriously threatened.148 Griscom 
intended to add Atlantic Transport to his own holdings, fortifying his position by 
consolidating with a successful freight service. Had it fallen into British hands it might 
have serious consequences for American shipping. Congressional hearings opened that 
year to discuss subsidies and potential increases to rates.149 If American concerns 
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proved vulnerable to British takeover, why should Congress support them with 
American tax dollars?  
This perceived danger to United States interests may have been the final push 
that prompted Morgan's grand entry into the Atlantic, for at first, that prospect seemed 
unlikely. In July 1900, when he was initially approached by British financiers to help 
with the creation of an Atlantic combine, most likely formed on the merger of Leyland 
and Atlantic Transport, Morgan replied that he did not care to engage in the shipping 
business.150 Without the kind of financial backing Morgan could provide, Leyland's 
purchase of Atlantic Transport came to a halt. By December of 1900, however, Morgan 
had not only changed his mind, but had started creating his own combine.151 
The fact that Congress began debating increased subsidies no doubt made direct 
involvement more appealing for Morgan. For years Griscom had built his shipping lines 
without the benefit of American subsidies, making it harder to build a truly American 
line. With potential subsidies coming available, the likelihood of success for an Atlantic 
combine increased substantially, making profitability of investment a stronger 
possibility. 
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Morgan financed the merger of International Navigation Company with the 
Atlantic Transport Company and provided the money for the construction of more new 
ships. At that early stage, he stayed mostly passive in company operations. Then, in 
1901—no doubt adding insult to the injuries caused by his refusal to back the British 
attempt at a merger—Morgan bought out the Leyland Line, adding it to the syndicate.152 
With that purchase, Morgan went from financier to co-owner of the syndicate. Atlantic 
Transport, International Navigation and J. P. Morgan & Company equally divided the 
stock of Leyland Line between themselves.153 
The British press published widely on the terms of the buyout, and very little of 
the reporting showed any support. The Liverpool Daily Post characterized the Leyland 
buyout as "A Blow to British Shipping."154 Another editorial called the trust socialism, 
referring to Morgan as a despot.155 The hostility to Morgan grew such that one editorial 
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felt the need to discuss and ultimately refute "All manner of occult explanation of his 
rise to unexampled power, of his business methods, of his plans and prospects is 
offered to what the politicians call "a confiding and generous public.""156 A certain 
amount of alarm was understandable; Leyland Line operated hulls totaling roughly 
300,000 tons and enjoyed a reputation among the best of British shippers.157 
Trying to allay concerns, Walter Glynn, managing director of Leyland Line, 
noted in an interview with the Liverpool Daily Post that operations of the line would 
continue without any changes. He also clarified that while Morgan was not buying the 
fleet, per se, he was buying a large amount of stock held by ordinary stockholders.158 
J.R. Ellerman, owner of Leyland Line, got Morgan to agree to pay £14 10s ($2,253 in 
2018) per share. Ellerman alone held 71,000 shares, which all went to Morgan. 
According to the same report, the remaining holders of the outstanding stock, valued at 
Morgan's buyout price totaling £1,750,000 ($276,780.18 in 2018) intended to sell.159 This 
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represented a considerable profit because a Frederick Leyland & Company balance 
sheet from December1900, provided to a general meeting in May 1901, showed those 
same stocks issued at £10 ($1,598.07 in 2018).160 
The tremendous amounts of money at play should have raised more alarm in 
British shipping circles concerning their own future independence. However, George 
Burns, second Baron Inverclyde and chairman of Cunard Line, seemed unbothered. "I 
cannot say I am at all surprised at the Leyland deal,” he noted. “I had expected 
something of that sort would happen before long between some of the American 
Millionaires and one of our big Shipping companies on this side, although I did not 
know which." Inverclyde went on to blame the government because, "they do not 
apparently fully recognize how necessary it is to support our Mercantile Marine against 
the encroachment of other countries."161 
One of his associates, David Jardine, wrote Inverclyde reminding him that 
Ellerman of Leyland Line had made overtures to buy out Cunard a short time before 
through an intermediary named Bellow.162 The next day Jardine wrote again, remarking 
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that the board of directors of Cunard were "terribly exercised about this affair of 
Morgan's" and wanted to know what overtures, if any, had been made.163 
Inverclyde's response displayed a remarkable lack of concern. "I do not see that 
there is anything so very greatly to worry about in connection with the Leyland deal...," 
he said. And as for Bellow, "Personally, I think Bellow is, and always has been, a perfect 
nuisance and I desire to have nothing to do with him, directly or indirectly under any 
circumstances." He went on to state that overtures at buyout had been soundly rejected 
by his late father, John Burns, first Baron Inverclyde, and the cause for concern 
remained minimal, at least for Cunard.164 However, this statement came before 
Morgan's purchase of Cunard's most direct rival, the White Star Line.  
With the means for cargo transport firmly in hand, the time had come to find a 
flagship passenger line for the great Atlantic combine, to be called the International 
Mercantile Marine when officially formed later in 1902. Morgan chose his personal 
favorite: White Star Line. It had the international prestige his other shipping lines 
lacked. White Star enjoyed a reputation as a luxury steamship line. Its liners garnered 
praise for their design and comfort, and in less than thirty years since the lines’ 
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founding, earned a reputation rivaled only by Cunard Line. White Star would be the 
jewel in the crown of Morgan's International Mercantile Marine.  
The White Star Line 
This history of the White Star Line provides an interesting counter to the 
problems Clement Griscom had in forming his Atlantic shipping lines. Thomas Ismay, 
the founder of the White Star, began his foray into Atlantic shipping just a couple years 
before Griscom formed his Red Star Line, while the White Star Line began service on 
the Atlantic at roughly the same time as its American competitor. In Britain, however, 
the advanced shipbuilding industry and generous subsidy laws made starting a new 
firm far easier. In contrast to Griscom, who had to deal with laws that seemed designed 
to prohibit American-owned shipping concerns, Ismay's problems centered on standing 
out from established lines and attracting cliental rather than the initial formation of the 
line or even finding investors. He found that unique quality in the comfort his ships 
gave to passengers. While other lines offered speed alone, his provided speed tempered 
by comfort and luxury on innovative and attractive steamers. This soon made White 
Star the primary luxury steamship line on the Atlantic and, ultimately, a highly 
desirable addition to Morgan's IMM.  
The ease with which Ismay formed his business contrasts dramatically with the 
hurdles Griscom had to overcome. Comparing and contrasting these two concurrent 
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ventures, therefore, demonstrates the relative imports the governments of the United 
States and Great Britain placed on shipping. For instance, Great Britain's generous 
subsidies pointed to strong support of shipping for national interest purposes.  On the 
other hand, the American Congressional reticence to support shipping through 
subsidies was indicative of the dominate laissez faire philosophy of governance relative 
to oceanic transport businesses. In other words, unlike Great Britain, if American 
businessmen planned on rebuilding American shipping, they would do it on their own, 
with their own money.  
The story of Griscom’s rival began in 1867, when a young Thomas Ismay 
purchased the name, goodwill, and house flag of the bankrupted White Star Line. 
Ismay, just thirty years old at the time, already enjoyed success at the head of T.H. 
Ismay and Company, which managed trading ships sailing to ports in Mexico and the 
West Indies. After purchasing the White Star name, he expanded his business by 
adding Melbourne, Australia to the company's ports of call. He soon operated a 
successful line of mail packets serving Australia.165 
As a result of these successes, during an informal game of billiards between two 
Liverpool businessmen in 1869, an investor named Gustave Schwabe approached Ismay 
about the possibility of founding steamship line on the Atlantic. Schwabe, a shipping 
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magnate in his own right, already held shares in the Bibby Line, a small but growing, 
British firm. Schwabe's nephew Gustav Wolff, a cofounder of Harland & Wolff 
Shipyards, provided both incentive and opportunity to offer Ismay a very unique 
proposition.166 Schwabe told Ismay that he was looking for new shipping investments. 
He promised Ismay financial backing for the formation of a new steamship line on the 
condition that Harland & Wolff build all the new company’s ships.167 Ismay agreed and 
formed the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company with shareholders that included 
Gustav Schwabe, Edward J. Harland and Gustav Wolff, adding steam to his already 
successful sailing packet line.  
The new White Star Line and Harland & Wolff enjoyed a unique relationship. 
Harland & Wolff agreed never to build ships for any company in direct competition 
with White Star. In return, White Star agreed to never use any other shipbuilder.168 In 
fact, White Star never bothered with a traditional “contract” at all, but instead made a 
general agreement with Harland & Wolff regarding the price of the ships they built. The 
relationship, as Thomas Ismay’s son J. Bruce Ismay observed, meant that "They have 
carte blanche to build the ship and put everything of the very best into that ship, and 
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after they have spent all the money they can on her, they add on their commission to 
the gross cost of the ship, which we pay them. We have never built a ship by 
contract.”169 The commission in the original agreement between Thomas Ismay and 
Messrs. Harland & Wolff was a four percent profit on the cost of each ship.170 This 
relationship gave Harland & Wolff a reliable income stream which allowed the 
shipyard to continue expansions and investments over time.  
These unique arrangements between White Star and Harland & Wolff allowed 
shipyard engineers far more latitude than many of their competitors. Other lines had to 
be more cost-conscious or had to labor under less cozy relationships with the builders 
of their ships. White Star, however, benefitted from experimentation in design and 
layout that Harland & Wolff pursued. In addition to building the basic bones of the 
ship, Harland & Wolff fitted out the vessel, meaning that they decorated and furnished 
the liners they built. All shipyards fitted out ships as part of construction, but in their 
unique partnership White Star again enjoyed better results than others, such as their 
main competitor, Cunard. Besides getting the best product possible from Harland & 
Wolff, White Star also got a ship that had the finest interior design, furnishings, and 
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decoration money could buy, rather than sub-contracting with additional costs. 
Additionally, Harland & Wolff usually carried out repairs and upgrades. This insured 
minimal time in refit as the shipbuilder was already intimately familiar with the ship 
they were modifying. In many instances, the same yard crew that built the vessal 
carried out modifications. As White Star ships changed over time from the original 
design specifications, Harland & Wolff could conduct maintenance more quickly.171 
This contrasted with the common practice of other shipping lines. Most others 
used multiple builders for multiple ships, even of the same class. For example, Cunard’s 
three-ship Abyssinia class of 1870 took shape with two different builders, resulting in 
different fuel requirements, speeds, and one sister, Parthia, which was smaller than the 
other two.172 White Star, on the other hand, benefited from one design team and one 
yard, often using the same basic engine design. This standardized fuel requirements 
and made support logistics less complicated. The only major drawback of White Star's 
relationship with Harland & Wolff, however, lay in that ships could only be built one, 
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or sometimes two, at a time. Thus, it took longer for White Star to bring their steamers 
online.  
Despite this issue, the White Star Line clearly towered over its rivals. White Star's 
first steamer, Oceanic, had several features that set her apart from all other ships on the 
Atlantic at that time. One observer exclaimed she looked “more like an imperial yacht 
than a steamer.”173 Edward Harland, who personally designed most of the ship, 
identified one key reason for Oceanic’s success: “Another feature of novelty in these 
vessels,” he noted "consisted in placing the first-class accommodation amidships, with 
the third-class aft and forward.” Prior to this change, all liners had placed their cabins in 
or near the stern of the ship where vibration and smells from the engine room, as well 
as the cork-screw motion of the ship in heavy seas, were most severe. The inclusion of 
“These and other arrangements,” Harland recognized, "greatly promoted the comfort 
and convenience of the cabin passengers, while those in the steerage found great 
improvements in convenience, sanitation, and accommodation… In short, for the first 
time perhaps, ocean voyaging, even in the North Atlantic, was made not only less 
tedious and dreadful to all, but was even rendered enjoyable and even delightful to 
many.”174 
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At 420 feet long and 40 feet wide, Oceanic's more streamlined hull, one of the first 
taking advantage of the new science of hydrodynamics, also allowed for higher speeds 
and lower fuel consumption than its competitors.175 The hull had a length to width ratio 
of 10:1 instead of the more traditional 8:1.176 This meant Oceanic was ten times as long as 
she was wide. The traditional ratio of 8:1 created a much bulkier hull. The slimmer hull 
allowed the water to flow more swiftly with less resistance. Lower water resistance put 
less pressure on the engines to gather and maintain speed and decreased fuel 
requirements.  
Together, these features—improved accommodations and faster speeds at less 
cost—helped seal Oceanic’s success. Oceanic arrived at Liverpool on February 26, 1871 
and opened to the press and public for inspection. Although nearly empty on her 
maiden voyage, carrying only 64 passengers (out of a potential 166 1st class and 1,000 
steerage), accounts still described her as a success. In New York, she again opened to 
the public and 50,000 curious people saw the first of the new breed. The competing 
Cunard Line, though serving more passengers (300 passengers on R.M.S. Calabria, 
which sailed in direct competition to Oceanic on her maiden voyage) and representing a 
more established company, could no longer rely on simple speed and reliability to claim 
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dominance.177 Nor could any other line continue to offer only the basic requirements of 
speed, regularity, and safety. White Star's arrival on the Atlantic signaled a new kind of 
ship, something of higher caliber that made the trans-Atlantic crossing more 
comfortable and enjoyable as opposed to a necessary drudgery. 
In quick succession, Oceanic's three sisters—Atlantic, Baltic, and Republic—
followed her onto the world stage, appearing in the later months of 1871. Together, 
these four ships helped set the terms by which the contest for dominance on the 
Atlantic were fought until the eve of World War I. White Star had thus introduced 
greater comfort and a high level of passenger service to set itself apart from other, more 
established lines. From here on, something had to stand out to attract passengers, 
something more than just a basic mode of transportation. 
At the same time as White Star and Harland & Wolff were making waves in the 
Atlantic, investment and expansion opportunities for Ismay began opening up in the 
Pacific. In 1874, ambitious railroad barons of the American West formed the Occidental 
and Oriental Steam Ship Company (familiarly known as O&O) in a bid to control 
shipping from Asia into U.S. Pacific ports and then into their own railroad networks in 
the continental United States. From the date of its incorporation, O&O enjoyed a 
relationship with White Star, chartering ships from White Star to sail on Pacific routes. 
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The ships that White Star provided for the San Francisco - Yokohama route included the 
finest and most advanced on the Pacific. In addition to providing these ships, which 
retained White Star names and livery, White Star employed the officers required to run 
them, although the O&O furnished the crews.178 O&O chartered White Star's Oceanic in 
1876 with the Gaelic and Belgic to help fulfill mail contracts.179 The O&O experiment 
expanded with ports of call including Kobe, Nagasaki, Shanghai and Honolulu.180 White 
Star-owned ships, designed and built by Harland & Wolff, served O&O successfully on 
the Pacific, providing added experience for White Star's officers and Harland & Wolff's 
engineers.  
In 1880, White Star entered into an arrangement with Shaw, Savill and Albion 
Line (SSA) on much the same terms as with O&O. White Star provided ships and entire 
crews, this time on runs to New Zealand, while SSA managed schedules and local 
logistics. Ships built for this trade included the Ionic, Doric, and the appropriately 
named Zealandic, under a business relationship that lasted into the 1930s.181 
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These charters provided several advantages to White Star. First, they allowed 
older Atlantic liners to find new and profitable lives on secondary trade routes. Without 
these life-extending charters, older ships would have been sold off because of rapidly 
changing technology. Often these ships sold at a loss while still relatively new. The 
chartering company also gained a competitive advantage. The former Atlantic liners 
retained the luxurious fittings usually reserved for the more prestigious North Atlantic 
route. Other lines simply did not meet the same standards and could not garner as 
much of the customer base. As a side benefit, White Star boasted a world-wide fleet, 
with the publicity boost of having ships that sailed all over the world. Finally, the 
charters provided an additional stable revenue stream that allowed White Star more 
freedom for expenditures on its primary Atlantic trade routes. Thus, it could pay higher 
stock dividends and set up a financial reserve. By the mid-1880s White Star and 
Harland & Wolff enjoyed world-wide recognition and a stable financial base, despite 
the often harsh trading conditions on the North Atlantic.  
As White Star expanded, so did Harland & Wolff. With the certain income 
stream provided by the profit agreement with Ismay's line, Harland & Wolff enjoyed 
more freedom to expand their Belfast holdings. Harland & Wolff routinely bought 
major new pieces of equipment such as lattice work cranes, expanded their yards for 
building larger slips, and bought out smaller companies to increase their own abilities. 
An example is the 1878 purchase of Alexander McLaine & Sons for £7,000 ($1,104,959 in 
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2018), which allowed Harland & Wolff to build their own engines instead of sub-
contracting.182 The 1880s brought a downturn in ship building due to the proliferation of 
firms and the way failing shipping lines were leaving the market. The income from 
White Star made the downturn less severe for Harland & Wolff, however, and assured 
their survival while other shipyards closed. Additionally, the reputation they had built 
with White Star's now world-famous ships helped bring in new contracts that less well-
known firms would not have been able to secure.  
At an 1885 meeting of shareholders aboard the Adriatic, built in 1872, Edward 
Harland remarked on how well White Star’s older ships competed with newer, larger 
and faster ships, “with their splendid load of nothing in them and producing less than 
that as a dividend to their shareholders.”183 Congratulating Ismay, Harland no doubt 
took satisfaction in knowing his shipyards constructed the high-quality steamers on 
which White Star built its reputation. Indeed, having revolutionized the Atlantic 
passenger trade and expanded interests the world over, Thomas Ismay was content to 
pursue a “rest-and-be-thankful policy” during most of the later 1880s.184 At that same 
shareholder's meeting, Ismay's business acumen also garnered Harland’s praise. T. H. 
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Jackson, who chaired the meeting, pointed to Ismay's "cool judgment" of not being led 
into costly new steamers, predicting that "when he (Ismay) thinks the time has come to 
build larger and faster boats we, as shareholders, shall be in safe hands."185  Jackson's 
speech proved prophetic. By the 1880s newer vessels, especially from archrival Cunard, 
finally attained the standards of comfort and luxury White Star had inaugurated. To 
maintain the position as the leading trans-Atlantic firm, White Star needed newer ships 
and increased financial means to build them. 
At the same time, White Star had proven such a formidable competitor that John 
Burns, first Baron Inverclyde and chairman of Cunard Line, entered into direct 
communication with Thomas Ismay over matters of competition and how to divide the 
limited trade on the Atlantic. In 1885, diminishing trade with the United States 
prompted Inverclyde to talk face to face with Ismay about their line’s competition.186 
Not coincidentally, Griscom's Red Star Line enjoyed increasing success in this period. 
While not directly mentioned, this no doubt partially prompted Inverclyde and Ismay's 
dialog.  
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From Ismay's point of view, the problem stemmed from Cunard's introduction of 
extra ships on the New York trade. Ismay believed they should first make "the sailings 
on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday sailings from Liverpool as efficient as possible to 
the Postal authorities, Passengers, and Shippers." To do this, Ismay stated he would 
willingly work with Inverclyde on scheduling sailings. However, he added,"...your 
steamers alone would accommodate twice the number of saloon passengers that are 
likely to be crossing," making sailings from his and other companies "inadequate to 
remunerate them for the extra steamers employed."187 
Replying that he did "not share the views which you express,” Inverclyde 
doubted Cunard’s ability to earn enough to pay for the extra sailings Ismay decried. 
Arguing that he must use the ships he had to shorten the rotation between sailings and 
best serve his stockholders, Inverclyde claimed that the decision came "purely from a 
mechanical point of view," not one of direct competition. He went on to say, however, 
that "As to the White Star Line building more powerful steamers, I have not a word to 
say - simply because it does not concern me - nor would it weigh with me in the 
conduct of affairs relating to the Cunard Company."188 Yet clearly White Star did 
concern Inverclyde, as evidenced by the very fact that he had initiated negotiations for 
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decreasing competition of the Atlantic trade. His concern was hardly surprising. In a 
few short years, Ismay's White Star had proven such a formidable competitor Ismay 
said he could out-build his rival if terms for co-existence could not be found. Although 
communications continued to be open between John Burns and Thomas Ismay, they 
more and more took on a no-nonsense, business only tone.189 
As the 1880s gave way to the 1890s, increased international rivalry for imperial 
colonies added another dimension to the Atlantic shipping scene. The 1885 war scare 
over Russia’s seizure of Afghan territory near the Oxus River and the British 
Admiralty’s consequent use of liners as auxiliaries presented Ismay with an idea.190 In 
the past, the Royal Navy, like others around the world, had used merchant ships as 
auxiliaries to increase patrols of the sea lanes.191 This often led to disaster. Most of the 
merchant ships were not built to withstand combat duties or even the sailing 
requirements of a navy vessel. Ismay planned to build ships to admiralty specifications 
under their supervision, in exchange for an annual subsidy. The ships would be built in 
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such a way as to minimize the time needed to convert them into a new breed of ship 
called the armed merchant cruiser.192 
 Ismay had already found favor with the Admiralty by offering the entirety of 
the White Star fleet to the government in case of war with Russia in 1885. In 1886, Ismay 
entered into correspondence with Arthur Forwood, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Admiralty. In these letters, Ismay negotiated the terms under which his ships would be 
available for government use and the terms under which "one or two vessels of high 
speed" might be built specifically for use as armed merchant cruisers. For each ship 
chartered, the parent company was to receive 15s per gross ton annually for five years. 
The resulting Teutonic eventually weighted in at 9,984 tons. Her yearly subsidy totaled 
£7,488 ($16,003,543 dollars in 2018. After two years of service to White Star, the ships 
would be available for purchase by the Admiralty at cost. The contract covered other 
provisions, such as how many members of the crew had to be Royal Navy Reserve and 
how much the subsidy would increase if White Star lost the mail contract. Should White 
Star be required to sell any ship to the Navy, they (White Star) were allowed to "remove 
from the Ships or Ship, the plated ware, cutlery, crystal, earthenware, blankets, 
counterpanes, and linens, which articles shall not be considered part of the equipment 
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of the ship." Furthermore, preparation of the ship for naval service and restoration for 
peacetime service would be paid for by the Admiralty.193 
 Ismay's new idea gained quick acceptance and Edward Harland immediately 
began drawing up acceptable plans for a pair of ships.194 Teutonic and Majestic, launched 
in 1889 and 1890, were the results. The ships were built for speed and quick conversion 
to auxiliary cruisers, with hidden gun mounts and structural support built into the 
design so as not to interfere with their primary role as passenger liners. The twins could 
be armed with twelve Armstrong 26 pounders, with a range of 200 yards, and eight 
machine guns.195 Proclaimed the best designed ship the Admiralty had yet seen, 
Teutonic was finished in time for conversion to an armed merchant cruiser and 
presented at the Spithead Naval Review of 1889.196 
 White Star's Teutonic and Majestic also introduced several other major 
innovations in the construction of the ocean liner. Naval vessels faced greater sailing 
stresses than their commercial counterparts. They tended to sail at maximum speeds for 
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longer periods of time and received less frequent stays in dry dock for maintenance and 
repair. The new ships were built accordingly. And because they were expected to be 
fast, Harland & Wolff designers installed the most powerful engines possible. This 
allowed White Star to finance the costs of competing for the Blue Riband with 
government subsidies instead of company profits. By doing so, they avoided some of 
the costs other lines incurred in maintaining speed records.  
 At the 1889 naval review at Spithead, Britain in honor of Kaiser Wilhelm II of 
Germany's state visit, Teutonic played guest to members of the British royal family.197 
Kaiser Wilhelm also paid the liner a visit, marveling, "We must have some of these," 
marking Germany's entry in the race for the greatest ocean liner.198 The elegance of the 
Teutonic and Majestic marked a new standard in luxury and comfort. White Star found 
that their new twins attracted passengers because of comfort alone.   
 As had become typical, the White Star-Harland & Wolff cost-plus relationship 
resulted in superior ships. Meanwhile, the British government's subsidy was based on 
size, speed and usefulness of the liner to the admiralty.199 Building the largest, fastest 
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liner possible became particularly important to the interests of both White Star and 
Harland & Wolff.  Although the cost of building larger and faster ships increased 
significantly for White Star, especially given the military standards now included, 
larger ships also brought larger subsidies to the company. White Star, meanwhile, could 
count on a new income stream that promoted the best upkeep possible. As a final 
display of shrewd business sense, White Star could benefit from the publicity it received 
from presenting itself as a patriotic company. Teutonic arrived at the naval review of 
1889 fitted out as an armed merchant cruiser for that reason.200 
However, White Star had its eye on more than just government service. White 
Star also took advantage of increased import-export business by building liners 
expressly for cargo and livestock service. During the 1890s, as it asserted dominance 
over the British share of the Atlantic market, the company also expanded into the 
development of cargo liners. Harland & Wolff provided such ships as the Nomadic and 
Tauric of 1891 and Naronic of 1892. These ships were specially designed for the exclusive 
transport of livestock, with minimal accommodation. They were designed principally 
for ranchers to oversee their stock, not for general passengers. These were shortly 
followed by the "Jubilee" class of 1899. These five ships took advantage of lessons 
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learned on the Australian run and Shaw, Savill, and Albion charter routes. They carried 
as many as 100,000 beef carcasses in refrigerated cargo holds.201 Here again, Harland & 
Wolff provided White Star with the best possible ship with new technologies, 
specifically in the refrigeration plants.  
 Queen Victoria's naval review at Spithead, near Hampshire, in June 1897 
provided another chance at innovation for Harland & Wolff engineers. Even though the 
assembled might of Her Majesty's navy and mercantile marine lined the harbor, the hit 
of the show was the uninvited, privately-built and owned Turbinia. The first turbine 
powered ship in the world, it raced through the lines of anchored ships at 32 knots. 
Although Royal Navy launches attempted to catch the intruder, Turbinia effortlessly left 
them wallowing in her wake. 
Inventor Charles Parsons, observers later learned, had privately designed the 
ship.202 His invention, the turbine, was able to use steam that usually got wasted 
through exhaust. This made steam engines more efficient and powerful and lowered 
the consumption of coal. This innovation in steam engines not only made the power 
plants more efficient, but far more economical and allowed higher speeds than ever. 
                                                          
201 Anonymous, "A New Torpedo-Boat Destroyer." Manchester Guardian, June 28, 1897. 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/guardian/ 
 
202 Ibid. 
 
111 
 
Most ships of the era had one or two screws. Now, a third screw could be added using 
the left-over steam in a low-pressure turbine. The development made for more fuel 
efficient, faster ships that that cost the same, if not less, than earlier vessels.  
Both merchants and naval leaders immediately looked into using turbines on 
their ships. White Star built major ships to test the new style of engines. Magantic and 
Laurentic of 1909, for example, were identical ships except for the difference in their 
engines.203  One ship was powered with triple expansion engines and a turbine geared 
to three screws, while the other ship had older style quadruple expansion engines 
geared to two screws. Testing found that that the ship with turbines, Laurentic, was 
faster and more economical than her twin sister. This despite the fact that Laurentic’s 
hull was dirty and Megantic’s had been recently cleaned and painted, decreasing water 
resistance.204 The information got tucked neatly away for the Olympic class, already in 
the earliest design phases at Harland & Wolff.  
 In the meantime, White Star’s leaders decided to continue the advancement 
of the Atlantic liner in the direction that had already brought them such accolades. 
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Having found a partial recipe for success in the Teutonic and Majestic, the company 
decided to go all in on the idea that comfortable crossings were the preferred mode for 
the sea faring public with the Oceanic of 1899. When White Star ordered its next ship 
from Harland & Wolff, it emphasized this new strategy, leaving speed laurels, extra 
maintenance, and higher fuel costs to Cunard and other lines.205 
 R.M.S. Oceanic, representative of this new focus on comfort and luxury, 
gained note for several reasons. First was her size. At 705 feet long and 17,274 tons, she 
earned the title "largest ship in the world."206 She was the first ship to exceed the length 
of the Great Eastern built forty years before, yet was lighter in tonnage. Her interiors 
were lavish in the extreme. The Ismays spent a great deal of time with consultants to 
make sure the designs were perfect for the new company flagship.207 Passenger 
accommodation stood at 410 1st class, 200 2nd and 1,000 3rd.208 While immigrant 
passengers remained the dominant share of profit (311,715 people divided among the 
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Atlantic lines in 1899), cargo also accounted for a significant share of the profits.209 In 
1899, the total value of American exports exceeded $1,478,050, 000 ($45,033,334,246 in 
2018 dollars).210 Oceanic's expanded hold areas allowed increased cargo capabilities, not 
to mention profit, for White Star. This potential for profit was not lost on the 
management of the other lines trading on the Atlantic. Immigration to the United States 
was generally a one-way trip, meaning ships usually sailed home with a nearly empty 
3rd class. By including large and fully loaded cargo holds, shipping lines could 
guarantee profit in both directions.  
 The Oceanic represented the pinnacle of White Star’s achievements but also 
represented tragedy for the Ismays. Thomas Ismay died not long after Oceanic’s 
completion. With his death the chairmanship of White Star passed into the hands of his 
son, J. Bruce Ismay. The younger Ismay came to power just as Griscom’s and Morgan’s 
associates began working on their International Mercantile Marine Project. 
Interestingly, on May 7, 1901, Ismay replied to a letter from the second lord Inverclyde 
addressing concerns about the growing threat of an American take over. “I cannot at 
present see how our interests will be influenced by the amalgamation,” he wrote, “but 
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feel sure The Americans have made Their mind to have a larger share of the Atlantic 
trade.”211 Ismay could not have been more correct with his prediction. Within a year of 
that letter, White Star became part of the amalgamation.  
Conclusion 
 The late 19th century proved fertile, if challenging, territory for the rebirth of 
the American merchant marine. Clement Griscom took steps to build on and expand 
new business opportunities, aided by modern communications technology and changes 
in business. Although these efforts faced challenges in the form of antiquated and over 
protective registry laws, they nevertheless slowly changed in the face of economic 
opportunity provided by new communications and travel technology that made 
international conglomerate business possible, practical and potentially highly 
profitable. Between the economic opportunities and the growing acceptance of Mahan's 
naval theories Griscom's endeavor enjoyed a favorable atmosphere that did not exist 
previously. The story of White Star’s founding and early growth, by contrast, provide 
an interesting counter narrative of national policy in a country with a history far more 
positively disposed to shipping. That these stories eventually converge helps illustrate 
the changing nature of business at the time.  
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To circumvent the obstacles in his path, Griscom used new developments in 
technology to take advantage of more friendly business environments, most notably in 
founding the Red Star Line in Belgium. By offering sailings supported by the 
Pennsylvania Railroad and choosing a centralized location in Europe as a base, Griscom 
offered shippers low rates and an excellent distribution point. These benefits were 
particularly advantageous for J. P. Morgan's U. S. Steel. Morgan's involvement as an 
early investor in Griscom's International Navigation Company allowed Morgan to see 
the potential for a larger Atlantic monopoly. While this occurred, Alfred Mahan was 
building an ideological base among politicians and the public that supported nautical 
expansion and an expanded merchant marine. After languishing for some time, the 
American merchant marine soon experienced a renaissance as a result of these collective 
factors.  
 At the same time, across the Atlantic, the founding and growth of Thomas 
Ismay's White Star Line demonstrated the potential of sympathetic interests acting in 
concert, even in the face of a crowded business with long established rivals. Like 
Morgan's integrated business interests, White Star and Harland & Wolff Shipbuilders 
supported one another through their early struggles and built a foundation for future 
expansion. When Ismay threatened John Burns with a shipbuilding race in 1885, Burns 
knew his Cunard Line would lose. While Burns had to negotiate with shipbuilders for 
new terms on each ship he built, Ismay could rely on the relationship with Harland & 
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Wolff to build the best ships at the lowest prices. Additionally, Burns' ships, even when 
they were the same class on paper, often differed wildly from one another in reality, 
while White Star ships were more uniform designs, easing White Star's logistical needs. 
The structure of the partnership between White Star and Harland & Wolff, with its 
efficiency and foundational strength, no doubt enhanced the line’s standing as 
Morgan's favorite Atlantic transport. When the time came to choose a flagship line, 
what better line for Morgan to select? The next chapter will explore the implications of 
this choice on both sides of the Atlantic and for the future of international shipping.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Olympic Dreams, Titanic Troubles and Gigantic Responses  
The White Star Buyout, Cunard's Escape and the Olympic Class Liners 
 
After stunning the shipping world with the purchase of Leyland Line, J. P. 
Morgan and his International Mercantile Marine became the greatest threat that British 
shipping had ever faced outside of war. The question looming in British shipping circles 
centered on what Morgan’s next acquisition would be.212 The answer did not take long 
to discover.  
                                                          
212 Anonymous, "American Shipping Trust Rumors." Manchester Guardian, January 21, 
1902. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/guardian/advancedsearch.html (accessed October 28, 
2014). Anonymous, "The European V. American Merchant Navies," The Manchester 
Guardian, April 30, 1902. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/guardian/advancedsearch.html 
(accessed October 28, 2014 
 
118 
 
White Star Line, with its new, superlative steamers made an obvious target, 
especially considering the recent death of its founder and the ascension to leadership of 
next generation family members. While J. Bruce Ismay, son of the line's founder, 
wanted to continue family stewardship for White Star, other, older members of 
company leadership looked forward to retirement.213 That William Pirrie, chairman of 
Harland & Wolff, emerged as Morgan’s primary ally in negotiating with the Ismays no 
doubt made them more willing to listen to Morgan’s buyout offers. When Morgan’s 
negotiations with the Ismays reached a successful conclusion, the controversy of the 
Leyland purchase looked like a festive occasion by comparison.  
For Morgan’s monopoly to work effectively, however, he had to control all major 
shipping firms on the North Atlantic that served American ports. To have this control, 
Morgan concluded, he also needed to acquire the Cunard Line. Yet in contrast to his 
successful acquisition of the White Star Line, Morgan’s pursuit of Cunard proved a far 
more complicated affair. In large part, this was due to the intervention of the British 
government through loans and subsidies that allowed Cunard to remain independent, 
renew its fleet and construct two of the most successful liners ever built to that time. 
The desire to compete with Cunard's new liners, in turn, prompted IMM’s leaders to 
produce still bigger and more superlative ships under the auspices of White Star Line. 
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Having worked so hard to build an international conglomerate, Morgan—and perhaps 
equally, J. Bruce Ismay and Lord William Pirrie of Harland & Wolff—would not let 
Cunard have the greatest liners in the world without a contest.  
IMM’s position may have seemed secure in the early 1900s, but in little more 
than a decade, all of this—the elusive pursuit of Cunard, the increased competition with 
that firm, and the consequent shipbuilding program—would lead to IMM's ultimate 
downfall. In the short term, White Star's new building program brought improved 
financial stability, thanks to increased stock sales and public relations gains as the new 
ships gained press coverage around the world. In the long term, however, the loss of 
two out of three of the new ships would bring on public relations nightmares and 
contribute to the loss of talent in leadership at the highest levels of IMM. Specifically, 
the sinking of Titanic caused a significant loss of confidence among the public in 
massive liners. The fact that J. Bruce Ismay survived the Titanic disaster, moreover, 
made him undesirable as president of IMM from a public relations standpoint, even 
though he had provided excellent leadership that stabilized IMM during his tenure.214 
Complicating matters further, J. P. Morgan's death in 1913, not only removed the 
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driving force of IMM but further decreased public trust in its leadership as previously 
unknown or secondary figures took over leadership positions. In the wake of these 
ruptures, the third ship in the Olympic class, Gigantic (hastily renamed Britannic) never 
even entered commercial service; instead, it served as a hospital ship in World War I, 
until sunk by a mine near the Greek island of Kea in 1915. Together, these events 
proved serious blows to what had become a shaky organization.  
Although all of these factors contributed to IMM’s decline, one additional issue—
the escape of Cunard Line from IMM—arguably played an even greater part in the 
company’s ultimate demise. Without Cunard, Morgan never held complete control of 
all the major shipping entering or leaving New York. Although Morgan later made 
arrangements that allowed IMM to at least co-exist with the shippers on the European 
continent, such as the French Line, Hamburg-Amerika Line and the German 
Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL), Cunard remained completely British. This was significant 
from both symbolic and economic points of view. Symbolically, the oldest trans-
Atlantic shipping firm, established in the 1830s, remained British. Economically, 
Cunard gained the backing of the British Empire for its coming competition with IMM.   
 Despite the important role that each of the forgoing factors played in IMM’s 
20th century decline, historians have largely failed to analyze their significance to the 
IMM's story. As mentioned in the introduction, most historians have proven more 
concerned with the Olympic class ships in their own right. Scholars tend to explain the 
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creation of the Olympic class as a vanity project for J. Bruce Ismay in reply to Cunard's 
Lusitania and Mauretania, if they connect them to previous events or successive super-
liners at all.215 They also fail to consider the leadership vacuum caused by the 
devastating losses of Ismay and Morgan to the long-term health of IMM and the public 
relations ramifications that resulted. All of these events played a role in the history of 
IMM in particular and the North Atlantic in general.216 Considering the historical 
context, much of this is not surprising. The loss of Titanic occurred just two short years 
before the outbreak of World War I. Britannic's sinking happened as part of the greater 
horrors of the Gallipoli campaigns, with what could be considered trivial loss of life (34 
total) compared to the context of the theater of war let alone the entire war.217 At the 
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same time, the difficulties IMM faced in the boardroom got eclipsed by a nation 
alternately studiously avoiding and then preparing for war. With this international 
maelstrom of cataclysmic events, it is hardly surprising that relatively mundane 
business history has been largely ignored. This chapter will not only examine that 
history, but also bring it into the context of the world events that surrounded them. 
 Writing on shipping during this period is dominated by the construction of 
warships and the dreadnought arms race.218 This is understandable because of the 
stunning proliferation of dreadnought battleships prior to World War I. For example, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, nicknamed the "ABC Countries" took part in the naval race 
resulting in the near ruin of their economies. The climax came when Brazilian policy 
makers attempted to build the largest, most power dreadnought in the western 
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hemisphere. Named Rio de Janeiro, the warship measured 671 feet and carried seven 
turrets mounting a total of fourteen 12 inch guns. By July 1912, the Brazilians realized 
they could not afford the ship and began looking for buyers. The Ottoman Empire 
purchased the ship while still being built, renaming her Sultan Osman I. The 
intervention of Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty prevented her delivery 
and she ended up in the Royal Navy as Agincourt after the Ottoman's friendly relations 
to Germany were revealed. The Ottoman's Reshadieh became the Royal Navy's Erin for 
the same reason. Likewise, Chile's Almirante Latorre, and Almirante Cochrane became 
Britain's Canada and Eagle because of Chilean financial problems.219 The drama and 
technological achievements that surrounded the dreadnought race make for fascinating 
reading and certainly draw attention because of their direct relation to the causes of 
WWI.  
In an effort to fill this gap in the historiography, this chapter will examine events 
between 1901 and 1912, including the buyout of White Star, the escape of Cunard, and 
the idea, planning, construction and reception of the Olympic class. It will consider the 
Olympic class in detail, with a focus not solely on ships, but instead on those ships as 
symbols, analyzing what they meant at the time and what competing lines were 
prompted to do in response. The ships enjoyed status as technological marvels. Each 
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ship featured new innovations from swimming pools, electric lights and 
communications devices, elevators and safety controls to what today seems like a basic 
service such as individual restrooms and bathing facilities for cabins. All of these 
enhancements blazed new trails in comfort during trans-ocean travel.  
Additionally, the ability to build these ships reinforced an industrial elite 
separating nations by capacity and levels of craftsmanship during an age of 
international empire. A sign of Germany's emergence as a world power stemmed not 
only from its industrial might, but its newfound ability to ship those goods on native 
built ships that equaled or exceeded Britain's most advanced designs. Likewise, even 
the names of these ships conjured images of national strength, industrial might, and 
both current and long past imperial glory. Roman provinces such as Mauretania and 
Lusitania, were represented by British ships that were olympic, titanic and even 
gigantic in scale. The Germans honored emperors (Imperator) or the nation itself 
(Vaterland). Looking at the ships and the business and politics that surrounded them 
helps give insight into the popular psyche of the era. 
 This chapter brings all of the issues into conversation with the more dominant 
events of the time period to establish a more complete picture of how commercialism 
influenced the age of empire and general society on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Historians who examine this period have documented the maritime naval race for 
dreadnought supremacy during the era. They have also studied the technological race 
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for advance land and air forces. However, the race for dominance in civilian maritime 
circles and how it fed into this intense nationalist competition has largely been ignored. 
The liners themselves encourage this perception. While viewing the grandeur of 
Titanic's first class reception room or Mauretania's skylights, or the comfort of 
Vaterland's lounge, it's hard to see these ships as statements of nationalist supremacy. 
One is easily diverted to admiring the artisanship of stained glass windows, hand 
carved woodwork, ornate paintings and comfortable looking club chairs that filled all 
the great liners. Nonetheless, these ships served a role in claiming nationalistic 
dominance just as much as they served as modes of travel, goods transportation, and 
recreation. This struggle is illustrated particularly well by Morgan's attempt to gain 
control of Cunard and the events the followed which led directly to the inception of the 
Olympic class liners.  
1902 and Full Speed Ahead 
White Star's Cedric sailed on her maiden voyage in 1902. Her new design, 
balancing cargo and passenger into a highly profitable combination on both legs of the 
Atlantic route, may have helped set White Star above Cunard on Morgan’s list of future 
acquisitions. The new ship had a cargo capacity of 17,000 tons and a service speed of 19 
knots using 280 tons of coal per day. It also soon set the company record for carrying 
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passengers at 2,957 during one trip in 1904.220 In the minds of the White Star’s leaders, 
Cedric had achieved the optimum cargo-passenger-fuel ratio. Its success prompted them 
to build three sisters—Celtic, Baltic, and Adriatic—over the next four years. Each was 
slightly longer and heavier than the one before it and each held the record of world's 
largest liner.221 
 As compared to White Star's Britannic of 1874, Cedric represented the 
tremendous changes in shipping technology that had occurred over the past quarter 
century. Britannic and her identical sister, Germanic, debuted as Blue Riband racers, each 
gaining the speed award. Both originally had auxiliary sails coupled with a single 
screw. Cedric, like Britannic, had her passenger accommodations in the center of the 
ship, with ends reserved for cargo. The newer ship, however, showed the increased hull 
volume that allowed for significantly more cargo capacity. Additionally, by 1901, 
multiple propellers joined the many designs allowing steamers to dispense with sail 
altogether, another factor that allowed dramatic growth. No longer hindered by having 
to remain small enough for the wind to propel it, ships could grow to enormous 
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proportions. Cedric thus demonstrated the continuity and the changes in liner design 
and technology that had occurred in the past 28 years.222 
 The four new ships, built between 1901 and 1907, allowed White Star to gain 
more experience with cargo-passenger ships while building its reputation for 
comfortable transportation. Harland & Wolff, meanwhile, honed designs that coupled 
reliable engine plants, moderate speed and hull forms that emphasized comfort at sea 
with increased internal volume. The process had been a long one. White Star and 
Harland & Wolff's business partnership had been beneficial for both parties and 
provided them with a great deal of practical experience in a short amount of time. By 
establishing solid business foundations, the companies were in position for bigger 
things.  
The means to finance larger and larger ships, however, faced several hurdles. At 
this point, the technical expertise already existed with Harland & Wolff to build the 
Olympic class, but the financial means, not to mention the motivation, did not—at least 
not yet. White Star could not count on the admiralty subsidy for armed merchant 
                                                          
222 Age, however, did not completely eliminate utility. Under other names for different 
owners, Britannic's twin Germanic, built in 1874, soldiered on until 1950, before sailing to 
the scrap yard at nearly seventy-five years old, a testament to the quality of Harland 
&Wolff's construction. In that time she served the Dominion Line, sailing to Canada and 
found her way to the Mediterranean, spending her last years as a store ship and floating 
hotel in Constantinople. See Anderson, White Star, 60; Frank O. Braynard, and William 
H. Miller, Fifty Famous Liners 3, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 16 - 17. 
128 
 
cruisers because they no longer built the fastest ships, though the mail subsidy 
remained intact. The company was profitable, but that did not give them enough cash 
on hand and the company never took loans for new construction. The company's 
profitability, sales of stock, and revenue from government subsidies had always been 
sufficient to cover business expenses and reasonable expansion. As ships got bigger, 
those expenses multiplied. Longer, heavier ships required stronger engines which 
needed greater amounts of fuel. Increased passenger space had to be furnished, 
equipped to fill passenger's needs, victualed and maintained, which required increased 
staff. This exponential increase in ships' size corresponded to an exponential increase in 
business expenses. Potentially, these expenses could be more easily handled as part of 
an international combine.   
Morgan’s initial overtures for purchase of White Star occurred at this time with 
the first newspaper rumors appearing in October 1901. Reports said that once Morgan's 
current tour of the Pacific ended, he intended to go to Liverpool to complete 
negotiations, which were to be started by his representative, Clinton Dawkins. Both J. 
Bruce Ismay and John Lee, American-Canadian manager of White Star, denied the 
report. According to stories in the Mail and Express, even Dawkins claimed ignorance 
saying, "If there are any negotiations pending for the control of the White Star Line I do 
not know of them. Mr. Ismay denied the reports when he was here. If there had been 
any change I have not been informed of it. I do not think there is anything in these new 
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statements." The paper also observed that White Star's capital stood at £750,000 
($11,866,905 in 2018) in 750 shares of £1,000 each. Making purchase of a controlling 
interest even more difficult was that most of it belonged to the Ismay family.223 Rumors 
continued in the press through October and into December, despite repeated denials by 
Ismay.224 One paper even quoted Ismay as saying "Mr. Morgan hasn't money enough to 
buy the White Star Line."225 
On October 21, 1901, Lord Inverclyde's associate, David Jardine, received word 
from Vernon Brown, a shipping agent in New York, that he had gotten a call from a Mr. 
Scwabb of North German Lloyd (NDL). Schwabb had confided to him that not only 
White Star, but also Cunard, had been bought by Morgan's syndicate. While Brown 
thought the rumors were incorrect, he noted that Ismay had consistently denied being 
in negotiations with Morgan. "Mr. Ismay could very likely truthfully say that he had 
had no interview or negotiations whatever with Mr. Morgan, but I do not think he has 
ever been asked to affirm or deny whether or not he has had any negotiations with 
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other parties,” Brown explained. “I have good reason to believe that various interviews 
were held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel between Mr. Ismay and Messers. Griscom and 
Barker,” he continued, “both of which gentlemen were also at the Waldorf the evening 
before Mr. Ismay sailed for home."226 It is worth noting that Ismay arrived in New York 
in September 1901 aboard the new Celtic, accompanied by William Pirrie of Harland & 
Wolff. While his arrival was mentioned in the press at the time, the recent assassination 
of President McKinley overshadowed news of potential meetings between Ismay and 
Morgan.227 One of Morgan’s allies in the negotiations to purchase White Star Line was 
William Pirrie, first viscount Pirrie, chairman of Harland & Wolff, who counted Atlantic 
Transport, an earlier Morgan purchase, as a client of his shipyard. Lord Pirrie became 
Morgan's primary negotiator with White Star stockholders, no doubt giving Morgan's 
overtures a friendlier face.228 
By November, Jardine had a stream of intelligence coming in from Vernon 
Brown regarding negotiations between Morgan, Ismay, and others. Brown seemed to 
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have contacts close to the negotiations. On November 15th, he reported that the 
Hamburg-Amerika line had been approached and that Albert Ballin, chairman of the 
line, visited London to flatly refuse the sale. Likewise NDL, the other leading German 
line, refused to consider any offer. Brown believed this to be German national policy. "I 
have reason to believe [Kaiser Wilhelm himself] has personally expressed his 
displeasure of the scheme," he commented.229 Brown also believed that negotiations 
were ongoing with White Star, though he had very little solid information. In what 
seemed a backhanded way, even to Cunard leadership, pressure decreased on Cunard. 
"The fact that no overtures have been made to the Cunard Company so far as I know 
would seem to indicate that they are no longer considered so important a factor in the 
trade as formerly."230 Inverclyde seemed to feel that Cunard was so insignificant that it 
was not worth Morgan's pursuit.  
Inverclyde had plenty of reasons to make this assumption. From the point of 
view of potential outside investors, such as Morgan, the entire Cunard fleet consisted of 
obsolete and aging ships. To be competitive with Morgan's combine—or as Inverclyde 
seemed to believe, to be considered worth adding to the combine—Cunard needed a 
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major fleet renewal program. This was out of the question, however, for an independent 
company with limited funds and a shaky future. Brown wrote about this topic a few 
times noting that "we cannot afford to sit still and see our business drift away from us, 
and yet the very discouraging outlook for shipping for the next year or two at any rate, 
coupled with the uncertainty of the fate of the Ship Subsidy Bill cannot but cause 
serious doubts and anxiety in the minds of yourself and associates as to the policy to be 
pursued."231 Besides making Cunard unattractive for outside investment, the state of the 
fleet appeared to make it a minimal threat in commercial competition.  
Just a few days later, in November 1901, Brown had more news to share: a friend 
of his, whom he did not name, but who was apparently was "close to Mr. Morgan and 
other members of the Syndicate (and who I have suspicions may be a member himself)" 
told Jardine that during Ismay and Pirrie's recent visit to New York, Ismay had named 
terms for the buyout of White Star. Brown's associate, however, believed that the large 
figures named by Ismay made a sale improbable "without modifications." At the same 
time, Dominion Line, a shipping company primarily serving Canada, came to an 
agreement with Morgan through Pirrie, whom the Dominion board of directors had 
authorized to negotiate for them.232 The importance of the acquisition by Morgan of the 
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Dominion Line lay in that the company served ports as far south as New Orleans and as 
far north into Canada as Montreal, with direct service to Europe. Although Dominion 
did offer some passenger service, the fleet’s more significant virtue was that it provided 
substantial cargo transport capacity.233 This gave Morgan's export import shipping lines 
a greater share of the market as well as serving a wider variety ports making the 
combine's services more available to shippers.  
Interestingly, this friend had asked Brown about possible Cunard negotiations, 
which he avoided. Brown warned Jardine, however, that he might be approached by 
syndicate representatives in the near future, even noting that some syndicate 
representatives had recently departed for England on Cunard ships. He also cautioned 
against "naming any price or even admit[ting] that a proposition might be 
entertained."234 Brown gave sound advice. Naming a price tended to only encourage 
Morgan; it suggested that a deal could be made and only details need be negotiated.  
The newspapers seemed to bear out Brown's assessment. One report stated, "The 
White Star people were informally asked to name a figure at which they would sell, but 
that figure proved so far beyond the ideas of the proposed purchasers that the subject 
was not pursued further.” The report continued that “the contention that of the White 
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Star people that no negotiations whatever had been entered into is, therefore, 
technically correct."235 A New York paper quoted Ismay as saying, "The White Star Line 
is not for sale." Yet that interview happened in January 1902, when Ismay arrived in 
New York with Lord Pirrie, Henry Wilding, and a pair of maritime lawyers.236 Another 
paper illustrated the lengths to which Morgan interests went to secure infrastructure to 
support the shipping trust. Documenting a "land grab" to build a railroad to service the 
waterfront, the paper explained, "English and American capitalists, worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars, are backing this scheme." After noting that $60 million had already 
been earmarked for the project, the paper hinted, "Others are ready to furnish all the 
money necessary to push the project to completion."237 Added together, all this pointed 
to Morgan's willingness to spend whatever it took to accomplish his goals—including 
getting Ismay and the White Star Line leadership to visit New York to at least hear 
Morgan out.  
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Relief from Brown's report, if any, proved short lived because on January 17, 
1902, Brown wrote that "Messers. Ismay, Graves, Pirrie, Wilding and Dickenson" had 
departed Liverpool on Celtic for New York. "This indeed looks like business and would 
make it seem probable that some sort of an arrangement is likely to be reached."238 A 
few days later, Brown wrote again with detailed information, which later proved highly 
accurate. Ismay and Pirrie, Brown believed, were authorized to negotiate on behalf of 
White Star and Dominion Lines, respectively. Morgan, Brown thought, intended to take 
all the shares he and his syndicate had acquired and place them in a parent company, 
along the same lines of Morgan's Northern Securities.239 Northern Securities held 
control of the Burlington, Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, Northern Pacific, and Great 
Northern railroads stock, effectively creating a massive land based transport monopoly 
(although the justice department later sued and broke up the monopoly under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, this was not finalized until 1904). In 1902, Morgan's intentions 
seemed clear.  
Brown assumed that Morgan planned to build an Atlantic monopoly exactly like 
Northern Securities. In doing so, Morgan would control land- and sea-based shipping 
from the Pacific coast all the way to Europe.  Brown still thought Ismay intended to 
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name a value for White Star far beyond a reasonable exchange of stocks options in 
Morgan's syndicate. However, he thought a cash price might be indicated to which 
Morgan would agree. Concerning Morgan's resolve to see his project completed, Brown 
wrote, "...I assume he has gone so far in this matter that he will strain a point to 
accomplish his ends rather than abandon the project."240 
Ominously, Brown noted that if White Star made a deal, Cunard would be the 
only independent company on the Liverpool trade. Brown offered to act in negotiations, 
but he thought that Morgan's friends might have something more subtle in mind. 
Brown knew that some associated with the syndicate already held Cunard stock and 
could discreetly get more, perhaps enough to gain control of the company without 
having to go through a buyout. In fact, John H. McFadden, a Mr. Dempster, "and others 
who are acting in harmony" supposedly owned one-third of Cunard stock, and Brown 
believed they "had been in communication with some member of the Syndicate."241 
Although rumors remained inconclusive regarding Morgan’s intentions toward 
Cunard, the German lines seemed to have come to an arrangement. While they avoided 
being subsumed into the syndicate, they did reach an agreement with regards to rates 
as long as they respected rates for British ports. However, Brown noted that Albert 
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Ballin of Hamburg-Amerika and Director Wiegard of the board of NDL were expected 
to arrive in New York shortly.242 Experience suggested that when a shipping line's 
leadership traveled to New York, a buyout announcement soon followed. Concern 
grew that the German lines may still be in play for acquisition. Coyness on the part of 
White Star leadership only served to compound rumors. 
Even at this late date, Ismay, Pirrie and others flatly denied impending buyouts. 
The group that arrived in January 1902 included Ismay, Pirrie, and White Star board 
member W. S. Graves; Henry Wilding, English agent of Griscom's International 
Navigation and chairman of Leyland Line; and maritime lawyers Ralph Neville and 
John Dickerson. All claimed ignorance. Ismay stated to reporters," I wish to say 
positively that the White Star Line is not for sale. There is not money enough in the 
possession of any American capitalist or combination of American capitalists to buy it." 
When asked the significance of so many important men of the steamship business 
arriving together, Ismay replied, “Our coming as members of one party is purely a 
coincidence."243 This convenient story got further embellishment in other papers, with 
ever more ridiculous claims.244 No doubt Inverclyde fumed while reading Vernon 
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Brown's reports side by side with the newspaper accounts, including Brown's most 
recent letter, which stated that the Ismay party had several meetings with Griscom and 
his representatives, including a partner of Morgan's named Steele.245 
Finally, on February 5, 1902, Lord Inverclyde received news from Brown in a 
coded telegram: "Contradict Syndicate Acquired Cloakedly Clepsommia All Services 
Clepsommia Party Acosmia Oceanic Bashful Cacophonie With Clickers Clewlines."246 
Inverclyde wrote back saying he translated the code to say, “Contradict syndicate 
acquired Dominion White Star Line all services. White Star party sail from here Oceanic 
referring to our letter of (blank) working agreement established between Hamburg 
American Packet Co. and North German Lloyd." Evidently, the code proved opaque 
even to Inverclyde, who wasn't certain what letters Brown referred to and lacked clarity 
on what the coded message meant.247 Inverclyde replied, "Even with all your letters 
before me, the whole thing remains somewhat of a mystery, because what did the 
distinguished party connected with the White Star company go to New York for?"248 
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The word "contradict" confused him, even though it later turned out to be part of the 
code.  
In a follow up letter, also on February 5, Brown finally broke the news to 
Inverclyde: White Star and Dominion Line had both been acquired and that shortly an 
American parent company would indeed be formed along the lines of Northern 
Securities. Although each line would continue to manage its own day-to-day 
operations, Morgan and "his friends" now owned a controlling stock interest and the 
parent company would have an American board of directors.249 As for the coded 
telegram, Brown clarified that "our letter" referred to the letters of the February 5th and 
7th and that the rumors they contained were correct.250 The confusing word "contradict" 
had meant that the telegram was intended for Inverclyde only.  
Brown's information proved mostly accurate, although it did not include some 
side issues about which his associates could not have known. For instance, in February 
1902, as an incentive to Lord Pirrie, Morgan offered an agreement to Harland & Wolff, 
which stated that “all orders for new vessels and for heavy repairs, or alterations that 
require to be done at a shipyard in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
including reboilering, re-engining [sic] and suchlike" would be given to Harland & 
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Wolff.251 This move gave the firm not only the lucrative repair and maintenance work 
for hundreds of ships, but also the majority of the new construction contracts. The 
influx of business assured Harland & Wolff's financial status for as long as Morgan's 
trust existed. It also further reinforced their ability to upgrade and expand the 
shipyards as new technologies became available. As for the specifics of the deal with 
White Star, Morgan offered the shareholders a payment of $32 million ($940,967,441 in 
2018).252 Interestingly, Brown had guessed that this figure would be between $40 and 
$45 million.253 Of that sum, 25% would be in cash and 75% in preferred stock of the 
International Mercantile Marine, worth 37.5% of the total stock of the syndicate.254 
The negotiations for White Star demonstrate the length to Morgan would go for 
his objective. To purchase what he envisioned as his flagship line, Morgan offered vast 
sums of stock, cash, and other benefits for a highly profitable and widely respected 
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Atlantic steamship firm.  Cunard Line did not enjoy the stature of White Star during 
this period, giving Inverclyde reason for concern. If Morgan should make offers to 
Cunard Line stock holders, what reason would they have, aside from patriotism, to 
keep Cunard British? They were men of business after all, and Morgan seemed to have 
the money to make a Cunard buy out very good business.  
At this point, the deal for White Star had just one more step: formal approval 
from the Ismay family. At first, the Ismays resisted the offer. Margaret Ismay, the 
widow of company founder Thomas Ismay, stood strongly against the buyout for 
sentimental reasons. In the end, however, she accepted Morgan’s terms, though not 
without some sadness. As she recorded in her diary in mid-May 1902, “The Annual 
Meeting of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, and the last one I fear, as it has 
passed into the hands of others. It is a great wrench being 'His' life’s work…” Earlier in 
the month she expressed similar feelings, adding that she believed Bruce Ismay, the 
company chairman and her son, had done the best he could in the negotiations.255 With 
the sale, White Star went from a family-owned business to just one part of a vast 
international concern.  
§§§ 
                                                          
255 Oldham, The Ismay Line, 141 
142 
 
J.P. Morgan’s 1902 purchase of White Star sent shockwaves through the British 
shipping industry and the British government, causing even more consternation than 
the earlier purchase of Leyland Line. White Star, along with Cunard, stood as the great 
symbols of British international commerce. Not only had the largest British cargo 
carriers fallen into American hands, but so had many passenger lines. This was 
especially distressing in the case of White Star since its most recent ships combined 
large cargo and passenger capabilities, making them perfect for use as military 
transports. Without the cargo and troop capacity these ships represented, many Britons 
recognized, Britain’s position in the event of war could become very precarious indeed.  
In Parliament, the president of the Board of Trade, Gerald Balfour, and the 
Secretary to the Admiralty, Hugh Arnold-Forster faced questions as concern now grew 
for the future of Cunard.256 The topic became a recurring one in Parliament. On May 1, 
Sir James Woodhouse made a lengthy floor speech asking questions about the syndicate 
and what it meant to British shipping.  He also expressed concern of another registry 
bill being enacted by the American Congress, which would allow ships under Morgan's 
control to gain American registry.  Another member of Parliament, Gibson Bowles, 
observed that 350 ships representing over 2,000,000 tons sailed under Morgan's control. 
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Although Balfour and other government leaders tried to calm the members of 
Commons, questions became heated before ending for the day.257 On May 12, 
recriminations resumed as three members of Commons took Balfour to task, grilling 
him on whether the Syndicate could take over Cunard as well.258 Concern for Cunard 
continued as Lord Charles Bearesford asked pointedly if any contract or agreement 
existed allowing the syndicate to buy out Cunard. Again, Balfour answered no.259 
Cunard’s continued independence would, in time, come back to haunt the 
International Mercantile Marine.260 In the first years of the 20th century, however, British 
fears were definitely stoked as Morgan's syndicate, having just purchased White Star, 
turned its attention to actively and rather openly pursuing Cunard. 
Cunard’s Evasive Action  
As Morgan turned his attention to Cunard, many Britons began to fret. If Cunard 
were bought out, they recognized, Britain, the "ruler of the waves," would lose all of its 
most prestigious merchant ships and many navy auxiliary vessels. Concern now grew, 
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among British politicians and citizenry, for the future of the line. The results of the 
sideshow playing out with Cunard provided the prompting to build the Olympic class. 
Between 1901 and 1902 Morgan made repeated buyout offers to Cunard Line, 
each of which its chairman, Inverclyde, rebuffed. Inverclyde hoped that as concern 
grew in Parliament that the Empire was losing its merchant fleet, government officials’ 
understanding of the importance of Cunard would grow, allowing him to use it as 
leverage to encourage government intervention.  
Hindering Lord Inverclyde’s efforts, however, was the fact that Cunard 
possessed an aging, deteriorating fleet. In 1902, the company's newest vessels were 
Campania and Lucania, both built in 1893. The rival White Star fleet, by contrast, 
included Oceanic (1899) and Celtic (1901), and planned to add more within the next 
couple years. Each of the White Star ships had taken the title of largest ship in the 
world, gaining headlines for White Star and IMM. Cunard’s most recent run at the 
headlines, conversely, proved far less positive. During a recent voyage, the Etruia, of 
1884 vintage, broke her sole propeller shaft. She lay dead in the water until a cargo 
steamer came along and towed her to the Azores. Even more humiliating, Etruia once 
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held the Blue Riband and the freighter that towed her to safety belonged to Morgan's 
syndicate.261 Even the German lines outshined Cunard's best.  
As Cunard's ships slipped into obsolescence, the German NDL and Hamburg-
Amerika lines built new liners designed for speed. From 1897 until 1907, when 
Cunard's new Lusitania brought the Atlantic Blue Riband home, the prestigious award 
for speed belonged to the Germans. One ship after another—beginning with Kaiser 
Wilhelm der Grosse, and followed by Deutschland, Kronprinz Wilhelm and finally Kaiser 
Wilhelm II—held the Riband with increasing records.262 The ships themselves also 
created a fashion trend that dominated the Atlantic for decades: they inaugurated the 
four-funneled liner. The German ships featured superior speed and aesthetic aspects 
that drained business not already absorbed by the Morgan syndicate. The names of each 
ship, painted on the hulls of such massive industrial marvels, proclaimed imperial 
German triumph and tarnished British shipping all the more by comparison. With the 
American Morgan buying up British shipping on one side of the Atlantic and the 
Germans’ rapidly growing continental dominance on the other, Cunard stood alone as 
the last major standard-bearer of British maritime commerce.  
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While this situation was in many ways an embarrassment, it also created an 
opportunity for Inverclyde. His strategy of remaining independent relied on playing the 
British government against the Morgan Syndicate. Writing to friends, he encouraged 
questions about the deal between White Star and the Morgan syndicate to be asked in 
Parliament.263 In at least one case, this plan backfired. Lord Selborne of the House of 
Lords questioned the actions of the Cunard board of directors, asking if they had taken 
steps to prevent sell out by stock holders and if not, why not. Inverclyde wrote Selborne 
personally to explain there was nothing he could do in that regard. "I cannot prevent 
Trustees or ordinary shareholders from selling,” he noted, “& if such an offer as I 
indicated is made I am bound to bring it before them and I think a large number would 
accept it."264 Despite this early critique, however, Inverclyde's machinations soon 
seemed to have a more positive effect. Lord Selborne happened to be First Lord of the 
Admiralty, a position he held through 1905. On March 13, 1902, he invited Inverclyde to 
meet with him at the Admiralty in person, to discuss the future of the Cunard fleet.265 
Shrewdly, Inverclyde used this meeting to press his advantage. Writing to 
Selborne a few days later, he explained he saw no choice but to sell the fleet, noting that 
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"The Company have been approached by outsiders with proposals.” If followed up, he 
noted, these proposals “would lead to the transfer of control of the Company's property 
on very profitable terms, and in giving up the right to entertain offers for the sale of the 
ships, the Directors would be relinquishing the possibility of making a very 
advantageous arrangement." Inverclyde added that he could not see renting out the 
fleet because it would "destroy entirely the company's regular business." Concluding 
his letter, Inverclyde explained that conditions on the Atlantic had changed to such an 
extent that free and open business competition would soon end, meaning that "trade 
will be regulated to a great extent by influences which are not British and which may be 
used to deter this Company."266 If Selborne wanted Cunard to stay British, in other 
words, he would have to find a way to help Cunard stay competitive and profitable on 
the Atlantic trade despite its competition with a massive monopoly.  
Fortunately, Inverclyde had a suggestion for Selborne: help Cunard build new 
ships. As Invercylde well appreciated, the Admiralty’s greatest concern was becoming 
involved in a war only to find that Morgan's syndicate denied the use of formerly 
British-owned ships to Britain. Worse yet, what would happen should those ships be 
employed as a bunch of "Alabamas?" asked a newspaper article, referring to the 
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Confederate cruiser that destroyed so much of the Union merchant fleet in the 1860s.267 
The clear solution, according to Inverclyde, would be an arrangement in which Cunard 
built new ships to the Admiralty’s specifications, a win-win situation for both parties. 
As Inverclyde contended, "The Cunard Company do not, any more than the Admiralty, 
like to see their ships surpassed in power and speed, and would be glad to endeavor to 
alter this if they were assured of adequate support."268 
Selborne offered a lukewarm response, suggesting that new ship construction 
created a separate issue, one he did not care to mix with agreements covering the Royal 
Navy's use of Cunard's existing ships in war time.269 However, Inverclyde insisted that 
the issues did connect. The entire future of the company, he stressed, rested upon 
building ships with an obligation to the Admiralty. If the company were free from any 
Admiralty obligations, it would not only change the direction of construction but future 
ownership of the fleet.270 In a follow-up letter to Selborne, Inverclyde issued an even 
more direct and dire warning. "If they [the purchasers of the fleet] had the controlling 
power,” he cautioned, “it would be very difficult to prevent their using it to the 
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prejudice of this country if it were to their interest to do so."271 By April 3, Inverclyde 
began the hard sell by sending Selborne a letter with estimates on the construction of 
two types of ships: a 700-foot long model, capable of traveling between 21 and 25 knots, 
and a 625-foot variation, capable of 18 knots speed.272 Although the design studies were 
by no means final, the 700 foot long 25 knot variant formed the basis for what 
eventually became the Mauretania and Lusitania.  
Albert Ballin and Germany 
Probably the most important man in German shipping circles, aside from Kaiser 
Wilhelm II himself, was Albert Ballin, the managing director of Hamburg-Amerika 
Line. Ballin first took notice of Morgan's actions in May 1901, during a stay in the 
United States, although it is possible he may have known something earlier due to his 
friendship with Lord Pirrie of Harland & Wolff.273 Ballin's chief concern was Morgan's 
attempt to buy up a controlling interest in HAPAG stock and bring the German line 
into the syndicate. He decided that it would be in the best interest of HAPAG to come 
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to an arrangement with Morgan, but he faced complications that British companies did 
not.274 
First and foremost was Ballin's friendship with, and status as advisor to, Kaiser 
Wilhelm. The Kaiser, who fancied himself a nautical man, had an almost paternal 
interest in the business of Germany's largest shipping lines, HAPAG and its rival North 
German Lloyd (which played the roles of the German White Star and Cunard Lines 
respectively). Wilhelm and Ballin met during the launch of Hamburg-Amerika's 
Augusta Viktoria, named for the Kaiser's wife, in 1891.275 Wilhelm took direct interest in 
the privately-owned lines on the basis of national interest. Wilhelm suggest to Ballin, for 
instance, that it would benefit Germany, and please him personally, if more German 
liners were built at yards in Stettin and Wilhelmshaven rather than Harland & Wolff.276 
The dread Ballin had for the Kaiser's reaction to the news of Morgan's combine must 
have been palpable.  
Ballin proposed to Morgan, through Lord Pirrie, that rather than becoming 
subsumed into the syndicate, Morgan and a couple of his partners should secretly buy a 
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minority stake in HAPAG with shares on the open market, thereby gaining some say in 
running the company without destroying its identity as a German firm. This plan, 
however, quickly leaked to the German press, prompting the Kaiser's displeasure. 
Ballin eventually maintained independent identities for both Hamburg-Amerika and 
North German Lloyd by agreeing to a long list of terms. First, the German firms agreed 
to join in a profit sharing agreement with the Morgan syndicate. Second, the Germans 
would cooperate on setting rates and selecting routes in exchange for the combine 
paying out one fifth of the total needed to bring up the German lines' common stock 
dividends should they fall below 6%.  In exchange, the syndicate would receive one 
fifth of all dividends over 6% of the German common stock. Additionally, the syndicate 
promised to take control of Germany’s main continental competitor, the Holland 
America Line, through purchase of stock.277  Morgan got 51% of Holland America and 
then promptly sold a quarter of the total to Hamburg-Amerika and North German 
Lloyd.278 
At every step of the negotiation, Ballin kept Kaiser Wilhelm well informed. 
Losing Germany's greatest steamer lines to Morgan would have been unacceptable to 
the monarch. Throughout negotiations, Wilhelm pressured Ballin to make sure the 
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independence of the lines was maintained no matter what other accommodations he 
had to make. Ballin presented the text of the deal to Wilhelm, who made some 
adjustments and approved it based on the continued independence of the German 
lines.279 
Increasing Pressure in Britain 
For Cunard, Morgan’s successful negotiations with the continental lines 
represented a very dangerous development. Between the understandings reached with 
the German lines and pending ownership of other European lines, Cunard's position as 
an independent company could easily become untenable. It might even face the stark 
choice of joining the syndicate or going out of business. Making matters worse for 
Cunard, the British government began to actively engage Morgan in negotiations to 
secure the use of the fleet in case of war. Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain met 
personally with Morgan to discuss the shipping syndicate. Chamberlain, angry because 
of the endangerment of British national interests, suggested that the government might 
purchase White Star’s best ships to secure them for British use. Morgan tentatively 
agreed to this proposal, but insisted that the British government pay 40% more than the 
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value of the ships.280 Stalemate ensued until the fall of 1902, when a new prime minister, 
Arthur Balfour, decided to restart talks. 
In the ensuing negotiations, Balfour convinced Morgan to promise to protect 
British interests for the next fifty years by maintaining British registry for any British-
built ships and by honoring prior commitments to the Admiralty. Making this pledge 
would put IMM in compliance with the Companies Act of 1901, a statute that codified 
long-standing practice. Specifically, the law stated that “no corporation shall be 
registered as owners of British ships, unless 'established under and subject to the laws 
of some parts of His Majesty’s dominions, and having their principle place of business 
in those dominions.'”281 In other words, J. P. Morgan could own shares of a British 
company, but not the firm itself, while company management had to remain in Britain. 
This served British national interests in terms of defense while also fulfilling Morgan’s 
goals by giving him domination of the market. Although Morgan controlled rates and 
consolidated routes, the British government maintained its access to the massive troop 
and cargo capacity that the newly American owned fleet provided. The agreement also 
adhered to Mahan's theories, in that profits from this merchant marine now flowed into 
American coffers, thus expanding the US economy. 
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While these negotiations were taking place, Selborne and Inverclyde continued 
their correspondence. The Cunard chairman repeatedly reminded the First Lord of his 
responsibility to his shareholders, noting that their interests were paramount. If Great 
Britain wanted to retain control of Cunard's fleet, Inverclyde argued, they simply had to 
offer something and not just expect Cunard to sign a deal which gave the government 
the right to call up the fleet for government service at any time.282 Selborne, on the other 
hand, maintained that he had no say and could not negotiate subsidies, claiming that he 
continued to see this as a separate issue.283 
As their communications continued, Inverclyde added Joseph Chamberlain, 
Colonial Secretary, to his negotiations with the Admiralty. In a suggested agreement 
with the Admiralty, Inverclyde proposed two large steamers, not less than 700 feet long 
and able to produce speeds of between 24 and 25 knots for the New York mail service. 
Additionally, he wanted four "large steamers" capable of 18 knots, also for New York, 
and three steamers for the Boston service capable of 16 knots. This refined the April 3 
proposal that included design studies. If the government agreed to subsidize the 
building and maintenance of those steamers, a special meeting of the shareholders 
would be called to amend the company articles so that no stocks could be transferred to 
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foreign holders.284 Once again Lord Selbourne responded in a lukewarm fashion.285 
Inverclyde wrote back expressing frustration, especially considering that a recent 
interview at the Colonial Secretary's office led him to believe negotiations had begun.286 
Inverclyde also sent copies of the proposal to Gerald Balfour, president of the Board of 
Trade and brother of Prime Minister Arthur Balfour.287 
This back-and-forth interaction proceeded as Inverclyde continued to stress the 
danger of a sell-out. Finally, in October 1902, the government proposed the deal for 
which Inverclyde had hoped, although negotiations over details lasted into 1903. In 
exchange for “staying British," Cunard gained a new yearly subsidy of £150,000 
($27,498,586 in 2018) not connected to the mail contract. In addition, the government 
offered a loan of no more than £2.6 million ($480,675,292 in 2018) at two and three-
fourths per cent interest. The loan funded a new pair of major trans-Atlantic liners, built 
to admiralty specifications. The ships had to maintain speeds of 24 to 25 knots and be 
built as auxiliary cruisers. The government also retained the right to call up the ships in 
the event of war. The agreement further stipulated that any future proposed ship with a 
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speed of 17 knots or more would have plans submitted for Admiralty approval before 
construction.288 This move guaranteed preservation of Cunard's fleet for both national 
and business prestige and policy related reasons.  
The deal received mixed reaction on both sides of the Atlantic. The North 
American Review, however, referred to the deal with Cunard, as well as the deal with 
Morgan and IMM to maintain British ownership of vessels despite American control of 
companies, as "masterpieces of British business-statesmanship."289 In Britain, 
announcement of the proposed agreement to Cunard shareholders "was most favorably 
discussed in the clubs and elsewhere, and it was generally accepted that the 
Government and the Cunard Company together had accomplished an effective strategic 
move against the American combine."290 As late as 1904, however, the member of 
Parliament from Lanarkshire, James Caldwell, posed a series of critical questions before 
the House of Commons: Why only two ships? Why only Cunard? Why not twenty 
ships and what of the German merchant companies? They had not received subsidies to 
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"stay German," he complained.291 Likewise, Winston Churchill, then a member of 
Parliament before assuming executive office, questioned the wisdom of the plan and 
asked why warships could not be built that would be equal to the proposed Cunard 
liners.292 This long term "buyer's remorse" was significant because it compared the 
response of Great Britain to that of Germany, and the resilience of the British merchant 
marine. To some, the American takeover and the poor condition of Cunard suggested 
the British merchant marine did not have the strength people imagined it did. Perhaps, 
these individuals may have concluded, the British merchant marine had reached its 
natural end.    
Ultimately, however, these criticisms failed to prevent the deal from going 
through. Made official on July 30, 1903, the deal with Cunard represented a significant 
change in British government policy. Previously, subsidies or contracts might be 
offered, but such massive loans changed the business relationship to something more 
akin to a partnership. Unlike the deal that subsidized White Star's earlier Teutonic and 
Majestic only, this new arrangement created two ships and extended to most of the 
current and future Cunard fleet. Additionally, the new annual subsidy fortified Cunard 
against competition from IMM, helping to assure its continued existence. The British 
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government had taken a direct interest in the future of a shipping company specifically 
to safeguard sea-lane lifelines. Britain relied on its imports and exports for its economic 
survival. In losing the fleets, the nation faced financial decline in peace and starvation in 
case of war. The resulting additions to Cunard, however, placed it on more equal 
footing with the newest White Star liners. 
Lusitania, Mauretania and Empire 
Cunard's two new giants represented a resounding reestablishment of British 
maritime superiority. At their premier in 1907, the twin flyers were immediately 
recognized as the largest and fastest in the world. Famous long before her demise by 
German torpedoes on May 5, 1915, Lusitania measured in at 790 feet overall and 87.8 
feet wide and weighed in at 31,550 tons with a designed speed of 25 knots. On her 
second voyage, Lusitania took the Blue Riband from Kaiser Wilhelm II with an average 
speed of 23.99 knots. Great Britain, and more specifically Cunard, went on to hold the 
award for the next twenty-two years, until NDL's Bremen finally won it from Mauretania 
in 1929.293 Adding another feather to Cunard’s cap, Lusitania edged out White Star's new 
Adriatic—launched just one day after Lusitania—for the title of the largest ship in the 
world by 7,099 tons and 61 feet. Such impressive statistics threatened the prestige not  
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only of White Star, but by extension the International Mercantile Marine.294 
Figure 1 RMS Mauretania 1907, Credit: Public Domain. 
 
As part of the Admiralty contract, both Lusitania and Mauretania included a 
number of structural features designed to increase resilience during wartime service. 
The pair had 175 watertight compartments that could be closed simultaneously and 
placement for eight 6-inch guns on the shelter deck, four on each side, should the twins 
be called up for service as cruisers.295 While not overly impressive as a fleet unit, the 
guns and speed made the ships potentially valuable as commerce raiders. Although 
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experience in World War I would later demonstrate that Mauretania's value lay in 
service as a troop carrier or hospital ship and not as an armed merchant cruiser (AMC), 
to observers in the early 1900s she seemed a fairly formidable vessel.296 
The statistics of the new liners remain impressive even today. Lusitania and 
Mauretania's passenger capacity each totaled 2,213.297 They featured a cargo capacity of 
20,000 cubic feet making them highly profitable cargo carriers. For passengers, novelties 
included a complete shipboard telephone system which allowed internal 
communications at any time and could be linked into the land-based telephone system 
when in New York or Southampton. Children enjoyed their own play areas with child-
sized furniture and dining accommodations, as well as professionally painted panels 
depicting nursery rhymes. For the especially wealthy passengers, two "Regal Suites" 
provided private dining, with a small kitchen, bathroom, parlor and two bedrooms.298 
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For the first time, a Cunard liner approached the White Star’s standards of comfort and 
luxury.  
Lusitania and Mauretania represented a major step in reestablishing the 
international prestige and the perception of British dominance in the world market. 
Even after years of engineering advancements and a growing share of the market, 
Germany's finest ships looked mundane and old-fashioned compared to their new 
British counterparts. Germany’s hard-won record for speed had been blown away after 
just two voyages of Lusitania. In addition,  that Britain could, seemingly at a whim, 
revolutionize nautical design and regain national prestige lost to Morgan's combine. 
Despite being the darlings of the transatlantic press just weeks before, White Star's "Big 
Four”—the Celtic, Cedric, Baltic and Adriatic—suddenly went from being known as the 
largest and most luxurious ships in the world to being second-best to Cunard.  
Britain's dominance in ship design and construction allowed them to build 
steamers that outstripped rivals in terms of technology and size. Mauretania and 
Lusitania served as more than just symbols, however. The abundance of shipbuilders in 
Britain allowed Cunard to construct in two yards simultaneously, thus placing them in 
service (and demonstrating Britain's industrial might) as quickly as possible. This 
situation was in stark contrast with Clement Griscom's earlier problems in forming his 
steamer lines. The lack of experience in modern shipbuilding in the United States drove 
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costs up to build steamers, in those few places where the facilities existed at all.299 
Indeed, prior to this time, the British built the majority of the German merchant navy to 
the great consternation of the Kaiser. The largest ship in the German merchant marine, 
Amerika, came from Harland & Wolff.300 This dominance extended into naval 
construction as well. The Japanese, as well as nations in South America and the 
Ottoman Empire, all looked to Great Britain's shipyards for their maritime construction 
needs.301 While American finance began to dominate international economics, British 
technology and industry continued to dominate shipping design and construction.  
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The Birth of the IMM  
Cunard's deal with the British government had occurred in October 1902, the same 
month that Morgan formally organized his International Mercantile Marine. Morgan, 
however, did not sit idly by after this deal had been struck. To the contrary, he 
continued to move forward with his own plans despite failing to obtain Cunard. In the 
ensuing months, as Cunard advanced the planning and construction of the Lusitania 
and Mauretania, the organization of IMM was simultaneously beginning to formalize, as 
Morgan set out to remake North Atlantic shipping according to his will.  
In the fall of 1902, Morgan officially formed the International Mercantile Marine, 
while complying with the previous agreements made in his negotiations with Prime 
Minister Balfour. Directors of IMM included William Pirrie, J. Bruce Ismay, three other 
British citizens (to represent British Imperial interests), and eight additional 
Americans.302 While this board oversaw IMM, each company within the combine 
maintained its own board of directors in compliance with the British Companies Act. 
However, these boards of directors served largely as rubber stamps, with ships used 
interchangeably between routes and even between one company and another by 
direction of IMM leadership in New York. For instance, in 1903, five ships changed 
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from the Dominion Line and Atlantic Transport Line to White Star for the purposes of 
route consolidation.303 This demonstrated the dominance of American leadership in 
determining the daily operations of IMM's constituent companies. Although Morgan 
abided by his word that the ships themselves would remain British with British 
ownership, registry and crews, Americans, led by Morgan, ultimately controlled the 
lines. The complexity of running such a vast operation contributed to American 
dominance in logistical and managerial affairs, especially with so many ships visiting 
the port of New York.  
In February 1904, just a little over a year after IMM formed, Griscom outlined the 
operations of IMM and the immensity of its scope in System Magazine. By that time, 
IMM operated 140 steamships sailing all around the world. As Griscom explained, "It 
has dealings with half a dozen different governments and with dozens of cities, each 
with individual regulations and port requirements to which it must conform." White 
Star ships called at New York, Liverpool, Boston, the Mediterranean, South Africa, 
Australia and other points in the Pacific. These legal and logistical complications 
multiplied because of the six companies controlled by IMM, each of which served many 
international ports.304 
                                                          
303 Haws, White Star Line, 59 - 62. 
304 Clement Griscom, "Organization and Shipping," System Magazine vol. 5, number 2, 
February 1904, 71-81. 
 
165 
 
Management of a shipping line encompassed a number of different 
administrative areas, divided into three major departments: 
maintenance/administration, freight, and passenger. Falling under the control of a 
manager, several steamships sailed between certain ports on fixed routes. The manager 
insured that the ships stayed in good repair and that the holds and passenger 
accommodation had as large a booking as possible. Griscom pointed out that ships only 
spent half their time at sea. "During the other half they are in port on one or the other 
side of the ocean, undergoing overhauling, cleaning, provisioning, unloading and 
loading that are necessary between voyages."305 
All of this incurred great expense. Griscom estimated that unloading and 
loading, painting, cleaning and making any needed repairs cost between $10,000 to 
$15,000 per ship for each one-way trip. ($272,836 to $409,254 in 2018). "This is aside from 
the cost of coal,” he continued, “which varies greatly not only with the speed of the 
ship, but between vessels of practically the same size and speed." That cost fell at 
somewhere between $15,000 to $25,000 ($682,091 in 2018). Contributing further to 
expenses were wages for three to four hundred crew, insurance, port charges—all 
multiplied by the number of ships within the fleet—plus the maintaining of port 
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terminals, offices, and agencies. The need to control these costs, Griscom emphasized, 
made careful organization at all levels critically important.306 
Herein lay one of the IMM's earliest and greatest problems. Henry Wilding, who 
controlled Leyland, insisted on running the line as though it were an independent 
concern, paying little attention to IMM directives.307 In effect, this caused Leyland to be 
in competition with its parent company. These failures to coordinate gave IMM a rocky 
start.308 Another problem lay in Griscom's management of IMM. Although he had 
proved effective in his leadership of his own lines, the massive conglomerate needed a 
much stronger hand. Many simply found Griscom's leadership in the massive combine 
wanting.  In a private 1903 letter to J. Bruce Ismay, Albert Ballin confided that while he 
still believed in the International Mercantile Marine, he felt the wrong men had been 
involved in its early management. Condemning the work of the first chairman of IMM, 
he called Griscom "reckless" and criticized him for his "guile." Ballin hoped that Ismay 
might be a better leader if he took over the chairmanship in the next year.309 Meeting 
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with Lord Pirrie in London before sending the December letter to Ismay, Ballin 
suggested that Ismay replace Griscom as the best candidate for the job.310 
Ballin was not the only one who felt that IMM needed a change in management. 
In late December 1903, C. E. Dawkins and Lord Pirrie wrote Charles Steele to explain 
that they and others had come to the conclusion that Clement Griscom should resign. 
“The successful working out of the I.M.M. Co.,” they claimed, “is to be found in what is 
popularly termed ‘one man of power,’ a power, however, to be wielded by someone 
whose whole life has been in the shipping business and whose whole time and thought 
would be devoted to the great shipping interests comprised by the I.M.M. Co."311 That 
person—that “one man of power,”—in their minds, was J. Bruce Ismay.  
Ultimately, such appeals worked, and Ismay replaced Griscom as president of 
IMM. Negotiations for Ismay’s takeover took some time, however. Morgan initially 
offered Ismay the position on February 10, 1904 at a meeting at Morgan's home. Ismay 
then took some time to consider it. Ismay confided, "There is no doubt that I.M.M. Co. is 
at present in an extremely unsatisfactory condition both in regard to finance and 
organization, and you will appreciate it will require a great deal of hard and anxious 
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work to put it on a proper working basis." He eventually agreed to take the position, 
but only if several requests were agreed to.312 
Ismay’s list ranged from the sweeping to the mundane. First, he specified his title 
should be president and managing director. As such, "his management of the business 
of the I.M.M. Co. shall be unlimited and uncontrolled, and his decisions on all points 
other than financial matters must be final." Second, he demanded that "the entire 
control of all subsidiary Companies of the I.M.M. Co. shall be vested in him, and that 
his decisions on all matters of policy and management of these companies shall be final 
so far as the I.M.M. Co. can control the same." Third, he required absolute authority to 
hire and fire anyone employed by IMM. Fourth, he insisted that J.P. Morgan himself 
must be ready to make good on any financial "deficiency" of IMM for three years after 
January 1, 1904. Ismay made nearly a dozen other, more minor demands as well, mostly 
with regards to his own managerial authority.313 With these requests, he hoped to gain 
clarity in future dealings with issues such as the earlier Leyland Line situation.314 
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Although Ismay agreed to accept the IMM presidency primarily because Morgan 
agreed to his long list of demands, encouragement from his mother, Margaret, also 
helped convince him to take the post. "I must put my personal feelings on one side, for I 
know it is a proud and important position you are offered," she wrote. Margaret Ismay 
believed her son was the best man for the job and fully supported his promotion, even 
though it meant him living half the year in America and half in England.315 The 
presidency of IMM dictated close work with the other members of IMM's top 
leadership. For Griscom, this had been easy residing in Pennsylvania, near the seat of 
Morgan's power. Ismay did not have that luxury. Inter-office intrigue and rivalry 
inherent in such business, as well as being the only Briton at the highest level of 
leadership, made Ismay's presence in New York all the more vital. These factors 
demonstrated that while on paper the lines and European leadership committee of IMM 
held considerable power, the authority to make the most important decisions 
nevertheless remained in New York.  
In accepting the promotion, Ismay made his intention to set things right with 
IMM his primary concern. Though he continued to hold the positions of chairman and 
managing director of White Star, which remained his principle personal interest, IMM 
took most of his attention. Writing to Lord Pirrie, Ismay lamented the poor condition of 
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IMM, especially in terms of finance. "I know the Company is largely indebted to your 
Firm, and we must do all possible to reduce this liability;” he wrote, adding “all I ask is 
that you should make it as easy as possible, and not press us unduly." Morgan and his 
chief aid Charles Steele, Ismay affirmed, "are quite prepared" to pay claims and make 
IMM a success. Ismay also remarked on the "[rate] war in the Mediterranean trade, in 
the Atlantic trade both passenger and freight." Both, significantly, were commerce that 
Cunard took part in, no doubt contributing to IMM's distress. Despite his concerns, 
Ismay closed on an optimistic note. "Well, I have undertaken a big job, and look to you 
to help me all you can, and feel sure I can rely on your loyal and hearty support."316 
The cause for Ismay’s financial concern lay in the First Annual Report of IMM in 
1904. With net earnings of $4,000,522 ($113,671,011 in 2018) and net expenses totaling 
$3,645,227 ($103,575,643 in 2018), IMM’s surplus earnings for the year totaled just 
$355,295 ($10,095,368 in 2018), a paltry sum in Ismay’s mind. The fact that 1903 saw a 
depression in freight on the North Atlantic had depressed earning by "not less than $1 
million,” he estimated.317 Ismay would certainly have been aware of this going into the 
IMM leadership position.  
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By the time of the report in 1905, one year into Ismay’s presidency, the horizon 
already seemed brighter. The surplus earnings totaled $3,127,491 ($89,874,495 in 2018)—
nearly ten times the previous year—while expenses remained largely the same as 
previous years.318 While the end of the freight depression played a large part in this 
improvement, Ismay's promotion to the top leadership spot in day to day operations 
helped as well. As Pirrie pointed out, he was, "sure your decision to accept the position 
of president of the IMM Company must have been as great a relief to Mr. Morgan and 
our other American friends as it was to your colleagues on this side."319 The stabilization 
of management gave a degree of solidity that no doubt reassured nervous current and 
potential investors.  
Naturally, the previous announcement of Cunard’s giant new steamers 
continued to ruffle IMM's feathers. In 1905, with the combine more stabilized, the 
opportunity arose to do something about it. White Star's “Big Four" (Celtic, Cedric, Baltic, 
and Adriatic) were smaller and slower than Cunard's new giants. Now the final ship in 
the group, Adriatic, lay incomplete in the builder’s yard, robbed of the title largest in the 
world and the attending prestige by the rebel Cunard Line’s new twins. As Cunard's 
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ships neared launching in 1907, it became more and more clear to IMM’s leaders that 
they needed to do something to recapture the spotlight.  
Olympic Dreams 
 Meanwhile back in Belgrave Park, London, Lord Pirrie invited J. Bruce Ismay 
into his home for an informal business dinner on April 30, 1907. The new ships, Pirrie 
proposed  that night, would exceed anything seen before in terms of luxury and 
comfort, following the design evolution of White Star's most successful ships. They 
would be fast, but not Blue Riband contenders. Guiding the rough design would be 
economy of operation and the maximization profits on the order of the "Big Four”—
only magnified.320 
Their proposal—which came to be called the Olympic class—could have gone to 
any of the lines under the IMM umbrella. While it may have made some sense to place 
the ships in the American Line fleet, thereby making the largest, most luxurious and 
technologically advanced ships in the world purely American, Ismay insisted that they 
be part of White Star.321 In his mind, the ships had to go to White Star for several 
reasons. The first was purely personal. Ismay's control of IMM allowed him to make 
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sure White Star remained the most prestigious line of the combine and even allowed 
him give what he saw as his family's ships received the best care. It was widely known 
that Oceanic of 1899, the last ship completed during Ismay's father's lifetime, got an 
unequal share of the younger Ismay's personal attention with regards to maintenance, 
improvements, and repairs.322  
Additionally, White Star's longstanding history and reputation, as well as its 
intimate relationship with Harland & Wolff, meant that it was far better established 
than any other line under IMM control. Only the Dominion Line was as old as White 
Star, but its leadership never contracted with Harland & Wolff until it came under the 
stewardship of IMM. Their only Harland & Wolff ships were second-hand purchases, as 
was much of their early fleet. In any event, Dominion primarily served Canadian and 
secondary American ports, as opposed to White Star which served New York.323 Red 
Star was a Belgium-based company before IMM and had never been as internationally 
prestigious an Atlantic carrier.324 Placing the Olympic class in any other line in the 
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combine, in short, risked losing the prestige and passengers attracted by the more 
established White Star.  
With the decision made to place the Olympic class within the White Star line, the 
disparate threads of technological advances and the foundations set up by White Star 
and Harland & Wolff partnership began to come together. As part of the new combine, 
White Star's profits surpassed £1 million in 1910 ($178 million in 2018) for the first time. 
To help raise money for construction, White Star placed four and a half per cent 
debentures on the British stock market. The debentures, which increased the line's 
equity and made the promise to pay dividends at scheduled intervals, raised £2.5 
million ($446 million in 2018).325 The line's history and position as a leading firm set a 
foundation of public confidence in the new project. The backing of the combine also  
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promoted consumer confidence when the new stock options came on the market, a 
strength increased further still by the attachment of Morgan’s name to the project.  
At the same time, Harland & Wolff expanded and upgraded their facilities. In 
1907 work began at the shipyards, demolishing three building slips and replacing them 
with two that accommodated ships in excess of 900 feet. The shipbuilder ordered new 
permanent freestanding gantries, the scaffolding like structures under which ships were 
built, from Sir William Arrol and Company of Glasgow. These gantries were 840 feet 
long, 270 feet wide, and 230 feet high. On top sat a massive crane with a load capacity of 
three tons with a reach of 135 feet and a capacity of five tons when extended 65 feet. 
Figure 2: RMS Titanic, 1912. The lifeboat placement and numbers were the same on 
Olympic at this time. Credit: F. G. O. Stewart, photographer. Public Domain.  
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Additionally, three "travelers" moved across the gantry on rails and five more cranes on 
each side.326 Besides the physical changes to the shipyard itself, the work force 
expanded to 15,000 men, of whom between three and four thousand were assigned to 
Olympic alone.327 To service the ships in Southampton, the future home port of the 
Olympic class, Harland & Wolff, at White Star's suggestion, leased two acres and built a 
new shipyard. By 1907, the Southampton yard was able to handle repairs, including the 
reconstruction of the Suevic, which had required the replacement of 130 feet of bow 
section.328 It was the most technologically advanced repair of any ship at the time.  
As details of upcoming construction of the ships became known, the Olympic 
class fired the American public's imagination. Newspapers across the United States 
covered their construction as early as 1908. As far away as Salt Lake City, Utah's Deseret 
Evening News carried articles detailing the "Monster Liners."329 The paper described the 
liner's innovations in great detail, comparing them to Cunard's Mauretania and 
Lusitania. The article's very appearance in a local paper so far from the Atlantic 
demonstrated the hold the great liners had on the public's imagination.  
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The excitement was clearer still on the eastern seaboard. In 1909, the New York 
Times published a full-page, illustrated article discussing the ships and what they 
represented. Included were comparison illustrations of the Olympic class and the older 
Mauretania. The article promised things not even White Star imagined, such as 
photography stores, children's rooms, and a full hospital. The article also discussed the 
practicalities that huge new ships demanded, such as improving the pier facilities in 
New York and the cargo handling machinery.330 By 1910 Harland & Wolff engineer 
Alexander Carlisle found himself chased by the press in the fashion of modern day 
paparazzi during a brief visit to New York. Vowing initially that he would not talk 
about the ships, Carlisle eventually answered questions for the New York Daily Tribune 
detailing size, speed and decoration. When asked to compare the closest competing 
ships accommodations, he remarked, "Be patient and watch for the decorations on the 
Olympic."331 
The Olympic class had greater ramifications as well, which went beyond public 
prestige or even Atlantic shipping. Perhaps most notably, they influenced the 
engineering of the Panama Canal, which was then under construction. Specifically, in 
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1908, plans for the canal underwent last minute changes when president Theodore 
Roosevelt declared that the locks should be built to accommodate the largest ships 
under construction at the time. The original size was 900 by 96 but planners increased 
this to a length of 1,000 feet by 110 feet wide, specifically for the Olympic class.332 
By 1911 professional and public interest in the Olympic class had become so 
great that The Shipbuilder, a professional journal for maritime architects, dedicated a 
"special souvenir number" to the class. Besides detailing the history of White Star, 
Harland & Wolff, and IMM, the book described construction techniques, builder's 
plans, and interior arrangements. Hailing the advancements of Olympic, the author paid 
particular attention to its watertight integrity. Noting that the doors were controlled on 
the bridge, he explained, "the captain can, by simply moving an electric switch, 
instantly close the doors throughout and make the vessel practically unsinkable."333 This 
claim, though not made by White Star itself, later came back to haunt the company. 
Even crew members were both impressed and intimidated by the Olympic class. 
Looking back on his time aboard Titanic, Second Officer Charles Lightoller said that it 
took him fourteen days to feel confident finding his way about the ship. Even a large 
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main passage with a huge door, "through which you could drive a horse and cart on the 
starboard side, aft," took three late-joining officers an entire day to find.334 He could not 
help but observe that, "Each day... everybody's admiration of the ship increased."335 
Considering what these ships represented, it is hardly any wonder that Ismay wired 
Lord Pirrie after Olympic's first arrival in New York, "Olympic is a marvel!"336 
Titanic Troubles 
While the size, luxury and prestige of these new ships set imaginations afire, 
their unprecedented size had unforeseen consequences. The man placed in charge of 
Olympic and the Titanic, Edward J. Smith, had never captained a ship so large. His most 
recent command, White Star's Adriatic, was 150 feet shorter and twenty-two thousand 
tons lighter than Olympic. For Smith, as well as for the hundreds of men responsible for 
sailing the Titanic and her sister ships, the consequences of these vessels’ massive size 
would surface only after Olympic came into service. These problems included 
hydrodynamics as well as numbers of lifeboats and bulkhead designs. Unfortunately, 
lacking piloting and engineering experience, neither Smith and his counterparts nor the 
                                                          
334 Lightoller, Titanic and Other Ships, 215. 
 
335 Ibid., 221. 
 
336 Brinnin, The Sway of the Grand Saloon, 364.  
180 
 
sailors under their respective commands would be able to resolve these problems when 
they arose at sea.  
 On September 20, 1911, Olympic was steaming south out of Southampton in 
an area called the Silent. HMS Hawke, a Royal Navy cruiser, roughly one-sixth the size 
of Olympic, was sailing on a parallel course on the larger ship’s starboard, or right, side. 
As Olympic increased speed Hawke suddenly veered into her side, ramming Olympic in 
the stern near the propeller shafts. Hawke's bow, designed for ramming and sinking 
enemy warships, so damaged Olympic the voyage had to be cancelled. In the following 
Admiralty Court hearing, Olympic was found at fault because of the suction caused by 
water rushing to fill the void in her wake. According to evidence presented at the 
hearing, the great strength of the vacuum pulled Hawke into Olympic's side despite what 
officers on both ships did to avoid the accident. Scientific experiments with scale 
models demonstrated the effect over repeated tests.337 Olympic had to return to Harland 
and Wolff for six weeks of repairs which had the side effect of delaying Titanic's maiden 
voyage as shipyard employees were shifted to repair work.338 
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The Olympic-Hawke incident, moreover, was not the last time this particular issue 
arose. As Titanic left the Ocean Dock terminal in Southampton, a similar situation 
occurred. On that fateful day, April 10, 1912, a number of liners were tied up to the 
terminal from which Titanic prepared to depart, due to a strike by dockyard workers. 
Ahead of Titanic were Oceanic moored to the dock itself, with the old New York tied to 
her. Titanic, steaming at about six knots, came abreast of the liners at a very narrow 
point in the channel. As she did so, the same type of vacuum that pulled Hawke into 
Olympic the year before formed in the water. Six thick ropes holding New York to 
Oceanic snapped and New York began to drift into Titanic's stern. Captain Gale and the 
crew of the tug Vulcan, passed some ropes to crewmen on New York, succeeding in 
slowing the ship while Capt. Smith on Titanic's bridge ordered extra power to his ship’s 
port, or left, engine creating a wash that pushed New York away. Although adrift and 
being pulled by the vacuum of Titanic's wake, New York quickly got maneuvered into a 
new birth down river by tugs.339 
 Lawrence Beesley, a Titanic passenger, described the incident: 
  "Apart from the serious nature of the accident, it made an irresistibly comic 
picture to see the huge vessel [New York] drifting down the dock with a snorting 
tug at its heels, looking for all the world like a small boy dragging a diminutive 
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puppy down the road with its teeth locked on a piece of rope, its feet splayed out, 
its head and body shaking from side to side in the effort to get every ounce of its 
weight used to the best advantage."340  
He continued: 
"We now moved slowly ahead and passed the Teutonic at a creeping pace, but 
notwithstanding this, the latter strained at her ropes so much that she heeled over 
several degrees in her effort to follow the Titanic... But as we were just clear, and 
as we slowly turned the corner into the river I saw the Teutonic swing slowly back 
into her normal station, relieving the tension alike of the ropes and of the minds 
of all who witnessed the incident."341 
Titanic’s foreboding problems on the day she set sail were soon overshadowed 
by the fateful and infamous events that occurred on the night of April 14-15, 1912. At 
11:40 pm April 14, Titanic brushed the side of a massive iceberg, bumping and 
scrapping along roughly 300 feet of hull. Although the damage from the iceberg has 
never been seen, neither at the time nor during any of the expeditions to the wreck, it is 
now believed the collision buckled hull plates and sheared off rivet heads opening the 
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hull along hull plating seam lines.342 The opening exposed the first five watertight 
compartments to the sea. The worst disaster Titanic's designers could foresee involved 
head-on collisions or ones in which as many as four watertight compartments became 
flooded. The fact that bulkheads between fifth and sixth compartments only went as 
high as E Deck, a few levels below the bulkhead between the fifth and fourth 
compartments, doomed the ship.343 This meant that as the ship sank by the bow the 
compartments further back would become flooded much in the same way an ice-cube 
tray fills with water through overflow.  
 While the ship's pumps slowed the sinking, the volume of water entering the 
hull eventually overwhelmed them. A little more than two and a half hours elapsed 
from the collision until the ship disappeared from sight. The conditions in between 
allowed almost perfect circumstances to evacuate the ship. During all that happened, 
the sea stayed flat calm, the night clear and illuminated by thousands of stars, and the 
ship itself remained steady with functional electrical systems until almost the very 
end.344  
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 A brief timeline of the disaster provides highlights of the discipline and order 
with which evacuating the ship took place. At 12:15 am, about 30 minutes after the 
collision, wireless operators began sending out distress messages that continued until 
power failed around 2:15 am. Boats, loaded with women and children, began lowering 
away at 12:45 am. At the same time, Capt. Smith ordered white rockets fired in case any 
ships were near enough to see them and offer assistance. Only at 1:40 am did the ship 
begin to list to one side, endangering the launching of lifeboats. Quick action by Chief 
Officer Henry Wilde averted the new crisis. He ordered all passengers to the opposite 
side, their weight counterbalancing the ship. Although no panic erupted, the now 
obvious condition of Titanic made passengers more willing to get into the remaining 
boats. Prior to this, boats left half-filled due to the crew's fear of the boats buckling as 
they were lowered and passengers’ reticence the leave the warmth and perceived 
security of the nearly 900-foot-long Titanic for a 20 foot long boat. 
 By 1:55 am, the last of the boats to be properly launched eased into water only 
15 feet below the boat deck, a distance that should have been over 60 feet. At 2:05 am 
Capt. Smith ordered "every man for himself," yet despite this, crewmen and passenger 
volunteers worked feverishly to free remaining collapsible boats A and B from their 
secured positions on the roof of the officer's quarters, beside the first funnel. They later 
floated off, providing rafts for several swimmers. At 2:15  am the final notes of the 
ship's band could be heard as Titanic's lights went out, blinked back on and then 
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darkened forever.345 Five minutes later, Titanic was gone leaving slightly more than 700 
in the boats and over 1,500 in the freezing waters of the North Atlantic.346 Drifting in 
Boat 5 with about thirty passengers and four crew, Third Officer Harold Pittman looked 
at his watch seconds after the waters closed over Titanic's stern. "It is 2:20," he said.347 
§§§ 
 The sinking of the Titanic remains a widely known disaster today, yet most 
remain unfamiliar with its broader implications. Perhaps most importantly, the sinking 
forced a reappraisal of the great liners in the United States, Britain, and throughout the 
world. While the overall national policies and business practices that created the 
Olympic class did not change, the ships themselves and the technologies they 
represented underwent heavy re-evaluation by leaders of shipping companies, 
policymakers, and the public alike. For the remaining members of the class, Olympic 
and the hastily renamed Gigantic (now Britannic), that meant a number of structural 
changes. These changes, in turn, would, at least in theory, allow Olympic and Britannic 
to survive the damage sustained by Titanic. Even if the ships suffered structural failure, 
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lifeboat capacity increased to accommodate all passengers and crew. These changes 
were the first in a long line of efforts by shipping companies to outdo each other in 
loudly demonstrating their dedication to safety.  
 Reevaluation began with the gathering of evidence about the disaster, first in 
the United States and then in Great Britain. Beginning April 22, 1912 and continuing 
well into June of that year, the British Board of Trade, a standing body regulating 
merchant ships registered to British ports, held an inquiry, appointing Charles Bigham, 
Lord Mersey of Toxteth, as wreck commissioner and head of the investigation. The 
inquiry featured testimony by the surviving primary architects of the Olympic class, 
Alexander Carlisle and Edward Wilding, as well as crew members, management and 
passengers. Wilding’s testimony was particularly interesting because Board council 
asked under what circumstances Titanic might have survived the collision with the 
iceberg. He implied that no hull could have withstood the impact Titanic absorbed. 
However, the following exchange between Lord Mersey, Commissioner of the Board of 
Trade, and Wilding provided a suggestion as to how the ship might have been saved: 
Commissioner Mersey: “I am rather interested about that. Do you mean to 
say that if this ship had driven on to the iceberg stem on she would have been 
saved?” 
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Wilding: “I am quite sure she would, My Lord. I am afraid she would have 
killed every firemen down in the firemen's quarters, but I feel sure the ship 
would have come in.” 
 Mercy: “And the passengers would not have been lost?” 
Wilding: “The passengers would have come in.”348 
 A more exacting grilling occurred on day twenty of the inquiry when 
Alexander Carlisle took the stand. Quizzed over and over about the number of lifeboats 
he had originally suggested, Carlisle said that he planned for a total capacity of 64. 
Asked if he thought the Titanic had enough boats, he said he repeatedly told 
management there needed to be more. When questioned about who he told and how he 
told them, all Carlisle could say was, "I showed them the plans of my proposals; I could 
not do anymore."349 
 Eventually the final report of the inquiry listed several recommendations that 
were adopted for new construction and for retrofits on older steamers. The 
recommendations centered on the two most important issues addressed during 
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testimony by the Harland & Wolff engineers: watertight integrity and lifeboat 
accommodation. The Board urged that total lifeboats not be determined by the tonnage 
of the ship, as had been done previously, but rather by the number of people the ship 
was intended to carry. As for bulkheads and watertight doors, the board directed: 
 1. That the newly appointed Bulkhead Committee should enquire 
and report, among other matters, on the desirability and practicability of 
providing ships with (a.) a double skin carried up above the waterline; or, as 
an alternative, with (b.) a longitudinal, vertical, watertight bulkhead on each 
side of the ship, extending as far forward and as far aft as convenient; or (c.) 
with a combination of (a.) and (b.). Any one of the three (a.), (b.) and (c.) to be 
in addition to watertight transverse bulkheads.350 
 In the aftermath of the Titanic disaster, White Star’s leaders began 
implementing new safety redesigns and enhancements into its remaining ships in an 
effort to incorporate the lessons learned from the disaster. However, despite these major 
changes, a crisis of confidence erupted among the public over just how safe ships of that 
size could be. This loss of public confidence greatly affected not only White Star and the 
International Mercantile Marine but other companies with "monster liners." Cunard, 
HAPAG, and North German Lloyd all quietly instituted their own redesigns in existing 
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ships and new construction to prove their giant ships were indeed safe. For Olympic, the 
near identical sister of Titanic, an immediate decrease in passenger reservations 
occurred. Hoping to reverse these trends, Ismay pledged reforms and modifications to 
existing liners and new construction.351   
 However, Ismay himself had become a liability to IMM. In the public 
imagination, he was the embodiment of dishonor and disgrace. His survival when even 
one passenger was left behind to die (let alone 1,200) ruined his reputation. For much of 
the American public, therefore, his promises to increase safety meant little. As long as 
he held the title of president of IMM, the public would have little faith in the combine's 
leadership. The broader implications of both the competition over safety features and 
innovation and of Ismay’s fall from grace will be fully explored in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
 J. P. Morgan’s purchase of the White Star Line in 1902 set up a series of events 
that led to the construction of some of the greatest steamships to sail the Atlantic, 
vessels that even today remain well known. By purchasing so much of Britain's 
maritime shipping, Morgan and his associates had called into question the nation's 
prestige and self-image. In an attempt to maintain independence, Lord Inverclyde of the 
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Cunard Line played British national interests of economics and military preparedness to 
help preserve his company's status. This in turn led to a new era in the relationship 
between British business and the British government.  
 Whereas before subsidies formed a common business practice, the 
arrangement between Cunard and the British government represented a long-term 
partnership that merged business and national interests over the long term. One key 
clause of the deal, which gave the British Admiralty approval over ship designs that 
included speeds over 18 knots, effectively gave the British government a seat on the 
board of directors of Cunard. Additionally, Cunard gained the financial foundation that 
allowed them to face Morgan's international conglomerate in combat for Atlantic 
supremacy.  
 Meanwhile, Morgan's syndicate and its formation into the International 
Mercantile Marine represented another evolution of business. While firms engaged in 
commerce on an international scale are common throughout history, IMM represented 
something new. Businesses like the British East India Company had global interests, but 
its directors and leadership always centered in Great Britain. IMM differed in key 
respects. Although the parent company of IMM existed in North America, its 
constituent companies in the United States, England, and other countries maintained 
their own boards of directors, in theory retaining a nominal independence. This, 
however, only existed on paper. As the 1903 transfer of ships between IMM companies 
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and the resolution of the Leyland Line situation showed, these boards of directors 
ultimately had to bow to the mandates of the central offices of IMM in New York. At 
the same time, the high stakes negotiations with the British Government represented 
something new. Morgan found himself in the position of having to maintain both 
United States and British national interests.  
 IMM had traced its ancestry to Clement Griscom's quest to rebuild the 
American merchant marine. Once fully formed in 1902, IMM straddled two planes of 
existence. Although it brought the lion's share of Atlantic shipping under American 
control, the ships themselves remained British with British registry. In a somewhat 
awkward arrangement, Morgan could own the companies, such as White Star, 
Dominion and Leyland Lines, but not the ships themselves, thereby maintaining 
Britain's right to use the ships in time of war. By the time the Olympic class came into 
existence, this arrangement had been firmly cemented into the minds of the public. The 
Olympic class, from the time of its inception, became known as British and American 
steamers. For example, Britannic's launch booklet advertised her as a "Royal and United 
States" mail steamer.352 The press coverage amplified this aspect. When Titanic sank on 
her maiden voyage, likewise, it triggered government oversight inquiries in both the 
United States and Great Britain.  
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 Though the Olympic class represented the greatest achievement of the IMM, 
the sinking of Titanic marked the beginnings of a series of disasters, public relations 
nightmares and misfortunes that bought the recently stabilized IMM to the brink of 
collapse. From April 16, 1912 until the eruption of World War I in the summer of 1914, 
IMM hobbled on. Far from ushering in the glorious and triumphant reestablishment of 
the American merchant marine that had been envisioned in 1902, however, IMM would 
instead experience slow decline. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Abandoning Ship 
April 16, 1912, Leadership Losses and WWI 
 
 The loss of Titanic created a massive but not insurmountable disaster for the 
International Mercantile Marine. The ship could be replaced and, fortunately for IMM’s 
leadership, few lawsuits followed. While several individuals did sue for lost property, 
White Star and IMM faced relatively little legal trouble.353 At the same time, inquiries in 
both the United States and Great Britain did little to affect IMM’s bottom line. The 
disaster left behind many widows and families without a means of support in its wake 
as well as loss of property. Both companies could have faced major lawsuits over loss of 
life, income and more, but many individuals simply did not sue, preferring not to put a 
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monetary value on a lost loved one’s life. As for the enquiries, no government fines or 
censures ensued. After all, IMM and White Star did follow the law and had built ships 
that could survive predictable damage based on past encounters. The companies would 
need to reevaluate the safety features on their ships, but fortunately for them, there 
would be no punitive expenditures.    
But if IMM weathered the immediate aftermath of the Titanic disaster without 
suffering indirect financial loss, all the negative publicity did create public relations 
problems. These pertained to both real and perceived safety upgrades that needed to be 
introduced throughout the IMM fleet and a crisis of confidence in large liners more 
generally, especially the Olympic class. One of the most immediate public relations 
problems, though, was the Olympic herself. The de facto flagship of White Star and IMM 
was a virtual clone of a ship now known for sinking and causing the greatest loss of life 
in a nautical disaster outside of war. The resemblance of both the interior and exterior 
of the ships was so complete that existing promotional material used pictures of 
accommodations and amenities interchangeably. Additionally, these materials always 
mentioned both Olympic and Titanic, creating a close association between the ships in 
the public mind. This problem was so immediate and obvious that when Bruce Ismay 
was informed that Olympic was steaming to meet the rescue ship Carpathia to render 
assistance the morning following the disaster, he was observed to physically shudder. 
He quickly asked Capt. Rostron of Carpathia to order his wireless operator to instruct 
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Olympic to avoid the area and continue to her intended port.354 A few days later, a large 
portion of the crew refused to board her on the next trip to New York until more 
lifeboats could be installed. Clearly, these problems had to be resolved if Olympic and 
her incomplete sister, Gigantic, were to be profitable members of the fleet. 
If these public relations problems immediately began to cripple IMM, in the year 
following the disaster, a talent drain began at the highest levels of IMM that all but 
secured its eventual demise. Ismay, who traveled aboard Titanic as a passenger and left 
the ship in Collapsible Lifeboat C, experienced significant stigma for having lived.355 
That negative public image contributed to the management's decision to take a hard line 
on his retirement from the presidency of IMM and the chairmanship of White Star Line. 
Ismay’s departure, compounded by the death of J. P. Morgan in 1913, left IMM drifting. 
Although replacements took up Morgan's and Ismay's duties, they simply did not have 
the drive or the enthusiasm for the IMM project of Morgan or Ismay.  
In addition to these internal issues, IMM also faced increased competition from 
Europe. In 1913, Germany's Hamburg-Amerika Line roared back with the construction 
of the Imperator class, building a fleet of ships bigger and faster than the Olympic class. 
At the same time, Cunard's earlier escape came back to haunt IMM with the launch of 
their new flagship, Aquitania, essentially a bigger Cunard version of Olympic. In 
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addition, IMM's capitalization problems continued. The company enjoyed solvency 
from the very beginning, but profitability, especially considering the investment, 
continued to elude IMM. This made building a financial foundation that allowed for 
funding future construction projects or weathering economic downturns next to 
impossible. While World War I provided a temporary life support, the handwriting was 
on the wall long before the conflict erupted.  
This chapter will examine these events as well as the economic, political, and 
public relations forces that helped signal the beginning of the end for the International 
Mercantile Marine. It will analyze the immediate public relations storm and the 
resulting fallout, as well as its impact on Ismay and his efforts to remain in shipping. It 
will also consider the public inquiries and how they affected not only the Olympic class, 
but other ships, and the dramatic competition over safety. Next, the chapter turns to the 
loss of talent at the highest levels, specifically Ismay and Morgan, and the lack of firm, 
motivated leadership, the resulting chaos that followed, and the issues caused by World 
War I.  Finally, it examines the internal strife as stock fights erupted over the best course 
to follow to make the company profitable during a temporary resurgence during the 
war and the decline of IMM in the 1920s.  
Mid-Atlantic, 1912 
 The survival of J. Bruce Ismay proved to be one of the most controversial 
issues to come out of the loss of Titanic, and negatively affected the long-term health of 
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the International Mercantile Marine. On April 19, just days after his rescue, Ismay 
testified to the U.S. Senate about his actions. Ismay reported that he had made the 
voyage, "as one is apt to, in the case of a new ship, to see how she works, and with the 
idea of seeing how we could improve on her for the next ship which we are building."356 
Asked by Senator William Smith of Michigan about the circumstance under which he 
left Titanic, Ismay responded, "The boat was there. There was a certain number of men 
in the boat, and an officer called out asking if there were any more women and there 
was no response, and there were no passengers left on deck. ...and as the boat was being 
lowered away, I got into it." 357 
 Some observers seemed to accept Ismay’s version of the story. Most notably, 
the presiding judge of the British inquiry, Lord Mersey, gave a fairly even-handed 
assessment of Ismay's actions. "Mr. Ismay, after rendering assistance to many 
passengers, found "C" collapsible, the last on the starboard side, actually being lowered. 
No other people were there at the time. There was room for him and he jumped in. Had 
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he not jumped in he would merely have added one more life, namely, his own, to the 
number of those lost."358 
 But if Lord Mersey had offered a charitable take on Ismay's conduct, empathy 
seemed to begin and end with him. Ismay’s testimony—and his actions—invoked the 
American public’s ire. While Capt. Edward J. Smith and the other officers and crew of 
the ship, both lost and surviving, escaped with relatively light criticism, Ismay became a 
lightning rod for condemnation, facing the disdain and scorn of many throughout the 
United States. The town of Ismay, Texas changed its name, while the press and public 
roasted Ismay daily in reports and opinion pieces. Alfred Mahan wrote in the Evening 
Post criticizing Ismay for taking a place in a lifeboat when someone else, anyone else, 
could have taken it instead. Elsewhere in the press, he became known as J. "Brute" 
Ismay.359 And Ben Hecht, a Chicago area journalist, composed a harsh bit of doggerel, 
published in several papers: 
The Captain stood where a Captain should 
For the Law of the Sea is grim; 
The Owner romped while the ship was swamped 
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And no law bothered him.  
The Captain stood where the Captain should 
When a captain's ship goes down 
But the Owner led when the women fled,  
For an Owner must not drown.  
The Captain sank as a man of Rank,  
While the Owner turned away;  
The Captain's grave was his bridge and brave,  
He earned his seaman's pay.  
To hold your place in the ghastly face of Death on the Sea at Night 
Is a Seaman's job, but to flee with the mob 
Is an Owner's Noble Right.360 
 
 Ismay thus found himself in a socially untenable situation caused by an 
impossible choice made under the most trying conditions. Had he stayed on Titanic, he 
would have died, leaving his wife a widow and children fatherless—but his honor and 
social standing would have been maintained. By getting into a lifeboat, he lost his social 
standing and became a pariah within his profession but preserved his family and his 
own life. Initially, Ismay hoped that he could lead IMM and White Star out of the public 
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relations debacle and help stabilize IMM as it sought to recover from the financial loss 
Titanic represented. However, the public perception of him was too much to overcome; 
overnight, he had become a social outcast.  
 Naturally, the fierce criticism Ismay faced created a problem for the 
International Mercantile Marine. Ismay had been an asset as the very image of what a 
leading member of the British shipping industry should be. Suddenly, that had all 
changed. What kind of future could the directors of IMM expect if the president of the 
company is the most reviled man in shipping? However, a solution existed for IMM in 
something Ismay had done before the Titanic disaster: his pending retirement. 
 What is generally unknown is that Ismay had already given the required 
notice several months before Titanic's loss. Ismay, however, had suggested it be kept 
secret so as not to cause undue unrest among investors and the shipping community. 
He planned to step down June 30, 1913 but later changed his mind around October 
1912.361 He had intended to do this for some time. He demonstrated his reluctance to 
take on the presidency of the syndicate at the time of his hiring through the list of 
requirements he had given Morgan. It had only been at the urging of family and 
professional associates that he took the job. Even as president of IMM, Ismay had 
always been more interested in White Star. Ismay envisioned staying on with that 
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company, reducing his responsibilities and no longer living part time in New York. 
While placing IMM on a better financial footing than it had been under Clement 
Griscom's leadership, Ismay desired to leave the position. However, the Titanic crisis 
made him reevaluate these plans, hoping to help IMM and possibly more importantly 
White Star, through post disaster troubles. 
Who's the Safest of Them All? 
 While Ismay’s fall from grace and subsequent departure from IMM caused 
problems in terms of the need to restructure leadership, the question of what to do with 
the remaining members of the Olympic class caused further headaches for IMM’s other 
managers. The Titanic disaster made it clear that they must make a number of structural 
changes to the Olympic and the hastily renamed Gigantic (now Britannic). These changes 
would take time and require rearrangement of schedules, moving ships around to cover 
routes as liners were pulled out of service, updated and brought back online. These 
changes meant loss of revenue and expenditures for new equipment, sometimes 
mandating redesigns of existing deck spaces for the placement of additional lifeboats 
and other safety equipment.  
With that in mind, the question was how to increase safety measures on existing 
ships. That could happen in several ways. First, the owners could install enough 
equipment, such as lifeboats, on their own. In White Star's case, the Olympic class 
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actually carried more boats than current laws required.362 The belief that the ship could 
survive long enough for rescue to come from other vessels answering radioed calls for 
help led White Star management to dismiss the need for more boats. The second way to 
ensure enough lifeboats for all would be a reevaluation of the laws governing ships. 
This required action from the Board of Trade, at least for British ships. Other nations 
would have to make their own way.  
 For Olympic and Britannic, this meant virtual redesigns—which for IMM 
meant a tremendous outlay of capital. While Britannic still sat under construction, 
Harland & Wolff could retrofit many of the desired improvements. Olympic—an 
existing ship, almost identical to Titanic—was another case entirely. She returned to 
Belfast in late 1912 to have an inner skin built and an increase in lifeboats from 20 to 
68.363 Olympic's modifications cost a total of £250,000 ($45,799,077 in 2018).364 The most 
obvious visible change occurred on the top deck that previously had only sixteen boats 
lining the deck with four rafts stowed elsewhere. Post refit, her top deck held two 
continuous strings of double nested life boats the length of the deck on either side. 
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When she returned to service in March of 1913, she was probably the safest ship afloat 
on the North Atlantic and differed greatly from her original configuration. 
  
Because of IMM’S relationship with Harland & Wolff, which was the exclusive 
designer and builder of White Star ships including the Olympic class, these alterations 
caused minimum disruption to Olympic's sailing schedules. Since the same designer and 
construction crew often worked on a ship throughout its service life, modifications were 
completed with minimal down time due to setbacks as new designers familiarized 
themselves with a ship. Remodeling the last of the Olympic class, however, took a bit 
more planning and time. Construction of Britannic simply halted until the findings from 
the hearings were released and the information taken in for modifications to the design.  
 
Figure 3 RMS Olympic, 1922. Notice the additional lifeboats on the Boat Deck. Credit: 
Public Domain. 
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Britannic eventually underwent many of the same modifications as Olympic. Without 
mentioning the reasons for the changes, Britannic's launch booklet detailed the virtues 
of her inner hull and her bulkheads that "carried right up to the Bridge Deck."365 The 
booklet called special attention to the lifeboat arrangements. New, massive, crane-like  
 
davits stood along the sides of the ship that could lower the boats electrically while 
holding them out several feet from the side of the ship. Even if Britannic listed heavily to 
one side during an emergency, all boats would remain useful, unlike boats mounted in 
traditional davits. The massive crane davits made this possible because of their 
capability to reach across the ship and launch boats stored on the opposite side. 
Harland & Wolff initially planned to install eight of these davits. The onset of the First 
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Figure 4 His Majesty's Hospital Ship Britannic, 1916, showing the difference from Titanic. 
Credit: Public Domain. 
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World War in 1914, however, meant that the ship needed to be completed quickly, with 
the result that only five of the planned davits ultimately got installed.366 
 Additional safety features figured prominently in newspapers when Britannic 
was launched. One article discreetly pointed out Britannic's similarity to Olympic "with 
the addition of some improvements which experience has suggested." Among these 
were the double bottom of the ship extending its whole length and the fact that lifeboats 
could be lowered fully loaded.367 The confirmed ability to lower fully loaded boats came 
as a direct response to criticism in the papers about boats on Titanic leaving the ship 
only half-filled. Establishing the ability of life saving equipment to function under 
extreme stress should have been just one of the safety measures routinely carried out, 
especially for new ships. This could have been solved by a lifeboat drill early in the 
voyage, but no such activity occurred. It would later become one of the features of 
added safety protocols on all liners.  
 The impact of the new focus on safety produced highly visual differences for 
the newest member of the Olympic class. While Olympic and Titanic were visually 
identical, except for some windows on the promenade deck, Britannic revealed 
prominent modifications making her easily distinguishable in surviving photographs. 
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Importantly, these differences would be equally obvious to the traveling public. The 
most noticeable included oversized crane-like Toplis Davits which overwhelmed the 
boat deck, emphasizing Britannic's ability to launch as many lifeboats as needed to 
evacuate all on board. Additional regular Wellin style davits, which could handle three 
boats took up the remaining space. If a ship could be made into a symbol of "lifeboats 
for all," Britannic achieved it. By making these changes, which were carried out to 
various degrees throughout the IMM fleet, IMM intended to show it had learned 
lessons from the Titanic disaster and the ensuing government enquiries.368  
 Hoping to achieve some much-needed good publicity for these costly 
alterations, IMM and White Star made certain that potential passengers were aware of 
safety improvements to their ships through press announcements, other forms of 
advertisement, and of course the highly visible design changes themselves. White Star’s 
competitor lines, by contrast, quietly made changes to their ships almost making it seem 
that they always had boats for all from the design stage. HAPAG's new flagship, 
Imperator, saw her lifeboat number balloon to eighty-three and two motor launches.369 
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Additionally, she had an "inner skin" that featured longitudinal and transversal 
bulkheads throughout the ship, with bulkheads extended far above the waterline.370 
 Cunard’s owners, likewise, made their own subtle public relations overtures 
emphasizing their ships’ safety centered designs. The April 1913 launching of their new 
flagship, Aquitania, featured a souvenir booklet that highlighted safety features of her 
construction without mentioning Titanic, despite the launching happening on the one-
year anniversary of the sinking. As Cunard’s publicity explained, "The division of the 
ship into watertight compartments is much more extensive than is required by any 
regulations, and exceptional conditions might therefore have been obtainable in 
connection with lifeboats.” In addition, the booklet boasted, “Cunard Company, early 
in 1912, submitted their plans to the Board of Trade for an installation of lifeboats, to 
accommodate everyone on board." Cunard also repeatedly mentioned that Aquitania 
continued features that previously existed in Mauretania and Lusitania, including a 
double hull and extensive watertight subdivision.371 In other words, although Cunard's 
booklet celebrated the launching of the new Aquitania, company leaders used the 
opportunity to report on the safety provisions of liners that preexisted Titanic in hopes 
of maintaining their ongoing success.  
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 While all these modifications needed to be made for safety reasons, for IMM 
and White Star, making the most highly visible changes was just as important from a 
public relations perspective. The remaining members of the Olympic class had a 
potential lifespan of twenty-five to thirty years. If these ships were to be profitable, the 
specter of a repeat of the Titanic disaster needed to be banished. Publicizing the 
modifications to the ships that held the flagship positions was one of the best ways to 
achieve this goal, especially with competing companies loudly proclaiming the safety 
features of their super liners. IMM and White Star wore the albatross of owning a vessel 
renown for massive loss of life. They needed to replace that distinction with one of 
owning the safest, most reliable ships on the Atlantic. Their efforts to refit Olympic and 
Britannic, as well as the other ships of the IMM fleet, went a long way to adjusting that 
perception.  
At Headquarters 
As all this played out, J. Bruce Ismay began to reconsider leaving the 
International Mercantile Marine. In August 1912, P.A.S. Franklin, one of the leaders 
within IMM, wrote Ismay encouragingly, saying, "I can only say that I regret 
exceedingly that you have decided to go out of the business and wish it were otherwise. 
Your position regarding the Titanic is improving everyday and the more thinking 
people consider it the better it will be, and you certainly have nothing to reproach 
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yourself with."372 Ismay, it seemed, was persuaded by these sentiments. By October, 
Ismay decided he wished to continue at least as a board member of White Star and 
communicated his wishes to the directors of the combine.  
Ismay would not have his wish, however. E. C. Grenfell, chairman of the British 
committee running IMM's British holdings, made it clear to Ismay that he could not 
remain at White Star.373 "As president,” Grenfell wrote, "you have been in absolute 
control of all the companies forming the I.M.M. Company, and you have, as was only 
natural, by your ability and strong personality overshadowed the other managers, and 
to a certain extent they have looked to you for guidance in all matters great and small. 
On your retirement,” he continued, "several of these junior men will have to be 
promoted to more responsible positions, and I think it will be easier for these men, as 
also for the incoming president, to assert their independence if their former chief is not 
on the boards with them." Although Ismay was allowed to remain on the IMM board of 
directors and the British committee responsible for running the British lines under IMM 
control, regarding White Star, the message was clear: thanks, but no, thanks.  374 
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 Despite the rejection, Ismay persisted in trying to remain with White Star. "I 
really do not care one iota about the other companies, but you will appreciate I am 
bound to have a good deal of sentiment in connection with the White Star Line,” he 
informed Grenfell. “I quite understand junior men will be promoted when I go and 
rightly so, but I cannot see how my remaining a director of White Star Line will in any 
way hamper matters. At present there are only three directors, therefore four vacancies 
on the board; why not fill them up and so promote the juniors?” he added "I cannot 
think my being on the board would in any way interfere with the incoming president, 
but if it would do so this ends the matter."375 Ismay's sentimental attachment to White 
Star was entirely understandable. Oceanic of 1899, the last ship built by his father, still 
sailed with the fleet.376 The rest of the fleet represented his own life's work and the 
continuation of his father's legacy. The Titanic disaster amounted to the greatest threat 
White Star had ever faced. That Bruce Ismay wanted to guide the company safely 
through its current troubles seems hardly surprising.  
 Unfortunately for Ismay, IMM management had its collective mind made up. 
After speaking with J.P. Morgan and J.P. Morgan Jr., Grenfell wrote Ismay to say, "I 
fully appreciate your desire from sentiment to remain on the board of O.S.N. [Oceanic 
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Steam Navigation, the official name of the White Star Line], and I much regret that, after 
further consideration, I do not see my way to alter the opinion expressed to you in my 
letter of the 23rd October."377 Harold Sanderson, Ismay's heir apparent whom he had 
helped promote through IMM ranks, offered little help. In November, he sent Ismay a 
letter detailing a dinner with Grenfell. After reinforcing Grenfell's comments, he 
reiterated that, "as retiring President, your name might very properly be expected to 
appear amongst the directors of the controlling company (I.M.M. Co.), and that this 
expectation could hardly apply in the case of any of the boards of the subsidiary 
companies, not even the O.S.N. Co."378 So much for loyalty to a mentor.  
 While Ismay dealt with the blow, newspapers began carrying rumors of the 
coming reorganization in amazing detail. The New York Times, for instance, recounted an 
IMM board meeting in London, reporting that a "reliable source" said that the 
resignation of Ismay and elevation of Sanderson formed the principal subject of the 
meeting. The correspondent even went so far as to ask Ismay himself about the rumors. 
Ismay responded, "I am sorry, but I have nothing whatever to say.” The correspondent 
told Ismay of reports that he had broken down and had gone to a sanitarium as a result 
of the Titanic disaster. "You can see that is not so for yourself," Ismay replied.379  
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 The effects that the loss of Ismay had on IMM cannot be overemphasized. 
Next to Morgan himself, Ismay possessed the most drive, knowledge and experience of 
anyone at IMM, qualities needed to make IMM a success. Morgan, though a financial 
mastermind, had entered the twilight of his years as IMM critically needed a stabilizing 
hand. J. Bruce Ismay, played the role of the "ideal man" as leadership of the IMM 
matured.380 He typified the British shipping owner "headman;" an anthropological term 
denoting someone with widely known and acknowledged skills in a particular area.  
Raised and apprenticed within his father's business, he brought a status no one else 
could to the leadership of the IMM. Indeed, Bruce Ismay's elevation had reassured 
nervous stock holders in 1903. On the one hand, his rise represented a commitment to 
British interests as Morgan had promised. On the other, he represented expertise and 
experience that few on either side of the Atlantic could rival. At the time of his ascent it 
was a win-win for investors and IMM alike. His loss would be yet another major blow 
to IMM as it weathered the post-Titanic years. 
Ismay’s replacement, Harold A. Sanderson, simply did not equal Ismay in terms 
of pedigree. While Sanderson had served as a member of the board of directors and had 
been associated with White Star for seventeen years by 1912, he did not have the name 
recognition and family history Ismay enjoyed. Sanderson had spent most of his life in 
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shipping and came from a shipping family. By 1899 he had become a partner in Ismay, 
Imrie and Company which managed White Star and from there became first vice 
president of IMM in 1902.381 Even with all this prior experience, however, Sanderson 
had never held the responsibilities Ismay had as the independent leader of a major 
shipping firm. Though he came from a shipping family, moreover, his family had not 
known the success or fame of the Ismays. For nervous investors, psychological elements 
such as these often factored in determining continued investment. Having a well-
known and experienced leader in a position of responsibility, especially in times of 
crisis such as the aftermath of the Titanic disaster, mattered greatly. Despite these 
setbacks, Sanderson succeeded Ismay in 1913 after a short interlude with P.A.S. 
Franklin as acting president while Sanderson prepared for his new duties.  
 While Ismay’s departure from IMM set in motion one set of problems for the 
company, another major blow hit shortly after Ismay stepped down: the death of J. 
Pierpont Morgan himself. Morgan had been vacationing in Europe when Titanic sank. 
Hearing of the disaster, Morgan wired his son Jack that, "Have just heard fearful rumor 
about Titanic with iceberg without any particulars. Hope for God sake not true." The 
Wednesday following the disaster happened to be Morgan's seventy-fifth birthday. 
Friends and business associates remarked that he was appalled and that his heart was 
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"very heavy."382 By early January 1913, Morgan sought rest. Between personal strain 
from the Titanic disaster and facing grillings in Washington by politicians (many of 
whom were looking to make their reputations during the recent election year), 
Morgan's age finally caught up to him.383 Hoping to escape the chaos, he set sail for 
Egypt on White Star's Adriatic reaching Cairo by January 26th. In mid-February, he had 
an attack of chest pains and shortly afterwards sent for his personal doctor George 
Dixon and biographer Herbert Saterlee. On February 17th, the New York stock market 
slumped following news of Morgan's declining health and The New York Times began 
publishing daily updates on his condition.384 
 When Dixon, and Satterlee, arrived on March 3rd, they found a wrecked 
Morgan. Overwhelmed by nervous strain, Morgan believed the Khedive of Egypt 
wanted to hurt him and that the American government planned to subpoena him for 
contempt of court. He had lost weight and believed himself on the verge of death. On 
March 10th, the Morgan party went to Rome. In Italy, his health deteriorated at an 
alarming rate. Between March 23rd and 29th Morgan became more withdrawn, refusing 
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to eat, subject to severe lethargy and not recognizing friends or family. By Sunday the 
30th he became delirious and too weak to move. After a spike in fever, he died the 
following Monday.385 In a quirk of fate, which seemed oddly symbolic of the decline to 
IMM that would follow Morgan's death, his body journeyed home aboard France, 
flagship of the French Line which IMM neither owned nor controlled.386 
 Even more than Ismay’s departure, the death of Morgan represented a fatal 
blow to IMM. The International Mercantile Marine stood as the culmination of 
Morgan's storied career. The success or failure of IMM reflected on his personal 
reputation. While his mental decline in his last years put IMM in danger, his death 
insured that IMM no longer had a personally invested patron. The surviving members 
of J.P. Morgan and Company, including Morgan’s son and name sake, had to look to 
the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Survival of the ailing IMM now 
depended strictly on the potential to make it profitable, not just the vindication of 
Morgan's business decisions. Only during the tenure of Ismay's presidency did IMM 
become viable or have a bright future. While Morgan and his associates accumulated 
considerable experience within the United States as railroad barons, that had not 
completely translated into running a trans-Atlantic steamship multinational.  
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 While the principles certainly applied, the practices differed. Ownership of 
the shipping lines, the deal with Harland & Wolff, and control of United States steel 
manufacturing together made for perfect integration. However, the railroad interests 
primarily dealt with one set of federal laws within the United States as opposed to 
IMM, which had to deal with multiple national governments representing varied 
cultures, histories, worldviews, and differently valued currencies. On top of this, the 
extra layer of bureaucracy, necessitated by British law in particular, slowed and 
complicated business decisions.  
 The British committee that oversaw the British assets of the International 
Mercantile Marine never really worked as intended. From the beginning constituent 
lines tended to run their affairs independently of the edicts of IMM management. Only 
J. Bruce Ismay's leadership, backed by Morgan, stopped Henry Wilding's reckless 
management of the Leyland Line, for example. Wilding exemplified the early problems 
within IMM. The constituent companies never quite saw themselves as anything other 
than independent companies. Wilding's maverick leadership of the Leyland Line 
provides the best example. With both Morgan and Ismay out of the company, IMM 
faced a leadership vacuum that encouraged an "every man for himself" attitude among 
the companies. With no certainty for the future of the International Mercantile Marine, 
the respective constituent companies' managements seemed justified in looking to their 
futures.  
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HAPAG Giants and Cunard 
Making matters worse, the resurgent German and British merchant marines 
began increasing in prestige at a time when IMM struggled most. Even before the loss 
of Titanic, the German company HAPAG announced a trio of giant liners that would 
eclipse Olympic and Titanic in size. The ships were to be named Imperator, Vaterland and 
Bismarck. News of the German giants resonated as far from the Atlantic Ocean as Salt 
Lake City, where the local press hailed the design of the new ships, although they did 
get some of the details wrong. Calling the lead ship of the trio Hansa, the paper 
proclaimed she would be "about 50,000 tons, or 18,000 more than the Mauretania and 
5,000 more than the Titanic," highlighting this with very accurate silhouettes of the 
future Imperator beside her competitors. The paper further pointed out the new ship 
would have a service speed of 22 knots and "her cargo and passenger accommodation 
will be immense."387 
 The town paper of Franklinton, Louisiana discussed Imperator two years later, 
documenting the constant growth of liners, as well as the hold they continued to have 
on the national imagination. Noting Imperator's recent launch, the Era-Leader described 
her accommodations including "apartments with private verandas," a "magnificent 
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swimming pool, and a Ritz-Carleton managed restaurant." With the Titanic disaster 
only a couple months in the past, the newspaper also took care to emphasize the safety 
aspects of the new ship. In addition to lifeboats in excess to the numbers required for 
passengers and crew, the ship's staff included three wireless operators.388 Watertight 
bulkheads ran both transversally and longitudinally throughout the ship and dynamos 
for lighting and operating the wireless system sat above her waterline, decreasing the 
likelihood of them being exposed to water immediately in case of emergency.389 
Imperator was quickly succeeded and improved upon by her sister, Vaterland. As 
flagship of the German merchant marine, Vaterland was without question an impressive 
ship. A commodore commanded her supported by four captains and seven officers and 
a total of 1,234 crewmen of which 442 worked in the engine rooms. Wireless 
communications featured three separate machines, with three operators allowing the 
main system to be crewed continuously. Another feature that gave Imperator and 
Vaterland an edge in the race for luxury and superlatives lay in the design of their funnel 
uptakes. While most ships had exhaust trunked through the center of the ship 
restricting the length of public rooms, the German ships' exhaust left the ship through 
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uptakes built along the sides of the ship. This allowed for a main dining room that 
could seat eight hundred guests. Arriving in New York on May 21, 1914, Vaterland 
measured in at 924 1/2 feet long, 100 feet wide and 53,500 tons.390 This outstripped 
Imperator's length of 900. Almost immediately though, that ship was bumped to second 
place by Cunard's Aquitania at 901 feet. 391  HAPAG leaders increased their ship to 919 
feet by adding a bronze imperial eagle on Imperator's bow.392 Germany, twice in 
succession, claimed the largest ship in the world.  
 While HAPAG built its new liners, Cunard constructed Aquitania, a ship that 
departed from the paradigm set up by Mauretania and Lusitania. While her older fleet 
mates continued to make records for speed, trading the Blue Riband back and forth, 
Aquitania's design emphasized comfort, luxury, and cargo capacity. Effectively, 
Aquitania became Cunard's Olympic class ship. At the same time, she competed with 
the HAPAG ships in her own version of safety theater. The ship carried eighty lifeboats 
and two motor boats. Of the eighty boats, "twenty-two are of the standard class of open 
boat, each constructed to carry 66 persons. The boats of the decked class are 58 in 
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number and have each accommodation for 54 persons. Omitting the two motor boats, 
the total number provided, there for, is 4,584, or 382 in excess of the total complement of 
the vessel."393 The motor boats had their own unique features. Each had its own Marconi 
wireless sets with a range of 300 miles with arias carried on bamboo masts that could be 
raised and lowered at will. The boats could also tow away "a considerable number of 
the lifeboats" from the scene of any disaster to Aquitania. Additionally, they carried 
medical provisions, blankets and food supplies should survivors need to wait an 
extended period for rescue.394 
 While these features provided a very real enhanced potential to save lives in 
an emergency, in many cases they simply boiled down to "safety theater." While all the 
boats and the highly publicized detail that surrounded them may have soothed a 
nervous traveling public, none of the publications disclosed how long it would actually 
take to fully evacuate the ships, a major safety issue in its own right. Titanic took over 
three hours to sink, providing plenty of time for orderly evacuation and stayed on an 
even keel (not capsizing) allowing the sixteen primary lifeboats and two of the 
collapsible boats on both sides of the ship to be lowered. However, the final collapsibles 
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(Boats A and B) floated off as water washed over the boat deck.395 The sad fact that few 
acknowledged at the time or after is that even if Titanic had the sixty boats originally 
called for, there would have been nowhere near the time needed to launch them all. The 
next two major shipping disasters, Empress of Ireland in 1914 and Lusitania in 1915, both 
sank in less than twenty minutes making organized evacuation impossible and creating 
casualty lists in excess of one thousand people.396 Even with all the safety precautions 
possible, in other words, conditions could and did prevent their implementation. While 
all the new safety precautions provided mental security to jittery passengers and 
contributed to making ships harder to sink under known circumstances, they often 
required specific conditions to be fully used.  
Additionally, the layout of the extra safety features seemed truly bizarre. 
Aquitania featured sixteen boats stacked in twos across the width of the aft boat deck, 
near the stern. "While the first and second outboard boats are being put into the water,” 
the journal Shipbuilder explained, “the inboard or feeding davits are engaged in picking 
up the inboard boats and dumping them in position for hooking on to or lowering away 
by the davits proper."397 In other words, the inboard boats had to be manually hooked 
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up, moved, and then detached from the davits to get them in position to be loaded and 
lowered. This process would have to be repeated as many as ten times for the farthest 
inboard boats to be launched. Notably, this operation would be happening 
simultaneously with the eight boats beside them. The only electrically-powered 
mechanism associated with the life boats were the winches that brought them back 
aboard after lowering. The process would be laborious, time consuming and crew-
intensive under emergency conditions when the manpower would have been at a 
premium at twenty-six other lifeboat stations and other evacuation duties. This does not 
even account for handling passengers, gathering supplies, damage control measures to 
extend the ship's time afloat, and other issues.  
 
Figure 5 RMS Aquitania, showing the odd lifeboat arrangement on the stern. Credit: 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwhich, London. 
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In the war over publicity, however, none of these practical concerns mattered. 
Companies had to out-do each other making loud and visible safety modifications no 
matter their viability. The practicality of many of these features appeared secondary. 
Another example included the lifeboats on the new HAPAG steamers. While the boats 
were positioned in more practical areas the company painted them black instead of the 
more traditional, and far more visible, white. Oddly enough, the one factor that never 
seemed to matter was time. While all these changes no doubt made ships safer, their 
practicality under extremely limited time was highly questionable, as the Lusitania and 
Empress of Ireland disasters later proved.  
 Safety features aside, Aquitania had many other eye-catching details. Like the 
Olympic class, she had a service speed of 23 knots, and accommodation for 3,230 
passengers and 972 crew.398 Like the White Star liners she was patterned on, designers 
placed most of her best rooms amidships where the movement of the ship impacted 
passengers the least.399 Second and Third class passengers also enjoyed higher standards 
than previous Cunard offerings, with large public rooms and well-appointed cabins 
featuring running water and ladders for upper bunks.400 Like the HAPAG giants, her 
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command staff included the best the line had to offer. The commodore of Cunard line, 
Capt. William T. Turner headed a sailing department that included two staff captains, 
seven deck officers and others totaling seventy-seven with additional staff. As they did 
on Imperator, Marconi wireless officers held status as crew members (unlike Imperator, 
however, Aquitania only carried two). The chief engineer, Mr. Bryce, had thirty years of 
experience and headed a department that included 339 members. The rest of the crew 
served in the purser's staff which counted stewards, stewardesses, chefs, nurses, typists, 
barbers, band members and others totaling 556 to cater to passengers' every need.401 
Aquitania arrived in New York for the first time on May 10, 1914, briefly bringing the 
title of world's largest liner back to Britain.402 Eleven days later, Vaterland arrived, 
eclipsing Britain's brief triumph. 
 The rapid succession of the world's largest liners demonstrates the intense 
nature of the rivalry between companies for supremacy on the North Atlantic. Each 
new ship reigned as the pinnacle of marine engineering for only a short time before 
being outstripped by an even larger, more luxurious rival. Ships coming after the 
Olympic class, however, needed more to win accolades other than simply being fastest. 
Interestingly, the emphasis on cargo capacity and luxury in both the Imperator class 
and the Aquitania show the influence of IMM and their Olympic class - moderate speed 
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coupled with very high-quality passenger accommodation and large cargo capacity, 
which minimized operating costs while maximizing payload. This was most evident in 
Aquitania. Prior to the Olympic class, Cunard's primary commercial appeal lay in speed. 
Lusitania and Mauretania offered the fastest crossing time possible. Many German liners 
came close, but the Cunard flyers held them off. White Star and IMM began the process 
of luring passengers away with comfort and luxury with the Celtic of 1901.  
 By the time the Olympic class came along, White Star's success in creating an 
enjoyable travel experience demanded a response. IMM, White Star Line, and Harland 
& Wolff had indeed crafted the defining design paradigm for early twentieth century 
ocean liners. The results took form in Cunard's Aquitania and the HAPAG trio. While 
imitation may well be the sincerest form of flattery, in this case it provided the avenue 
to try to topple IMM from its leading position on the North Atlantic. Morgan's failure to 
gain control of Cunard and the German lines virtually guaranteed competitors eagerly 
seeking to end IMM's dominance. While this competition certainly gave IMM’s 
leadership and investors cause to worry, IMM's unstable financial foundation left them 
ill-positioned to respond in an effective manner. With the loss of Ismay and Morgan on 
one front and increasing competition on another, the leadership of IMM needed to take 
steps to stabilize its financial base if it hoped to survive. Those efforts began in earnest 
in the aftermath of Titanic's loss and the resurgence of international competition.  
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Bond Fights and World War 
On October 1, 1914 and again on April 1, 1915 the International Mercantile 
Marine defaulted on payments on its outstanding 4.5% bonds. At first glance, this may 
have come as a surprise: earnings for 1913 had totaled $9,567,048 ($244,380,094 in 2018), 
rising from a low of $903,176 ($24,826,050 in 2018) in 1908.403 But while these number 
appeared to suggest a brightening future, the final numbers after all costs and 
depreciation for IMM gave a less bullish outlook. After charges and depreciation, 
profits for 1913 stood at $315,602 in liquid capital ($8,061,718 in 2018). Between 1903 and 
1913 the combine's liquid capital averaged just $291,131 ($7,436,632 in 2018). By 
comparison, the capital of Germany's HAPAG over the same period averaged 
$3,729,216 ($95,258,867 in 2018).404 
The outbreak and escalation of the Great War only worsened the situation for 
IMM. With so many of its ships called up to wartime service in the British navy, IMM 
became even more reluctant to pay out dividends. While cargo space demanded a very 
profitable premium from those shipping into the warzone, costs to find the crews, fuel, 
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and everything else needed to sail the remaining civilian ships increased. Furthermore, 
the uncertainty of ships moving in and out of a zone in which unrestricted submarine 
warfare and mines laid in shipping lanes made shipping even more unpredictable than 
regular sailings on the stormy Atlantic.  
The fate of His Majesty's Hospital Ship Britannic, the once-named Gigantic and 
last of the Olympic class, offered a clear example of the issues brought on by the 
eruption of the Great War. Britannic finally launched on February 27, 1914 and moved 
to one of the berths at Harland & Wolff for completion. Denied the title of the largest 
ship in the world by Germany's HAPAG trio and Cunard Aquitania, she only claimed 
the title "the biggest British built ship."405 Even though the worsening situation clouded 
the European horizon, papers and the launch booklet put out by White Star pointed to 
Britannic's luxurious and comfortable accommodations. Her increased width allowed 
installation of more private bath facilities, still an innovation on the North Atlantic.406 Of 
course, her new safety features received star billing. The launch booklet listed her 
electrically powered gantry davits, arc lamps, and gangway lanterns and other extra 
lighting as well. Power "Morse Lamps" used to signal other ships at sea connected to 
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special circuitry to avoid failures in emergency conditions.407 Observers predicted her 
maiden Atlantic voyage to be sometime in September 1914. The commencement of the 
Great War that summer disrupted these plans.408 
 Although the process of fitting out Britannic as a passenger ship continued 
until the outbreak of war, that work was abruptly suspended in favor of more pressing 
warship construction: namely, converting Britannic to a hospital ship. As such, she 
could accommodate a maximum of 3,300 patients and a medical staff of fifty-two 
doctors, 101 nurses, and 336 orderlies. The doctors and other senior staff members 
occupied the First-class areas, while junior staff took up residence in Second- and Third-
class rooms. Public rooms through the ship became the locations of medical treatment 
areas. The First-class dining room became the intensive care ward, while next door, the 
grand reception room became the operating theater. Upper portions of the ship, such as 
the enclosed promenade, became dormitories for those with less severe wounds.409 The 
re-outfitted hospital ship Britannic was called up for service by the British Admiralty on 
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November, 15, 1914. Commanded by one of White Star's senior officers, Capt. Charles 
Bartlett, Britannic left Liverpool for her maiden voyage on December 12, 1915—not to 
New York, as originally planned, but to Mudros on the island of Lemnos in the Aegean 
Sea, a collection point for casualties from the Gallipoli and Dardanelles battles. There, 
joining Olympic, Mauretania and Aquitania, Britannic provided medical support for the 
"Dardanelles route." 410 
 Britannic served ports along this route until November 21, 1916, when she 
met her premature demise. At first believed to have been attacked by a U-boat and 
torpedoed, evidence later pointed to a German mine.411 The damage was relatively 
similar to that suffered by Titanic four years earlier. The same number of watertight 
compartments opened to the sea in about the same area. Yet despite all the touted safety 
improvements, Britannic sank in less than half the time of her elder sister. When the 
mine detonated she was undergoing a shift change, with watertight doors open to 
facilitate crew movement. To make matters worse, all her portholes were open in 
preparation of taking on new wounded from the Mediterranean theater, even though it 
violated regulations for obvious reasons. Despite all the design changes, Britannic 
quickly took on water. The earlier outlined design changes could only have worked had 
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Britannic's portholes and watertight doors been closed. With them all open to the sea, 
Britannic could not survive. It will never be known how well, if at all, Harland & Wolff's 
structural design changes would have performed had the violations of safety 
regulations not been made. In all likelihood, she would have survived at least long 
enough to be beached in the shallow water of nearby Kea Island. What would have 
happened from there is anyone's guess. But if Britannic herself did not fare well, her 
crew and passengers fortunately did: the added life boat launching features and 
accommodations proved more than adequate. The only casualties occurred when one 
boat launched prematurely and got pulled into the ship's propellers.412 
 Significantly, even though her loss meant a blow to wartime needs, especially 
in terms of care for the wounded, the changes made to Britannic in lifeboats won praise 
in the aftermath of the sinking. "The fact that out of a compliment of 1,500 all except 
fifty have been saved is a practical proof of the value of the precautions,” crowed the 
Manchester Guardian. “They are expensive additions to the construction of a liner, but 
they have proved their worth against mine or torpedo, and it is to be hoped that, when 
shipbuilder have only ice and collision to face, that fact will be remembered."413  
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 While the Britannic saga unfolded, IMM’s financial troubles continued to 
mount. In October 1914, IMM defaulted on its payments. In response, the New York 
Trust Company, as a trustee of the bonds, declared principle of the bonds payable and 
due initiated a law suit to foreclose in April 1915. The U.S. District Court in New York 
appointed P.A.S. Franklin receiver of the company. Franklin would later succeed 
Harold Sanderson as IMM president. But before that could happen, in February 1915, 
IMM defaulted a second time on both stock dividends and bond payments. This led to 
efforts at reorganization of its financials, most notably the creation of committees to 
represent the different groups of bond holders.414 By August, the committees proposed 
what became known as the "Bannard Plan," named for Otto Bannard, who chaired the 
bondholder committee that proposed the plan.415 According to Bannard, their goal 
aimed not only “to recognize the existing priorities and equities between the various 
classes of securities, but to also fix the capital of the New Company on a basis more 
nearly approximating the intrinsic value of the tangible properties and securities to be 
owned by the New Company."416 This "New Company" according to the scheme, was 
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"whatever company may be finally utilized to issue new securities to be used under the 
Plan. The New Company will acquire the ships owned by the International Mercantile 
Marine Company, and either directly or indirectly, through a subsidiary company…"417 
In other words, the "new company" that came out of the reorganization would have a 
better financial standing based on its real assets, not the intangibles such as "good will” 
and reputation that J. P. Morgan had relied on. The New Company would also provide 
new bonds for two of the existing classes of bond holders of IMM (4 1/2 and 5 % 
holders). Other bond holder would have to buy new bonds. The plan, finally, would 
reduce IMM's capital by $80,000,000 ($2,003,149,504 in 2018) and annual fixed charges 
by $1,272,000 ($31,848,487 in 2018).418 
Bannard had high hopes for his reorganization scheme. He also had a good deal 
of support. After visiting Europe, he returned with the backing of English and Dutch 
bond holders and of the foreign bondholders committee. However, a group led by 
Henry S. DeForest opposed the plan because he and others believed common stock 
holders stood to lose a great deal. In September 1915, Bannard agreed to hear out the 
DeForest Committee's complaints but did not think they would be accommodated.419 
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The DeForest Committee, however, decided to challenge the plan and a stock holder 
fight ensued.420 
 DeForest and other shareholders had several reasons to battle the 
reorganization, but the new context of the Great War was without question the most 
compelling of them. Due to substantially increased profits, the company's position had 
suddenly become far less dire. IMM went from a deficit of $300,000 in 1914 to a profit of 
$11,000,000 ($7,586,550 and $275,419,306 in 2018) for the first seven months of the war.421 
In large part, this can be explained from the lack of competition. German merchant 
marine sat interred in ports stretching from South America, to New York, to 
Bremerhaven Germany, while the British merchant marine had been taken up for war 
service, with many ships becoming armed merchant cruisers, hospital ships, or 
troopers. Driving rates up even more, most of the ships controlled by IMM came under 
British government wartime jurisdiction in accordance with the agreement between J. P. 
Morgan and Arthur Balfour negotiated in 1902.  IMM controlled the few remaining 
ships freely trading on the North Atlantic. If someone wanted to sail or ship something 
across the Atlantic, IMM had become the only game in town. In other words, the Great 
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War had done what J. P. Morgan could not: give the United States a virtual monopoly 
of Atlantic trade.  
 With little else for the management of IMM to do, monitoring the financial 
health of the company became a primary concern. The war may have given IMM a 
boost, but Bannard and his allies fired back that the war would have to end sometime. 
When it did, they argued, the British and German merchant marines would return, 
placing IMM in the same position it had previously been in. For this reason, Bannard 
endorsed reorganization. His plan soon had support from another faction of the 
ongoing stock holder's fight, the Wallace Committee, chaired by James N. Wallace, 
president of the Central Union Trust Company of New York and a preferred stock 
holder.422  
In August 1916, building on Bannard’s initial proposals, Wallace and his 
committee offered a new plan for reorganization—the “Wallace Plan.” Based on the 
idea that while the astounding wartime profits continued, the company should be 
reorganized to pay off its current debts and stave off complete reorganization. The new 
plan sounded an optimistic note by reporting that the value of assets owned by the 
company greatly exceeded its indebtedness. Admitting that "current earnings were 
extraordinarily large,” it suggested “that upon the return of normal times under 
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conservative management the earnings should be sufficient to show a substantial 
balance after payment of all fixed charges."423 Ultimately, the plan was adopted at a 
meeting of stockholders on September 29, 1916, but it only went so far. Although it 
succeeded in paying off previously defaulted interest payments and loans, no changes 
were made to the structure of the company.  
This failure to fundamentally overhaul IMM was a response to the belief that 
current war time profits would continue indefinitely, even after the war. The enormous 
profits proved enough to quell the stock fights once the Wallace plan was adopted. The 
stockholders were for the moment satisfied. Yet new problems formed as the war 
continued that the Wallace plan did not envision. The United States required ships for 
its own trade and war time needs. In 1916, the U.S. government began taking action to 
provide them. 
 
Wartime and Postwar, 1917-1920 
 
While all IMM ships sailed under American ownership, at least on paper, in 
reality the ships remained under control of their nations of registry, due to the deal J.P. 
Morgan made with Balfour during the formation of IMM. As the Great War ramped up, 
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ships under IMM control reverted to the British Royal Navy, convoy duty or other war 
measures that took them out of general mercantile service. While this meant great 
profits for IMM, it severely constricted American trade outside of the Entente, or British 
allies. Even though the United States held onto its neutrality at that time, trade with 
Germany came to a halt because of the British blockade; German ships could not get 
out, and American ships were not permitted in. Additionally, with European trade to 
Central and South America radically decreased, an opportunity presented itself to 
expand trade within the Western Hemisphere.424 But for all that to happen, there had to 
be ships completely controlled by American interests. IMM simply could not fulfill that 
need.  
In a long belated move, the United States Congress finally created the bills 
Morgan and Clement Griscom before him had sought in 1916. One measure, sponsored 
by Joshua alexander of Missouri, allowed for the purchase and American registry of 
foreign built ships. It even allowed those ships to be used as naval auxiliaries for 
military purposes.425 The bill would make IMM irrelevant and potentially represented 
the end of IMM since the firm could no longer market itself as the American merchant 
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marine. Those shippers looking to use truly American vessels would now find ships 
with American registry, American crews, and American flags flying from the stern post. 
Quite possibly, they would choose those over IMM ships which still flew British or 
Belgian flags with largely foreign crews.  
The bill allowed for the purchase of ships by the new United States Shipping 
Board which existed for "encouraging, developing, and creating naval auxiliary and 
naval reserve and a merchant marine to meet the requirements of the United States with 
its Territories and possessions and with foreign countries," and to "to regulate carries by 
water engaged in the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States."426 
Importantly, the Shipping Board could authorize construction and purchase vessels, "as 
far as the commercial requirements of the United States marine trade may permit for 
use as military purposes, and to make necessary repairs on such vessels."427 The 
Shipping Board could, in turn, sell or lease those ships to American business interests, 
with the restrictions that "Any vessel acquired from Board, whether American of 
foreign built, may be registered or enrolled and licensed or both as a vessel of the 
United States, and entitled to the benefits and privileges there under and may engage in 
the coastwise trade." Likewise, any of those vessels would only be allowed to trade 
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under American registry and "shall not, without approval of Board, be transferred to a 
foreign registry or flag, or sold, chartered, or leased, except under prescribed 
regulations."428  
The legislation represented a looming threat to the interests of IMM. While the 
bond holders fought over dividends, members of IMM leadership, including current 
company president Philip A. S. Franklin, saw danger. Franklin gave testimony at 
congressional hearings hoping to steer the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce away 
from supporting the bill. He told the committee rather than buying up ships, the new 
Shipping Board should be used to examine "whether or not there are any handicaps 
under the American flag as compared with other flags, and if there are, what can be 
done to eliminate them."429 In other words, what would make the shipping world better 
for IMM? Obviously, British shipping had far more support in the form of larger 
subsidies, as outlined earlier. If the bill restricted the new board to examining 
difficulties of American shippers, most notably IMM, it would certainly find that 
shipping faced a deficit of support as compared to pre-war Britain or Germany. 
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However, Franklin argued, the current problem with American trade lacking transport 
would continue.  
Additionally, Franklin correctly foresaw the Shipping Board itself as a potential 
competitor to IMM. "My objection to the power you have given the board is entirely as 
regards operation of ships. I do not think a board controlling and sitting as a judge over 
a trade should also be a competitor in that trade and have an interest in the trade."430 As 
written, the Shipping Board could "charter, lease or sell vessels acquired to citizens of 
the United States."431 If the Board chartered or leased ships to American citizens, it 
would naturally be obligated to look for the most profitable returns on those leases for 
the benefit of the American taxpayer. The Board itself would then become a de facto 
shipping line, operating much the same way as IMM itself. Like IMM, the Shipping 
Board would not be saddled with the day-to-day operations of ships, instead delegating 
these duties to leasees, much like the British Committee and individual companies ran 
IMMs individual lines.  
Franklin's testimony made plain his concern. "You are giving a board... power 
over shipping; at the same time you are proposing to give them a line of steamers to 
operate against that shipping,” he observed. “Will they be an impartial board? Will the 
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trade think they are impartial and consider them so, or will they say, ‘All you are after 
is to make a good showing with your own property,’ which would be perfectly 
natural."432  
Franklin's concerns, it turned out, were largely justified. Despite his objections, 
the bill passed and Woodrow Wilson signed it into law on September 7, 1916. By then, a 
large percentage of the German merchant marine sat interred in New York and other 
American ports for fear of destruction or capture by the British Royal Navy. Included 
among those vessels were the 54,000-ton Vaterland, largest ship in the world, Amerika of 
21,000 tons, and former Blue Riband holder Kronprinzessin Cecilie, as well as many other 
large passenger and cargo ships. Should the United States enter the war and the 
Shipping Board confiscate the German ships they would most likely find themselves in 
American merchant service after the conflict ended, all with American registry. Should 
this come to pass, IMM would face major domestic competition for the first time. 
Beyond the Shipping Board issues, the war caused other problems for IMM. As 
German exports halted because of the British blockade, American manufacturers began 
to fill the gap. As production increased, so too did the need for export services.433 IMM, 
however, had no ships to take advantage of the new trade boom. With nearly all their 
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ships appropriated for British war service, only neutral, completely American-owned 
ships could take advantage of the new business. In the short term, this did not seem to 
matter to IMM stockholders—IMM made considerable profits from British wartime 
shipping, the stock fights had ended, and the company had stabilized, at least for now. 
But once the war ended the new Shipping Board, whose creation Franklin had hoped to 
prevent, would have already established an American shipping firm that would have 
been active in the trade for some time. Moreover, the British government-backed 
Cunard Line would return to regular trade, while the German merchant marine would 
no doubt return to business as well. All of these promised to increase the competition 
for IMM down the line. IMM would have to do a lot of work to break into an 
established market against shippers that effectively had the backing of the United States 
government. Any hope that the complete Atlantic monopoly would ever be made real 
evaporated even as IMM enjoyed its most profitable era.  
The shipping bill became law in September 1916, but it was not until the U.S. 
entry into the war, seven months later, that IMM would see the full effects of the 
measure.  Within ten days of the declaration of war on April 16, 1917, the Fleet 
Corporation, which would operate the confiscated German liners, was formed with 
$50,000,000 ($987,832,031 in 2018) in capital from the United States Shipping Board on 
behalf of the United States. Combined with the Emergency Shipping Fund Act of June 
15, 1917, this set the stage for a major expansion of U.S. shipping that eventually 
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sidelined IMM as both the American merchant marine and a monopoly. The act gave 
the president of the United States the power to requisition, authorize construction of, 
and operate ships.434 Although this power was legal, an executive order dated July 17, 
1917 delegated this power to the United States Shipping Board.435 The Board held the 
authority to acquire ships already built as well as to operate or dispose of them. It also 
benefited greatly from the fact that President Wilson transferred control of enemy ships. 
In a series of executive orders between May and November of 1917, Wilson ordered the 
confiscation of German ships in American ports all over the world. Among these ships 
were over eighty-nine well-built Atlantic steamers and a number of support vessels, 
including tugs, tenders, cargo and harbor fuel carries, many of which were virtually 
new. At the top of the list of those confiscated in Executive Order 2651 sat Vaterland.436 
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For IMM, the competition created by the Shipping Board’s abrupt fleet expansion 
represented a disaster of the first magnitude.  
The effects for IMM would not be immediate. The Shipping Board’s new vessels 
would be held up for some time undergoing refit, repair and being crewed for United 
States service. For the remainder of the war, they would be used almost exclusively for 
wartime needs. After that, however, they could easily be refurbished and employed for 
the private sector (and indeed, this is precisely what later happened). While facing this 
looming threat during 1917 and 1918, IMM still experienced public relations problems. 
IMM was seen by the American public not as an American firm, but as a front for 
British interests. With J. P. Morgan, a symbol of American capitalism dead and buried, 
public perception grew that British interests dominated IMM actions.437 As Franklin 
would later say, "As you can see, you have purely Americans on there [the IMM board 
of directors] and they are very much interested in the development of the American 
flag. We are very much criticized at the moment by people who are not doing 
anything."438  
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Determined to shed the perception that IMM was a British front, Franklin 
decided to entertain offers from a British syndicate for the purchase of the White Star 
Line. The syndicate later turned out to be Owen Phillipps, 1st Baron Kylsant's, Royal 
Mail organization. In November 1917, IMM reached a tentative deal with Lord Kylsant 
on the sale, but knowing a transaction of such magnitude would have effects on the 
American stock market, leading to negotiations with the U.S. Treasury.439 The decision 
to sell off British assets marked a fundamental change in the nature of the IMM. While it 
had always been intended as a basis for an American merchant marine, its very name—
International Mercantile Marine—clearly demonstrated wider scope. Morgan began 
building IMM with the goal of an international monopoly controlled by American 
interests. By preparing to sell off foreign assets, Franklin signaled the end of IMM as a 
monopolistic entity and international business. If Franklin's plan worked, IMM would 
morph into just one of many Atlantic shippers. However, IMM would be entirely 
American-owned with American ships registered in the United States. Potentially, it 
would truly become the American merchant marine.  
The idea of IMM selling off foreign assets prompted treasury Secretary William 
McAdoo to write President Wilson. "While I do not agree with all of Mr. Walters’ 
conclusions and inferences,” he noted, referring to a Baltimore businessman involved 
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with the sales, “I am in full accord with him about the fundamental question, namely, 
the transfer of British ships owned by the American corporation, the International 
Mercantile Marine, to the British Government. I believe that this Government should 
not permit these ships to be transferred but should insist that their American 
ownership, although under British registry, should be preserved."440  
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, fully agreed. "Just before I went abroad 
I had a talk with Mr. Hurley [head of the Shipping Board] about the proposed purchase 
by Great Britain of the International Merchant Marine,” Daniels explained to Wilson, 
just after the 1918 Armistice. “Both of us thought that until the Peace Conference settled 
all these problems, it seemed unwise for Great Britain to be buying corporations owned 
entirely by Americans, and while the course pursued by Americans of building the 
ships and putting them under British registry, this has always seemed to me justified 
only because our Government has paid no attention to securing a large merchant 
marine, which would guarantee to us a part of the world’s trade."441 Even though 
negotiations had been completed to sell all British interests, President Wilson directly 
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intervened, asking Franklin for the sale to be suspended. The IMM board complied with 
his request.442  
 At the same time, Bainbridge Colby, a member of the U.S. Shipping Board, 
had an idea to make IMM more fully American, possibly by purchasing the combine's 
British assets.443  Evidently, neither Colby nor Wilson knew about the intervention of the 
British government that prevented Morgan from doing that when he formed IMM. 
Colby's goal would be an established firm to take up operation of the confiscated 
German ships once the war was over. Writing to Wilson about a meeting he had with 
members of Congress, he noted that there was a general agreement that the sale should 
not occur. "Judge Hardy [a Democratic representative from Texas] went even further,” 
Colby explained, “and stated it as his opinion that we should not only acquire the 
International Company’s ownership in the British vessels, but should acquire, if 
possible at a reasonable price, the stock of the International Mercantile Marine 
Corporation, carrying with it the ownership of nine ships under the American flag."444 
Wilson replied stating, "It is my hope, therefore, that the Shipping Board will at once 
buy everything there is to be bought in connection with the transactions we have been 
discussing. I dare say that they can hardly decline to sell to us rather than to the 
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British,” the president continued. “I am inclined to think that perhaps we should better 
sound them also about the possibility of buying the stock of the International Mercantile 
Marine Association, carrying with it the ownership of the nine ships under the 
American flag."445 
 It was an interesting plan. If the Wilson administration followed through on 
the purchase, there would be a number of benefits for both the government and IMM. 
First, the U.S. would gain control of the largest shipping organization in the world. 
Secondly, the Shipping Board could turn over all the confiscated German ships to the 
IMM, secure in the knowledge that an established firm with considerable experience 
would use the ships to foster American commerce and international interests. For 
IMM’s leaders, the perception of being a British puppet in the eyes of the public would 
cease, allowing them access to the goodwill of th American people as a truly American 
merchant marine.  
The idea hinged, however, on British interests accepting the proposal, an 
outcome that ultimately did not occur. With the backing of the President, Colby sent the 
IMM board of directors a letter announcing the offer to buy IMM's British interests on 
the same terms as the Kylsant syndicate had offered.446 By January 1919, however, 
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Wilson had begun to have second thoughts. British interests and political leaders now 
threatened to condemn and confiscate the British built ships controlled by IMM.447 
Echoing the President, Josephus Daniels confided to his diary that the “President said 
Great Britain would be very sore if we bought the stock in the Mercantile Marine Co & 
we would get so little advantage (we could not get ships since [Sir Joseph] Maclay 
[British Minister of Shipping] says he would take them) would it be worthwhile?"448 In 
the end, the idea came to nothing due to fierce opposition by the British. On April 1, 
1919, the Shipping Board told IMM’s leaders that they were free to sell White Star and 
other British interests if they chose.449  
If such a sale went through, the perception that IMM was simply a British front 
might finally disappear. In a postwar environment that was veering more toward 
isolationism, negating the public perception of IMM as being one of the greatest British 
shipping companies in the world—despite its American ownership—would finally 
allow IMM to be recognized as a fully American company in the eyes of the public. As 
Franklin put it later, "We were also desirous of developing under the American flag, 
and we felt that if we could get such a good price for all our foreign property, we would 
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have a very huge sum of money to be invested in American shipping, if we found we 
could get American shipping on what we considered a proper basis."450 Unfortunately 
for Franklin's plans, IMM stockholders voted down a renewed offer by Lord Kylsant's 
Royal Mail.451 Most likely this was because of the fantastic profits from war time 
shipping. With so many of IMM's British holdings about to be released from war time 
service and a war-ravaged Europe in need of American exports, the profits would still 
be rolling in. At least, that's what stockholders may have believed.  
Franklin, however, still had one remaining potential avenue to minimize 
competition on the postwar Atlantic. What if, he pondered, IMM gained control of all of 
the former German liners, or at least the very best of them? During the war, most of the 
German ships had been used as troop transports and support ships. Shortly after the 
war in 1919, the Shipping Board began to seek civilian buyers or leasees and released 
ships in ones and twos. In 1918, IMM put in a bid seeking to purchase Leviathan as well 
as several other liners. The bid was placed early because IMM had handled the 
management and maintenance of Leviathan during the war. Opposition quickly 
emerged in Congress. In questions before the select committee on Shipping Board 
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Operations, Franklin faced grilling in Congressional hearings on the assets, ownership, 
and leadership of IMM.452 Despite repeated offers to manage the ship or buy it outright, 
IMM never gained control of Leviathan or any other German ship confiscated by the 
United States.453 
Offloading Ballast and Correcting Course 
By the time Warren G. Harding became president in 1921, IMM found itself in a 
strange position. Having tried to divest itself of foreign assets to change public 
perception, the company reversed course at the behest of the President Wilson in what 
might be deemed a patriotic rather than practical decision. Subsequently, IMM was 
frozen out of gaining access to German war prizes because of hostility from the same 
government that had asked it to retain its foreign holdings. In August 1921, failing to 
find what it saw as suitable managers, the Shipping Board founded the United States 
Line, which it subsequently operated. The line was government owned but privately 
managed because there were no commercial buyers. The company offered service from 
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Danzig and Mediterranean routes at first, adding London and New York by 1924.454 On 
July 4, 1923, the line added a refurbished and modernized U.S.S. Leviathan. Advertising 
her as the largest ship in the world, the United States Line was now in direct 
competition to IMM, White Star Line, and even Cunard. Leviathan, now painted with 
red, white and blue funnels, boasted American crew, registry and ownership and 
formed the flagship of an American fleet.455 This fully American steamship service 
completely undermined IMM as the United States’ merchant marine. 
In the postwar division of the German merchant fleet, White Star had not 
completely lost out. It gained the Bismarck, the newer, even bigger sister ship of 
Leviathan, from the British shipping controller. Renamed Majestic, she joined Olympic as 
a replacement for the lost Britannic. The running publicity battle between the United 
States Line and White Star over which ship was really the world's largest continued 
until the construction of Cunard's Queen Mary in 1936. Long before that, however, 
White Star had ceased to be an IMM property. In January 1927, Lord Kylsant finally 
purchased White Star from IMM, as the syndicate divested itself of foreign properties.456  
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The hostility to foreign entanglements engendered by World War I in the United 
States, coupled with a worldwide shipping slump following the war contributed to 
falling profits for IMM. Increasingly, IMM's foreign holdings became a burden 
politically, financially, and in terms of public relations. Net profits decreased from a 
high of over $13 million in 1921 ($183 million in 2018) to just over $5 million in 1926 ($71 
million in 2018). With depreciation of assets and other fixed charges subtracted, 
moreover, IMM actually ran a deficit of over $2.4 million ($34 million in 2018) from 1922 
to 1927.457 IMM found itself in an even worse position than had existed before the Great 
War. It faced both slowly sinking income and increased world competition, a 
competition made difficult by a homegrown competitor that had usurped the position 
IMM was initially created to fulfill. The company had failed in both its primary 
missions: to create a true monopoly on the North Atlantic and to be the rebirth of an 
American merchant marine. 
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Chapter 5: 
 
Sailing into the Sunset 
The End of the International Mercantile Marine 
 
When Clement Griscom began his quest to rebuild the American merchant 
marine in the late 19th century, his ambitions included the acquisition of American 
owned, built, registered and crewed ships. The laws of the United States and 
prohibitive cost of construction prevented all of this except for American ownership but 
even that had its limits. After Morgan took over, his International Mercantile Marine 
modified Griscom's original ambitions into not just an American merchant marine, but 
an international monopoly bringing all Atlantic shipping under American control. 
Ultimately, Griscom's and Morgan's plans failed for several reasons.  
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The first reason lay in the difference in construction technology between Europe 
and the United States. As detailed in chapter one, American ship builders continued to 
build wooden hulls designed for coastal trade. European builders, on the other hand, 
transitioned from iron and then to steel. Likewise, European builders, supported by 
shipping owners who were in turn supported by generous subsidies by governments, 
experimented with engines designing faster and faster ships. Paddlewheels gave way to 
screws, also known as propellers and old-style steam engines gave way to modern 
turbines. A related issue came about because of the abundance of shipbuilders in 
Europe. As Griscom noted in his testimony to Congress in 1901, the cost of building a 
ship in America was twenty-five percent higher. The lack of American interest in 
international affairs had consequences in American industry in that there was little 
demand to build modern steel ships that could resist the punishing environment of the 
Atlantic Ocean.  
It was only after Admiral Alfred Mahan began his series of books and articles 
that the American public began to warm to the idea of a world class navy. As Mahan's 
influence grew, American interest in all things nautical increased, Mahan gained 
supporters in high places, including Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore 
Roosevelt. Likewise, politicians in Congress began warming to the idea of supporting 
an American merchant marine to the point that discussion of subsidies began. Here in 
lay the second reason Griscom and Morgan's ambitions failed.  
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Though repeatedly discussed in Congress, subsidies never gained the traction 
the shippers, including Griscom and Morgan, believed they needed to make American 
shipping profitable. Indeed, when Morgan founded the International Mercantile 
Marine, taking over from Griscom's International Navigation in 1901, his plan 
depended on the passage of s shipping subsidy being debated in Congress at the time. 
While Congress debated subsidies almost annually in the 1890s, the results were always 
minimal. The defeat of the 1901 subsidy represented a major problem for IMM and 
aspiring U.S. shippers. British shippers received generous subsidies while IMM relied 
almost exclusively commercial receipts. Since Morgan had overpaid for so many of the 
assets IMM gained control of, the combine's financial foundation was overvalued at 
best. This ultimately resulted in the bondholder fights over reorganization during 
World War I.  
A third major problem that led to IMM's decline was the failure to create a true 
Atlantic monopoly. Without having all shipping under his control, Morgan could not 
set shipping rates and insure profits. Had he been able to do so, as he had with 
American railroads, the need for subsidies would have been minimal since Morgan 
could insure prices completely covered the price of operating the ships in the fleet. 
While his profit sharing deal with the German firms and warm relationship with the 
Kaiser insured at least a détente type relationship for the duration of Morgan's lifetime, 
no such agreement existed with Britain's Cunard Line. As this dissertation shows, the 
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escape and continued independence of Cunard from Morgan's monopoly represented 
another major blow to Morgan's ambitions. An independent Cunard not only gained 
even more support from the British Government, that included more subsidies and 
loans to build major new steamers. These steamers were so superlative that even IMM's 
newest ships were eclipsed. In the public relations war that erupted (and persisted) 
over which nation and company controlled the largest ships in the world. This was a 
challenge that could not be ignored. However, Cunard was not the only renegade in 
shipping. A number of small British firms as well as the national line of France 
remained independent with the ability to undercut IMM rates at will.  
The Olympic class ships resulted directly from the rivalry with Cunard. While 
they initially generated the type of public relations buzz that helped revive the fortunes 
of IMM, the losses of Titanic and later Gigantic/Britannic represented a financial upset, as 
well as a crisis of confidence and prestige, that occurred at bad times for IMM. Titanic's 
loss initiated a crisis in confidence in large liners in general that affected the entire 
shipping community, leading to years of "safety theater" that lasted right up to the 
outbreak of the Great War. Companies went to great lengths to prove that their ships 
were the safest on the sea, while IMM had to demonstrate they had learned lessons 
from the disaster in particular as the owners of Titanic's near identical two sisters. 
Indeed Olympic suffered ticket cancellations until her virtual rebuilding in 1913. 
Britannic's loss represented another problem for several reasons.  
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First was the public relations problem. For the second time an Olympic class 
liner sank to the bottom of the ocean. Being the victim of the German war machine, 
however, mitigated the issue. The biggest problem lay in the fact that the ship itself 
would not be available to the combine following the war. The British government 
released Olympic from war time service in August 1919. After a refit at Harland & Wolff, 
she reentered service in July 1920, in time for the renewed Atlantic season. A suitable 
running mate, Germany's former Bismarck renamed Majestic did not enter service until 
May 1922, a gap of nearly three years.458  Even then, Majestic had to be purchased from 
the British shipping board and her construction completed all costing time, money and 
resources most assuredly in excess of what reconditioning Britannic would have cost.  
As during the war, public perception of IMM had changed. Now viewed as a 
front for British interests as opposed the American takeover of British interests that it 
really was, IMM suffered under attacks from politicians and media leaders because 
almost all IMM's ships were in British service during the war, leaving America without 
a merchant marine for its own pressing war time needs. This led to pressure in 
Congress to build a true American merchant marine, a political battle which 
represented the final blow to IMM existing as controlling force and symbol of American 
shipping. With its foreign assets increasingly seen as a liability both within IMM 
management and by the general public, attempts began to divest of those assets. The 
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intervention of Woodrow Wilson to stop this eliminated IMM's opportunities post-war. 
Even though IMM leaders obeyed the request of the government, that same 
government refused to allow them to take confiscated German ship after the war, 
placing IMM in an untenable situation.  
Unable to gain control of large, first class ships that the U.S. government had 
confiscated from the German merchant marine, IMM had to stand by as the American 
Shipping Board ignored its existence and sought an American management firm for 
hundreds of thousands in shipping tonnage. Considering that IMM had complied with 
the will of the government during the war this seemed like an injustice. Eventually the 
Shipping Board gave up looking and formed a company itself. With the creation of the 
United States Lines, IMM lost any claim to being the American merchant marine. For an 
organization created to rebuild American shipping this put the final nail in the coffin to 
its original ambitions as designed by Griscom and Morgan.  
Not only did IMM lose the public relations angle of being the American shipper, 
it now had competition in the form of a line that decked itself out in patriotic themes. 
Postwar advertising for Leviathan feature her red, white and blue funnels almost as 
prominently as the words "United States Lines" striking a decidedly patriot, perhaps 
even nativist chord in post war shipping.459 Rather than using British ships, even if they 
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were under American control, exporters now had the option of shipping their produts 
on truly American ships. Their German origins did not matter since their registries were 
now American. At least not for the purposes of public relations. In this environment, 
IMM did the only thing it could do, finally shed itself of its foreign holdings and 
attempt a makeover.  
In 1926 White Star Line, formerly the crown jewel of IMM, became a part of the 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, a British owned firm. The profits from the sale of 
White Star went to the retirement of outstanding debts, not any type of restructure, 
almost assuring the eventual demise of IMM as an international company.460 The 
liquidation of foreign assets continued and by 1934, in the deepest throes of the Great 
Depression, control of the Atlantic went to the British. With the last of the foreign 
holdings gone IMM ceased to be an international merchant marine, but just one of 
several American shipping firms. Thus ended J. P. Morgan's dream of an Atlantic 
monopoly.  
They All... Well, Some, Lived Happily Ever After 
 For the rest of the players in the story of IMM and the rebuilding of the U.S. 
merchant marine, mixed futures lay in store. Of the companies that played a role in 
Morgan's ambitions, perhaps White Star had the most lamentable fate of all, falling into 
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disrepute after being sold. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which mirrored 
Morgan's IMM in terms of outrageous sums spent to gain control of assets, attempted to 
create a British version of IMM. Like IMM, they purchased White Star with the 
intention of making it a flagship line within the company. However, Lord Kylsant, the 
head of the combine, had neither the skill nor ethics of Morgan, and went to jail for 
fraud in 1931.461 The world-wide depression hit his interests hard leading him to 
embezzle money from the profitable White Star to keep his other companies afloat.462 
With White Star's financial foundation gutted, its bewildered stock holders had to sell to 
arch rival Cunard in a deal brokered by the British government.463 By 1936, the new 
Cunard-White Star gained Atlantic supremacy with RMS Queen Mary, the largest ship 
in the world at the time, and winner of the Atlantic Blue Riband.464 However, White Star 
endured the junior position of the new company's formation and ceased to exist with 
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the buyout of its remaining shareholders in 1949.465 The last of the great White Star 
Liners, RMS Britannic (III), a motor liner built in 1929 and only two thirds the size of the 
Olympic class, went off to the breaker's yard in 1960.466 Today there remain only a few 
remnants of the once great White Star Line. The museum ship Nomadic in Belfast, tender 
for the Olympic class, sits in the Hamilton Dry Dock on the former grounds of Harland 
& Wolff, who carried out most of her restoration.467 Cunard's "White Star Service" 
promises "All staff are trained at our White Star Academy, so each and every member of 
our crew delivers the same high level of service across every element of your cruise"  in 
a gimmicky last vestige of White Star at sea.468 And of course Titanic and Britannic, the 
great ships built by White Star, IMM, and Harland & Wolff to be the final words in 
Atlantic dominance, rest on the bottom of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. 
 Cunard, HAPAG and North German Lloyd all remained independent and 
survived World War I. The German firms lost most of their fleets to the Allies as war 
reparations and faced a long rebuilding program, made all the more humiliating as 
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their former ships, now in Cunard, White Star, or United States Line livery, plied the 
North Atlantic and even served German ports. By 1929, HAPAG built the twin fliers 
Bremen and Europa, once again gaining the Blue Ribbon for speed. However, WWII saw 
a virtual repeat of events for the German merchant marine; Bremen destroyed during 
the war, and Europa ceded to the victorious Allies.469  
 Cunard exists to this day, now an American owned subsidiary of Carnival 
Cruises, which purchased the company in 1998.470 After the long fight to "remain 
British," Cunard had actually left British ownership two years previously in 1996, when 
the Norwegian firm Kvaerner purchased Trafalgar House, Cunard's owner, for $1.38 
billion in 1996.471 Cunard currently operates a fleet of three ships with a fourth under 
construction as well as the world's last trans-Atlantic liner, Queen Mary 2.472  
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 The people involved in the IMM adventure continued on as well. Lord 
William Pirrie, Morgan's chief negotiator with the Ismays, remained on the board of 
directors of IMM but eventually left it, succeeded at Harland & Wolff by Lord Kylsant. 
During the Great War, he oversaw the construction of numerus warships in his yards, 
as well as dummy warships, civilian ships disguised as battleships, to help mislead and 
defeat the Germans. He died in 1924 while on a three-month business trip in transit 
from Buenos Ayres to New York.473 In New York, his body was transferred to Olympic 
for the voyage home.474 
 After suggesting J. Bruce Ismay for the chairmanship of IMM, Albert Ballin 
remained head of HAPAG and a leader of German shipping. He became increasingly 
depressed for the future as World War I became imminent, however, suffering from 
insomnia and overwork as his greatest ships, Imperator, Vaterland, and Bismarck took 
shape against increasingly dark war clouds. On his desk, a framed copy of the words 
"Life is just one damn thing after another." appeared. By the end of the war, the 
company he had spent his life building lay in ruins and the ships he designed were in 
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enemy hands, used to help bring his country to its knees. On November 9, 1918 a couple 
days before the armistice, Albert Ballin  ingested a lethal overdose of sleeping pills.475 
He was 61.  
 J. Bruce Ismay lived in semi-secluded retirement after leaving IMM in 1913. 
During World War I, he contributed to patriotic causes, including a substantial 
donation to the Mercantile Marine Service Association in Liverpool which earned a 
grateful telegram from King George V. While his wife occasionally gave dinner parties, 
they always occurred in Ismay's absence. Indications are that he was an introvert and 
the scrutiny endured during the Titanic's aftermath did not help. When frequenting St. 
George's Hall for musical concerts he usually bought two seats, one of which held his 
hat and coat.476 Increasingly, Ismay seemed determined to never again have to be in the 
public eye.  By 1936, as Cunard and White Star merged, Ismay entered his 70th year in 
declining health losing a leg to diabetes. He maintained his physical independence as 
much as possible, using devices such as a pulley system to allow him to take baths in 
privacy.477 On October 14, 1937 he suffered a stroke that ultimately proved fatal, passing 
away just three days later.478 
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 Phillip Albright Small Franklin got a bonus from the sale of White Star in 
1927 of $250,000 (Over $3.6 million in 2018), in addition to his $100,000 salary which 
decreased to $50,000 ($739,429 in 2018) during the Great Depression. In 1931, IMM 
merged with the Roosevelt Line, a shipping company which his son, John Franklin, 
helped found. He stepped down as president of IMM in favor of his son at that time. He 
later served as chairman of the United States Lines until his retirement in 1938.  He died 
on August 14, 1939 of Parkinson's disease at the age of 68.479 
 As much as this dissertation is about businesses and people that owned and 
managed them, it is also the story of the great liners of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Often these ships became celebrities in their own right, capturing 
imaginations to the present day.  
 The German line HAPAG's giant trio, Imperator, Vaterland and Bismarck, 
ended up confiscated by the Allies during the First World War. Imperator and Bismarck 
went to Britain becoming Cunard's Berengaria and White Star's Majestic, respectively, 
replacing Lusitania and Britannic. Vaterland became a trooper for the United States, 
renamed Leviathan, eventually finding her way to the United States Lines. The 
management of United States Lines and White Star engaged in a running battle over 
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whether Leviathan or Majestic held sway as the largest ship in the world until 1934, 
when Leviathan was laid up after being hit by the Depression. She was scrapped in 1938. 
Majestic was laid up after the merger of Cunard and White Star in 1935 and then sold to 
the Royal Navy for use as a training ship and renamed Calendonia. When a fire broke 
out in 1939, she was deemed beyond repair and subsequently scrapped. Berengaria 
remained in service until 1938, when a series of fires caused Cunard-White Star to 
declare her unsafe for passenger service. She was sold for scrapping later that year.  
 Cunard's Aquitania survived service as an armed merchant cruiser, hospital 
ship, and troop transport in the Great War, returning to regular trans-Atlantic 
passenger runs in 1920. She remained in Cunard's express service through the 1920s 
and '30s with Mauretania and Berengaria. Cunard-White Star planned her retirement for 
1939 after the completion of the new Queen Elizabeth. World War Two changed that 
because of the dire need for large ships. Again called up as a trooper, she served the 
Allies transporting soldiers world-wide. She returned to an austerity refugee service in 
1948, finally being retired and scrapped in 1950 aged thirty-six, a ripe old age for a 
major liner. Indeed, Aquitania holds the title of the last and longest lived of the fourteen 
four-funneled liners of the Atlantic.  
 Olympic came out of the World War I relatively unscathed. After the loss of 
Britannic, Olympic soldiered on as a troop ship spending most of her time shuttling 
personnel between Halifax and Europe. On May 18, 1918, during a voyage from New 
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York, her lookouts spotted a surfaced U-boat. Captain Bertram Hays, commanding 
Olympic, recounted what happened: "There was only one thing to do, and that was to 
try to ram it, so I altered course to bring it ahead... ...and at 3:55 am hit him a swinging 
blow with our stem which put an end to his career."480 From the bridge, Capt. Hays saw 
the wreck of the U-boat pass along the side of Olympic already upended and sinking 
fast. Hays later received the Distinguished Service Order medal from King George V.481 
The sinking of U-103 by Olympic remains the only recorded ramming and destruction of 
a U-boat by a commercial liner during either world war. After the war, Olympic enjoyed 
refurbishment, conversion to oil fuel from coal, and continued as a primary member of 
the White Star fleet.  
 As a side note, Olympic's later career potentially lays low some modern 
theories on the structural weakness of the Olympic class in general. The U-boat sinking 
in 1918 started a string of collisions followed by one in the Hudson in 1927 and the 
ramming and sinking of the Nantucket Lightship in 1935. In the Hudson River incident, 
Olympic backed into the Furness Bermuda liner Ft. St. George, causing minimal damage 
to both ships.482 The incident with the Nantucket Lightship proved much more severe. 
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On May 15, 1934, Olympic sliced through the lightship in dense fog while approaching 
New York. Only three of the smaller ship's crewmen survived. Both Capt. Binks of 
Olympic and Capt. Braithwaite of the lightship later appeared on a newsreel discussing 
how fast it all seemed to occur. A crewman from the lightship said that before he knew 
what happened, he found himself in the water. Footage from the newsreel shows only 
minor damage to Olympic's paint above the waterline.483 
 What makes these incidents interesting relative to the Olympic class's 
structural integrity are recent articles, such as a 2008 piece that appeared in the New 
York Times suggesting that a possible reason Titanic sank was substandard or weak 
metal used throughout the hull.484 In 1934, Olympic was 23 years old. If weak materials 
or poor construction were to blame in the loss of the substantially younger Titanic, 
researchers now ask, shouldn't collisions in roughly the same area (with both the U-boat 
and the lightship) caused similar damage, especially in a ship that had sustained many 
years of wear and tear? While Titanic suffered damages beyond what she was designed 
to withstand, Olympic's career points to a well-constructed ship that served admirably 
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in the roles she was meant for, even under circumstances that caused stress to her 
design. This is only to be expected given the special relationship between White Star 
and Harland & Wolff. 
 Olympic continued on briefly after the formation of Cunard-White Star, when 
like so many of her former White Star fleet mates, Cunard-White Star declared her 
surplus in favor of keeping older Cunard ships. For a brief period she sat in "lay-up" 
next to another unwanted liner, Cunard's own Mauretania, which had just recently lost 
the Blue Riband to a sleek new German liner.485 Sir John Jarvis eventually bought her in 
September, 1935 expressly to relieve the jobless in the city of Jarrow, on the River Tyne 
in England.486 Over the next two years, grateful employees of Jarrow's scrapping 
industry disassembled Olympic until only the bottom of the hull remained, which then 
got towed away to Inverkiething, Scotland for final demolition on September 19, 1937.  
J. Bruce Ismay survived her by less than a month.  
  
§§§ 
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 The International Mercantile Marine was the first modern multinational 
corporation. Using the power of modern technology, J. P. Morgan attempted to build a 
combine that crossed not just oceans, but national boundaries. In today's world, the 
gigantic multinational is common. Titanic tech-based businesses like Google, Facebook, 
or financial entities like JPMorgan Chase are now both powerful as well as plentiful. 
Additionally they continue the tradition of informal empire by transmitting culture 
around the world often changing local culture in its own image. The pervasiveness of 
Disney, or the “House of Mouse,” is but one example.487 Yet to understand the roots and 
origins of today’s multinationals, as this dissertation has shown, we must look back 
more than 100 years, to one of the first companies that launched this trend: the 
International Merchant Marine. 
 Built from existing steamship companies with the goal of conquering the 
Atlantic for American industry, IMM was in many ways the prototype of today's 
multinational. While this dissertation focused on the economic, policy and business 
aspects of IMM, the combine continues to have lasting significance in every day life. 
The great liners of IMM transported thousands of immigrants from all over Europe, and 
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frequently, the world.488 While this is an important story, it’s one that could easily have 
double the size of A Tall Ship further complicating a narrative and analysis that is 
already challenging to follow. Rather than losing the importance of immigrant 
passengers in a maelstrom of business and government intrigue, A Tall Ship eschewed 
the issue, reserving it for future analysis. 
Understanding how IMM formed and ultimately failed shows the starting point 
in the evolution of the multinational corporation. Since IMM’s era, companies have 
learned to diversify to strengthen their economic foundations, reaching into the deepest 
foundations of world economics. IMM, however, failed to take these steps. Unable to 
gain a complete monopoly of the North Atlantic due to British and German resistance 
to Morgan, IMM never had the footing Morgan intended. This, followed by the 
formation of an American company in 1920 built from confiscated German liners, 
insured IMM’s eventual decline as an international corporation. Yet even though IMM 
was a failure in its intended role, it nevertheless represents one of the earliest examples 
of American informal empire in a global age. In the end, its history offers an important 
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lens for thinking about the United States and its rise as a world economic power in the 
early 20th century.   
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